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Floods have a devastating impact on society, costing thousands of lives and billions of 
dollars annually. Scientific projections indicate that flood risk is expected to increase in the 
future, driven by socio-economic growth and climate change. However, managing flood 
risk is a complex and costly process that requires decision-making with uncertain future 
conditions under the fear of making irreversible, inefficient choices. To support decision-
makers, flood risk assessments provide estimates of the monetary impacts of floods or 
the economic efficiency of adaptation investments, although they often lack spatial or 
temporal dynamics. In addition, homeowners also make decisions at an individual level, 
such as implementing building-level adaptation measures or purchasing flood insurance. 
Homeowners’ decisions often deviate from rationality, as it is difficult for individuals to 
estimate the probability and associated damage of a potential flood. This PhD disserta-
tion explores the extent to which we can incorporate the decision-making dynamics of 
governments, households, and flood insurance into a flood risk assessment at different 
spatial scales, and how this may improve flood risk management, applied to cases in the 
US. 
First, this dissertation explores how traditional cost-benefit approaches to evaluating 
the effectiveness of flood adaptation measures can be improved. Building codes for 
individual-level adaptation measures, such as elevating or flood-proofing buildings, are 
often evaluated and implemented on aggregated scales. For instance, traditionally only a 
single measure with a single implementation height is evaluated for an entire flood zone. 
In reality, a more spatially explicit approach could improve the financial and risk-reducing 
effectiveness of the measures by identifying differences in building styles and evaluating 
different types of measures for various implementation heights. Therefore, in Chapter 2, a 
micro-scale CBA at the building level is developed to obtain an optimal mix of adaptation 
measures per flood zone. The approach is applied to the 100-year coastal flood zones in 
Venice Beach, Los Angeles and in Naples, Long Beach, California, for current conditions 
and three different sea level rise scenarios (75 cm, 150 cm, and 200 cm by 2100). The results 
demonstrate that for the analyzed flood zones, an optimal mix of measures consists of 
35%–45% dry-floodproofing measures and 55%–65% building elevation. An optimal mix 
of measures, as derived from our micro-scale approach, yields up to 85% higher economic 
efficiency than the commonly applied, traditional, aggregated approach. 
Chapter 3 develops a comparative economic evaluation method to overcome the temporal 
inflexibility of traditional CBA approaches. The applied method couples a cost-benefit 
analysis with the concept of adaptation pathways (alternative sequences of measures), 
allowing for flexibility of adaptation strategies over time. The CBA coupled with adaptation 
pathways is compared with a traditional scenario-based CBA and a CBA that evaluates the 
effectiveness of delaying adaptation investments. The approach is applied to a case study 
of coastal Los Angeles County, California under current conditions and three sea level rise 
scenarios (75 cm, 150 cm, and 200 cm by 2100). Results show that following adaptation 
pathways can yield a higher economic efficiency (up to 10%) than static adaptation 
strategy planning. However, certain adaptation investments over time can significantly 
decrease economic efficiency when transiting from one strategy to another, defined as 
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investment tipping points. Overall, adaptation pathways demonstrate the potential for a 
more flexible and realistic alternative than the traditional approach. 
While Chapters 2 and 3 primarily concern governmental decision-making regarding flood 
adaptation strategies or zoning practices, Chapters 4 and 5 focus on integrating an agent-
based decision model within a flood risk assessment framework, including individual 
household decisions and allowing for the evaluation of insurance market reforms. Chapter 
4 evaluates the effectiveness of National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) reforms and an 
affordable loan structure to fund building-level adaptation measures in Jamaica Bay, New 
York for coastal flood risk. Households are simulated in an agent-based modeling environ-
ment. The model is benchmarked with empirical data to ground the behavioral rules of the 
household agents in economic theories. Results show that the introduction of risk-based 
premiums can improve penetration rates and the affordability of insurance compared to 
the baseline NFIP scenario in Jamaica Bay. A premium discount for building-level adapta-
tion incentivizes more homeowners to invest in such measures, but it does not have a 
significant impact on the affordability of risk-reducing measures or insurance policies. An 
affordable loan structure (i.e., low interest rate and longer time span) for homeowners to 
finance building-level adaptation improves the uptake and affordability and amplifies the 
effect of a premium discount. The combination of cheap loans and risk-based premiums 
with a discount can double implementation of risk-reducing measures for Jamaica Bay up 
to 17% in 2080.
Chapter 5 expands upon the model used in Chapter 4 through the addition of govern-
mental decisions on large-scale adaptation, adding fluvial flood risks and by applying it 
to the conterminous US. The emphasis is on the NFIP’s future resilience to climate change 
and socio-economic drivers that are expected to increase risk over time. The increased 
geographical scale, while incorporating local-scale decision dynamics, allows for a 
comprehensive evaluation of the effects of policy changes. The results show that insurance 
reforms (i.e., a transition to risk-based premiums) are necessary to climate-proof the NFIP. 
For example, the transition to risk-based premiums would increase uptake of risk-reducing 
measures from 5.5% to 9.2%, preventing approximately $9 billion in cumulative flood 
damages over 2020 to 2050, expressed as present values. Moreover, Chapter 5 highlights 
the influence of governmental decisions (reactive or proactive) on the performance of 
the NFIP and flood risk in general. Combining the proposed NFIP reforms with proactive 
governmental adaptation investments will result in the most economically desirable 
scenario of saving $24 billion in total societal costs over 2020–2050, again expressed as 
present values. 
Overall, this dissertation demonstrates how traditional flood risk assessments and 
economic appraisal methods can be improved spatially and temporally by integrating 
the dynamic adaptive behavior of key agents into an agent-based model. The developed 
methods and models can aid in better informing decision-makers, and even households, 
on the impacts of their choices for adaptation investments. 
The dissertation concludes by providing recommendations and future research avenues. 
XIII
First, sufficient empirical data on adaptation decision-making in a flood risk context is 
lacking. Even though this dissertation makes a valuable contribution of applying empirical 
data to ground behavioral rules in economic theories, there is still a systematic lack of 
long-term empirical data to validate and calibrate behavioral decision models. Future 
research focusing on acquiring empirical data suitable for these models will be a major 
improvement. Second, human behavior is complex, and the models developed and used 
in this dissertation are simplified concepts of reality. Therefore, additional processes or 
behavior types, such as physical relocation of agents or other financial incentives (e.g., 
subsidies and tax rebates), should be incorporated. Third, while the results in this disser-
tation are tailored to U.S. cases, applicability to other areas and regions may provide new 
insights, such as the effectiveness of multilateral adaptation aid. Last, a fully integrated 
hydro-dynamic model, in which agent decisions directly impact the hydrological cycle, 
would improve the accuracy of adaptation decisions. 
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Despite 2019 being a relatively uneventful year in terms of natural hazard events, this still 
accounted for a total of $150 billion in overall losses worldwide (Löw, Rauch, & Bove, 2020). 
The ten-year average losses from natural hazards is around $187 billion globally, of which 
45% as a result of floods, storms and landslides (Löw et al., 2020). Over the last decade, 
the US, the main focus of this dissertation, has experienced 18 major flood events and 15 
tropical cyclones that have caused at least more than a billion in damages per event (NOAA 
National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI), 2020). Examples are Hurricane 
Harvey with $131.3 billion, Hurricane Maria with $94.5 billion and Hurricane Sandy with 
$74.8 billion, but also fluvial flood events such as the Louisiana flooding in 2016 with $11 
billion in losses (NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI), 2020). 
The economic impact of flood events has been increasing over the past decades, mainly 
driven by socio-economic development in flood prone areas (Aerts & Botzen, 2011a; 
Jongman et al., 2014). US flood plains are an illustrative example where cities have been built 
close to the coast, rivers or other waterbodies for strategic advantages and food security, 
but consequently leave them more easily exposed to floods (Burby, 2001). Future flood risk 
is expected to increase even further by the continuation of socio-economic growth and 
exacerbated by the effects of climate change, such as sea level rise and a higher frequency 
of extreme storms (Hallegatte, Green, Nicholls, & Corfee-Morlot, 2013a; Jongman, Ward, 
& Aerts, 2012). Taherkhani et al. (2020) show that the odds of extreme flooding double 
approximately every 5 years into the future. As a result, a present-day 50-year extreme 
water level (with a 2% annual chance of occurring) is likely to occur annually before 2050 in 
roughly 70% of the coastal regions in the US (Taherkhani et al., 2020). 
Estimates of the magnitude of climate change effects on natural hazard losses are still 
uncertain. For example, global future sea level rise projections for the year 2100 range 
from 0.4 m to 2.5 m or even higher (DeConto & Pollard, 2016; Hansen et al., 2016; Le Bars, 
Drijfhout, & de Vries, 2017; Sweet et al., 2017), depending on assumptions about thermal 
expansion, melt of glaciers, Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets, and future greenhouse gas 
emissions. The continuation of urbanization and economic growth in flood-prone regions, 
and the effects of climate change and future uncertainty possess enormous societal 
challenges and will require ambitious adaptation management to mitigate future flood 
losses (Oppenheim et al., 2019). 
1.2 Managing floods
Flood risk management is the ongoing comprehensive process of identifying, assessing 
and reducing societal flood risk (Jochen Schanze, 2006; OECD, 2015). Here, flood risk is 
defined as the production of the flood hazard, the exposure of assets and people and 
their vulnerability (Kron, 2005; Smith & Petley, 2009). A flood hazard event is defined as the 
physical process of flood (flood extent, depth, velocity) and its probability. A flood event 
is categorized as a hazard if it impacts the human system (e.g., damage to properties, loss 
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of life or economic disruptions). Exposure is defined as the assets at risk, such as people, 
properties, or other economic activities. Lastly, vulnerability is the degree to which the 
exposed elements are susceptible to, or unable to cope with, flood events. Managing 
floods is a challenging and often costly process. It involves active stakeholder participation, 
split responsibilities between different levels of governmental bodies (e.g., local, region, 
national or even cross-boundary), and decision making with uncertain future conditions 
such as climate change (Smith & Petley, 2009). International efforts have been made to 
support countries or regions by establishing frameworks to guide disaster risk reduction 
(DRR) policies. An example is the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, which 
supports a more systematic disaster-risk-informed approach (UNISDR, 2015).  
1.2.1 Flood Adaptation
Flood adaptation are the measures to reduce the vulnerability of the exposed assets, and 
thereby reducing flood risk (IPCC, 2012). On a regional scale a reduction in flood risk can 
be achieved by structural measures such as dikes, levees or storm-surge barriers (Aerts, 
Botzen, de Moel, & Bowman, 2013). Nature-based solutions are increasingly implemented, 
whereby natural systems, such as mangroves or coral reefs, are utilized to reduce flood 
risk but also yield external benefits such as increasing biodiversity or recreational values 
(Cohen-Shacham, Walters, Janzen, & Maginnis, 2016). While structural and nature-based 
adaptation measures are highly effective in reducing risk, the large-scale engineering 
projects are often difficult to implement as they require large upfront investments and 
policy makers face the risk of making irreversible, inefficient economic choices (Aerts et 
al., 2014b). As a result, no action is taken until the next disaster strikes (Aerts, Botzen, et al., 
2018). 
On a local scale, households can reduce flood risk by implementing building-level 
adaptation measures. Examples are dry-floodproofing to prevent water from entering the 
property, wet-floodproofing allows water to enter the property but minimize damage, 
and elevation to raise the property completely to prevent flooding (de Moel, van Vliet, & 
Aerts, 2013; Zarekarizi, Srikrishnan, & Keller, 2020). The implementation of individual-level 
adaptation measures are relatively cheap and can be enforced by building codes, but 
the responsibility and the costs are often placed on individuals (Lucas & Booth, 2020). If 
individual DRR is not enforced by policy regulations but seen as a voluntary action, house-
holds have to make their own estimates on their risk of being flooded and the associated 
benefits of investing. However, research shows that individuals often overestimate the 
probability of flood events but underestimate the resulting damage (Barberis, 2013; 
Botzen, Kunreuther, & Michel-Kerjan, 2015). Since limiting these perceived consequences 
are often an important determinant of decisions to implement DRR measures, only a small 
share of individuals considers the voluntary implementation of DRR measures desirable 




Flood insurance is a complementary option to flood protection or individual DRR, as it aims 
to cover the residual flood risk after adaptation measures have been implemented (OECD, 
2016; Wolfrom & Yokoi-Arai, 2016). Households pay an annual premium in exchange for the 
coverage of possible losses on their property. Subsequently, in case of a flood event the 
insurer will pay-out the endured damages up to the covered amount. In theory, premiums 
should be actuarial fair, meaning they reflect the objective risk of that property, and will 
result in constant welfare over time (Tresch, 2008). However, in practice, premiums are often 
higher because of loading factors, such as operating expenses, taxes or reserve funds. In 
addition, it is common practice to include a deductible in flood insurance policies, whereby 
the policyholders has to pay a lump-sum amount or a percentage of the total damage in 
case of an event. In other cases, premiums are (cross-) subsidized, and are lower than if they 
would be based on the objective risk. In such cases, households are incentivized to stay 
or even move to flood prone areas, increasing exposure (Aerts & Botzen, 2011b).  Overall, 
flood risk insurance allows individuals to reduce the volatility in their welfare (Tresch, 2008). 
An additional benefit is that insurance pay-outs can significantly improve (the speed of 
the-) recovery after an event, decreasing long-lasting and indirect impacts (Koks, 2016). 
Flood insurance is complementary to adaptation to cover residual risk, but can also 
incentivize DRR by offering a premium discount to households who have implemented 
risk reducing measures, such as elevation or dry-floodproofing (Kunreuther, 2015). The 
discount should reflect the reduction of risk of the implemented measures to remain 
close to the objective level of risk (i.e., actuarial fair). By doing so households receive a 
financial incentive that objectifies their subjective estimate of the probabilities and 
expected damages of flood events (Hudson, Botzen, Feyen, & Aerts, 2016). In practice this 
has proven to be difficult. Hudson et al. (2019) show that European natural hazard insurers 
are scoring very low in incentivizing risk reduction or risk signaling (Hudson, de Ruig, et al., 
2019). Setting up systems to actively monitor the implementation of DRR measures and 
the associated discounts is costly, limiting the benefits for insurers. An additional barrier 
is that many natural disaster premiums are not risk based in the first place and there is a 
lack of transparency over which share of the premium is covering risk or loading factors 
(Hudson, de Ruig, et al., 2019). Poor execution of premium discounts could even incorrectly 
incentive households to move to high-risk flood plains. 
1.2.3 The National Flood Insurance Program
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is the largest flood insurance program in 
the world with over 5 million policies in force and covering $1.3 trillion in assets by 2019 
(Horn & Webel, 2019). The program was created in 1968 to offer affordable insurance to US 
households and businesses, and to mitigate and reduce flood risk. However, due to the 
extreme hurricane seasons and extensive flooding events over the last two decades, the 
NFIP would have hit their borrowing limit of $30.4 billion to pay for the claims of hurricanes 
Harvey, Irma and Maria (The Congressional Budget Office, 2017). Therefore, the congress 
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canceled $16 billion and the current NFIP debt is estimated at $20.5 billion by 2017 (The 
Congressional Budget Office, 2017). In addition, the program has been criticized for incen-
tivizing policyholders to stay in flood-prone areas, making inaccurate risk assessments, 
setting premiums that do not reflect risk, and having a lack of incentives to implement DRR 
(Dixon & Clancy, 2006; Michel-Kerjan & Kousky, 2009). To overcome some of these issues, 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has announced the Risk Rating 2.0 
program, to be released in 2021, to steer the NFIP towards risk-based premiums (FEMA, 
2019b). 
1.3 Risk assessments and economic appraisal
Before flood management decisions on flood adaptation or insurance are made, it is 
important to inform decision makers about the present and (uncertain) future flood risks, 
and on how changing policies or strategies affect risk (IPCC, 2014; OECD, 2015). A flood risk 
assessment can play a role in providing spatial risk projections and determining the effec-
tiveness of adaptation measures or flood risk transfer options (Hallegatte, Shah, Lempert, 
Brown, & Gill, 2012; Winsemius, van Beek, Jongman, Ward, & Bouwman, 2013). By applying 
so-called depth-damage curves that represent the relationship between the inundation 
depth and the share of damage a specific property type on average will endure during 
a flood event, monetary impacts are assessed for a set of flood hazards with different 
probabilities of occurrence (de Moel & Aerts, 2011). The benefits (i.e., avoided losses) of 
adaptation measures can be estimated in such an analysis assuming different projections 
of flood hazard events and exposed assets (Aerts et al., 2014a). 
Cost-benefit analyses (CBAs) are one of the most commonly used economic appraisal 
methods in order to support decision makers with adaptation investment decisions (Aerts 
et al., 2014b; Hallegatte, 2006; Hallegatte et al., 2012; van der Pol, van Ierland, & Gabbert, 
2017). The estimated benefits from the flood risk management measures are weighted 
against their investment and maintenance costs. The benefits as avoided losses estimated 
by flood risk assessments and maintenance costs over time are discounted to the present 
value over the expected lifespan of the measures (Tresch, 2008). Consequently, when the 
present value of benefits exceed the present value of costs, the adaptation strategy is 
deemed economically efficient.
1.4 Accounting for uncertainty
While risk assessments in combination with CBAs have proven to be effective in evalu-
ating flood risk adaptation (Hallegatte et al., 2012), they are susceptible to different types 
of uncertainty (Dittrich, Wreford, & Moran, 2016; Lempert, 2014). De Moel & Aerts (2011) 
estimate the different levels of uncertainty introduced in the flood risk assessment. To 
present, most of these uncertainties are included in a robustness-test or extensive sensi-
tivity analysis (e.g., Aerts et al., 2014a; Aubé, Hébert, Wilson, Trenholm, & Patriquin, 2016; de 
Bruin, Goosen, van Ierland, & Groeneveld, 2014). However, a gap in the current literature 
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is the influence of spatial scales in individual DRR measures or building code strategies. 
Building code strategies are often evaluated on an aggregated level, focusing on a flood 
zone and evaluating a single type of measures for a single implementation height. For 
instance, only 1 m of dry-floodproofing of buildings is evaluated for an entire 100-year 
flood zone, instead of also considering alternative heights or measure types. Economic 
inefficiency can arise from this aggregated approach, leading to undesirable building 
codes and even misinform homeowners on the economic desirability of different types of 
DRR measures they are able to implement. 
Besides their spatial implications, CBAs are also limited in their flexibility or capacity to 
deal with future uncertainty. To address some level of uncertainty, many studies apply a 
scenario-based approach, which assesses (future-) risk while assuming different climate- 
and socio-economic projections (Aerts et al., 2014a; R. Mechler, 2016; Ward et al., 2017). 
While such an approach offers insights into which adaptation strategies are economically 
desirable in certain flood risk scenarios, they are bound to certain future projections with 
a high degree of uncertainty (Hunt & Watkiss, 2011a; Kunreuther et al., 2014). In addition, 
most studies assume a stationary adaptation strategy over time, with lifespans of 50 to 
100 years. It is likely that through learning about the effects of climate change and new 
advances in adaptation technologies, stationary strategies will become quickly outdated 
or suboptimal. Haasnoot et al. (2013), have developed the concept of adaptation pathways, 
which evaluates until which ‘adaptation tipping point’ an adaptation strategy is viable. At 
such a tipping point, sea level rise has reach a threshold and it is necessary to “shift gears” 
and transfer from one strategy to another (Haasnoot, 2013). Preparing for future transitions 
allows to cope with uncertainty over time and potentially spread adaptation costs over 
time . The approach has been predominantly applied in conceptual adaptation studies, 
but is gaining more traction in economic appraisal studies. For instance, Lawrence, Bell, & 
Stroombergen (2019) demonstrate the practical application of complementing multi-cri-
teria decision analysis with an adaptation pathway approach for a case of New Zealand.
Other economic appraisal methods have been developed to specifically address future 
uncertainty, such as real option analysis (ROA), robust decision making (RDM), and iterative 
risk management (IRM). ROA originates from corporate finance, and aims to value the flexi-
bility of expanding, shrinking, delaying or terminating investments in physical assets (Kind, 
Baayen, & Botzen, 2018). By doing so, the value of investing now against investing later are 
jointly determined and optimized whilst considering uncertainties. More recently, appli-
cations of ROA in the field of flood risk assessments are increasing (Buurman & Babovic, 
2016; Hino & Hall, 2017; Kind et al., 2018). However, in reality ROA is often constrained by 
data requirements or probabilistic uncertainty parameters. Moreover, where CBAs strive 
to clearly communicate the outcomes with policy makers, the complexity of ROAs are 
difficult to understand, even for experts (Kind et al., 2018). 
RDM assesses proposed adaptation options against a wide range of plausible futures 
(Lempert & Groves, 2010; Sriver, Lempert, Wikman-Svahn, & Keller, 2018). By visualizing and 
statistical processing of the large database of model outcomes, it is possible to identify 
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the futures where adaptation options will be successful or fail to reach their goal. While 
RDM shows large potential, standalone or even as complement to adaptation pathways 
(Kwakkel, Haasnoot, & Walker, 2016), it requires much computational power and quantita-
tive probabilistic data (Lempert, 2019). 
IRM is a framework that iteratively cycles through the different steps of identification, 
quantification and assessment of risk, to adjust or change adaptation management strat-
egies when necessary (Mochizuki et al., 2015; Simpson et al., 2016). Irreversible decisions 
are postponed to acquire new knowledge or technologies over time and potentially 
changing the adaptation strategy or policy. Again, this framework lends itself to support 
the adaptation pathway approach. In practice however, the identification of suitable risk 
thresholds or the practical application remains unclear (Mochizuki et al., 2015). 
The aforementioned methods are in an early development phase, are limited by data or 
computation power, or are too difficult to apply in a policy context. Further research is 
needed on economic appraisal methods that can address future uncertainties, such as 
climate change, in an understandable and applicable fashion. 
It should also be noted that all these techniques primarily focus on the evaluation or assess-
ment of adaptation measures or strategies, and often do not include flood insurance. As 
mentioned before, flood insurance can provide a vital role in incentivizing DRR measures 
for households, discourage further flood-plain development through risk-based pricing or 
even decide risk in an area is no longer insurable to force governments to implement flood 
protection (Hudson, de Ruig, et al., 2019; OECD, 2016). The latter is observed in the UK, 
where insurers only continued to offer flood insurance under the condition that land-use 
planning and flood protection improved (Crichton, 2005). Hudson et al. (2019) conducted 
a comprehensive study on flood insurance reforms for European markets, integrating the 
additional incentives of DRR measures through a premium discount (Hudson, Botzen, & 
Aerts, 2019). A flood risk assessment was combined with a Multicriteria analysis (MCA) to 
evaluate the effectiveness of stylized insurance market structures. Studies have contrib-
uted to assess and evaluate the national flood insurance program (NFIP) of the US, often 
through statistical approaches (e.g., Browne & Hoyt, 2000; Kousky & Kunreuther, 2014; 
Miller, Dixon, & Clancy, 2019; The Congressional Budget Office, 2017). However, most of 
these studies either focus on solely the insurance market or a combination of the insurance 
market with individual DRR. 
1.5 Human behavior dynamics and flood risk
Even when future uncertainty is properly accounted for in flood risk assessments or 
economic appraisal studies, a fundamental flaw in these frameworks and methods is the 
lack of dynamic, adaptive decisions and the interplay between the physical and social 
system (Palmer & Smith, 2014). For example, governments, households and flood insur-
ance each make DRR choices that can significantly change exposure or vulnerability over 
time. For example, a household moving into a floodplain or implementing DRR measures 
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will thus have an impact on the physical hydrological system. And the other way around, 
increasing flood risk or one major flood event with huge impact will raise the risk percep-
tion of households, and therefore trigger the implementation of adaptation measures 
(Botzen et al., 2015; Thistlethwaite, Henstra, Brown, & Scott, 2018). 
A better understanding of the influence of certain policies on risk and how the adaptive 
behavior of humans play a role will improve decision making (Aerts, Botzen, et al., 2018; 
Palmer & Smith, 2014). For example, Haer et al. (2019) show that the effectiveness of 
individual DRR partly depends on governmental flood protection investments. If a govern-
ment is proactively investing in flood protection, further investments in individual DRR can 
lead to societal inefficiencies (Haer et al., 2019). Another example in context of the NFIP is 
the implementation of the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, to move 
towards unsubsidized risk-reflecting premiums (Kousky & Kunreuther, 2014). Many insur-
ance policies became unaffordable, resulting in a decrease in penetration rates. Two years 
later, the Homeowners Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 reverted the changes (The 
Congressional Budget Office, 2017). A better understanding of the behavioral dynamics 
and interactions between the physical and social system will lead to more accurate and 
efficient flood risk management. 
Socio-hydrology is an emerging field with an interdisciplinary focus on the aforemen-
tioned dynamic interactions and feedbacks between the hydrological- and social systems 
(Blair & Buytaert, 2016; Di Baldassarre, Viglione, et al., 2013; Sivapalan, Savenije, & Blöschl, 
2012). Efforts have been made to conceptualize dynamics and feedbacks and apply these 
concepts to stylized models. So far, two main types of coupled human-flood models 
can be distinguished: system dynamic models and agent-based models (ABMs). System 
dynamic models using coupled non-linear differential equations to represent lumped 
system behavior (i.e., one variable such as flood awareness is an aggregated, representa-
tive value for the entire system) (Barendrecht, Viglione, & Blöschl, 2017). While many of the 
system dynamic models are still conceptual or stylized, the potential is seen in recent liter-
ature on the dynamic interactions of floods, human experience, memory, preparedness or 
adaptation investments (e.g., Albertini, Mazzoleni, Totaro, Iacobellis, & Di Baldassarre, 2020; 
Barendrecht et al., 2019; Di Baldassarre, Viglione, et al., 2013). 
The focus of ABMs is on different types of individual agents (e.g., households) with each 
their set of behavioral rules to allow them to interact with each other and their environment 
(Bonabeau, 2002; Liu et al., 2012; Srbljinovic & Škunca, 2003). Agents are heterogeneous 
and dynamic, allowing them to simultaneously interact while influencing the system as 
a whole. This bottom-up approach allows ABMs to address emergences, the concept of 
system-wide processes and patterns that arise from the interaction of individual agents 
with themselves, each other and their environment (Railsback & Grimm, 2012). Whereas 
the behavioral rules of agents can be simplistic in nature, the complexity of interaction and 
unpredictable behavior between agents as an outcome of the simulations is the added 




Recent literature demonstrates the applicability of ABMs for flood risk related topics. For 
instance, Filatova (2015) and de Koning et al. (2019) use a ABMs to investigate the impact 
of floods on the housing market and urban land management. The ABMs developed by 
Dawson et al. (2011), O’Shea et al. (2020) and Alonso et al. (2020) show the application of 
in-event dynamics and the dynamic interactions during an evacuation phase of a flood. 
Dubbelboer et al. (2017) developed an ABM on the interactions between flood protection 
investments and flood insurance under a changing climate, for a case in Camden, UK. Tonn 
and Guikema (2018), Tonn et al. (2019), and Han & Peng (2019) are examples of studies that 
integrated household-level decision making in DRR decisions or insurance decisions, for 
case studies in Fargo, North Dakota, and Miami-Dade County, Florida. The model developed 
by Haer et al. (2019 & 2020) is most closely related to the goals of this dissertation. With a 
focus on the EU, the model simulates different adaptation policies, stylized flood insurance 
markets and household DRR decisions. The decision model is based on economic theory 
coupled with a fluvial flood risk model.
Similar to system dynamic models, AMBs in the field of flood risk management are often 
stylized versions of reality or limited to a specific case study area. In addition, a major 
challenge is to find suitable data that can be used in the validation or benchmarking of 
the behavior rules of the models (Aerts, Botzen, et al., 2018; Crooks, Castle, & Batty, 2008). 
This dissertation will further explore the opportunities to incorporate human dynamics 
within a comprehensive flood risk framework, with a particular focus on flood insurance. 
Specifically, the world’s largest flood insurance program, the NFIP, is simulated in relation 
to government and household decisions on a local and continental scale for coastal and 
fluvial flood risks under changing climate and socio-economic conditions. Moreover, the 
model is benchmarked with empirical data.
1.6 Goal and research questions
The main goal of this dissertation is to explore to what extent we can incorporate decision-
making dynamics of governments, households, and flood insurance within a flood risk 
assessment at different spatial scales, and how this may improve flood risk management. 
The research is applied to cases in the US. To achieve this goal, this dissertation follows five 
research questions.  
1. To what extent are building code strategies able to cope with increasing risks 
from climate change, and how is economic desirability dependent on the spatial 
scale of the analysis? (Chapter 2)
2. How can the economic evaluation of adaptation strategies include temporal 
uncertainties such as climate change to improve the implementation timing of 
strategies or pathways? (Chapter 3)
3. How can flood insurance and the way it incentivizes household adaptation 
decisions be included in a flood risk assessment framework that estimates future 




4. How can a large flood insurance market, such as the National Flood Insurance 
Market, be reformed to improve efficiency and equity, considering climate change 
effects? (Chapters 4 and 5)
5. To what extent are flood insurance and large-scale flood protection complemen-
tary? (Chapter 5)
1.7 Outline of the dissertation
Figure 1.1 shows an overview of the different chapters, their case study area and moreover 
the emphasis of the chapter on either individual DRR, large-scale flood protection by 
governments or flood insurance. In greater detail, the chapters address the following:
First, Chapters 2 and 3 aim to demonstrate conventional flood risk assessments, but also 
to improve the CBA applications in view of uncertain developments of risk under climate 
change. Chapter 2 assesses and optimizes the economic efficiency of household-level 
DRR. Chapter 3 builds upon the concept of adaptation pathways, and aims to economi-
cally evaluate transitions from one adaptation strategy to another. First a conventional risk 
assessment and CBA is conducted for the proposed adaptation strategies. Subsequently, 
the benefits of delaying investments is explored after which the pathways are economi-
cally evaluated. The methodological framework is applied to a case study of Los Angeles 
County, CA. 
Local scale
Santa Monica and Naples, CA
Chapter 2
Regional scale






United States of America
Chapter 5
- Individual disaster risk reduction
Legend
- Large-scale ood protection
- Flood insurance
Figure 1.1 | Mapped outline of the dissertation which shows the geographical focus of each chap-
ter and in dark (white) colored symbols the included (excluded) risk management strategies.
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In order to include flood insurance and behavioral dynamics, Chapter 4 applies a coupled 
human-flood agent-based model to a case study of the NFIP in Jamaica Bay, NY. Several 
NFIP reforms are evaluated with a focus on the interactions between households DRR and 
flood insurance affordability and incentives. A benchmark based on empirical data is used 
to ground our behavioral rules in economic theories. 
Chapter 5 will demonstrate a comprehensive, continental ABM, applied to the conter-
minous US which includes governmental adaptation policies, and household choices in 
DRR and flood insurance in a risk assessment framework. This chapter specifically focusses 




Rising waves of indecision
How financial incentives can support flood risk management
Chapter 2 
A micro-scale cost-benefit analysis of building-
level flood risk adaptation measures in Los 
Angeles
This chapter is based on: de Ruig, L. T., Haer, T., de Moel, H., Botzen, W. J. W., & Aerts, J. C. J. H. (2020). 
A micro-scale cost-benefit analysis of building-level flood risk adaptation measures in Los Angeles. 
Water Resources and Economics, 32, 1–14.
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of flood risk adaptation strategies offers policymakers insight 
into economically optimal strategies for adapting to sea level rise. However, building-level 
adaptation measures such as floodproofing or building elevation are often evaluated at 
aggregated spatial scales, which may result in sub-optimal investment decisions. In this 
paper, we develop a flood risk model and combine it with a micro-scale CBA at the building 
level to obtain an optimal mix of adaptation measures per area. We apply this approach 
to Venice Beach in Los Angeles and Naples in Long Beach. We subsequently compare our 
results with the conventional, spatially aggregated area-based CBA approach. Our findings 
show that a mix of 35%-45% dry-floodproofing measures and 55%-65% building elevation 
measures is optimal. Elevation works best in areas with high inundation depths, while 
dry-floodproofing is preferable in areas with shallow inundation depths. The optimal mix 
of measures derived from our micro-scale approach results in an economic efficiency up to 
85% higher than that yielded by the commonly applied spatially aggregated approach. We 
therefore recommend that economic evaluations of building-level adaptation measures 
be conducted at the smallest possible scale, or that CBAs be performed on disaggregated 





Floods are devastating natural disasters, costing thousands of lives in 2017 alone (Munich 
RE, 2018; Vitousek, Barnard, Fletcher, et al., 2017). Population and economic growth have 
been major drivers of flood risk over time, and they are expected to raise future exposure 
to flooding (Laurens M. Bouwer & Bouwer, 2011). In addition, climate change and sea level 
rise may further increase the frequency and severity of flood hazards (IPCC, 2014) and, 
therefore, further increase future flood risk. Low-lying cities in particular are concentrated 
areas of economic activity, population, and wealth, which makes them vulnerable to the 
effects of climate change. Hallegatte et al., (2011) and others (e.g., Balica, Wright, & van der 
Meulen, 2012; Hunt & Watkiss, 2011) show the necessity of city- and local-scale flood risk 
assessments and the development of adaptation policies to cope with local specificities. 
A number of strategies are available to limit flood risk, including structural adaptation 
measures, nature-based solutions or building-level adaptation measures (Aerts, 2018; Aerts, 
Barnard, Botzen, Grifman, Hart, De Moel, et al., 2018; Aerts, Botzen, et al., 2013; UNISDR, 2015). 
Structural adaptation measures and nature-based solutions are difficult to implement in 
certain cases because they often require large upfront investments and their long-term 
benefits are uncertain, meaning that decision makers face the risk of making irreversible, 
inefficient economic choices (Aerts et al., 2014b). Furthermore, especially in urban areas or 
cities, space is limited and the need to account for diverse stakeholders’ interests can make 
adaptation planning highly complex (Aerts et al., 2018; Aerts et al., 2014b; Waylen, Holstead, 
Colley, & Hopkins, 2018). Alternatively, building-level adaptation measures usually require 
less space and the involvement of fewer actors. These measures may be divided into 
three main types: (1) elevation of the building to prevent flooding, (2) dry-floodproofing 
to prevent flood water from entering the building, and (3) wet-floodproofing to allow 
water to enter the building but minimizing damage (e.g., using concrete floors instead 
of carpets). Besides often being relatively cheap, building-level adaptation measures can 
be enforced by municipalities or flood insurance, by specifying a minimum requirement 
for floodproofing structures in flood zones (Aerts et al., 2018). In addition, building-level 
adaptation can be incentivized through a premium discount for flood insurance (Hudson, 
de Ruig, et al., 2019; Paudel, Botzen, & Aerts, 2012). Hence, building-level adaptation is not 
necessarily an individualistic choice, but is often designed, implemented and enforced on 
a community level. Nevertheless, homeowners can go beyond these minimum require-
ments, for example, by floodproofing their building up to a higher than required height.
Most studies that evaluate the costs and benefits of flood risk adaptation measures for 
individual buildings (e.g., Aerts et al., 2014a; de Moel et al., 2013; Poussin, Bubeck, Aerts, & 
Ward, 2012) assess the aggregated economic efficiency of applying a single adaptation 
measure to all buildings in a large area with a particular flood inundation depth; for 
example, 1 m elevation is applied to all buildings in a 100-year flood zone. However, such 
an approach can result in economic inefficiencies: if, say, a building in a 100-year flood 
zone is expected to flood up to 10 cm (~0.3ft), it is unlikely that the benefits of adaptation 
will outweigh related investment costs for that particular building. Conversely, the same 
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100-year flood zone could include buildings for which the chosen adaptation measure 
does not offer sufficient protection. In particular, higher elevation could be more econom-
ically efficient for certain buildings because of higher expected inundation depths during 
a flood. Such differences cannot be identified through commonly applied cost-benefit 
analyses (CBA) conducted on aggregated spatial scales, which can result in sub-optimal 
investment decisions on an individual-building scale. Aggregated scale CBA approaches 
could discourage policymakers from implementing and enforcing individually focused 
adaptation measures by suggesting that these measures are inefficient at the aggregate 
level, even if they are efficient for particular buildings. 
In this chapter, we aim to assess the effects of spatial scales when assessing the economic 
efficiency of building-level adaptation. We first assess optimal adaptation measures on 
an individual-building level by developing a flood risk model combined with a so-called 
micro-scale CBA. We then compare the economic efficiency yielded by the micro-scale 
CBA with that obtained through a conventional area-based approach, in which a single 
measure is evaluated for a larger area, or a community scale. We illustrate our method with 
a case study of Venice Beach (Los Angeles, CA) and Naples (Long Beach, CA), which are 
both vulnerable to coastal flooding and sea level rise.
2.2 Methods
Figure 2.1 illustrates our overall methodological approach that is summarized here and 
explained in more detail in the following subsections. The costs and benefits of adaptation 
measures were assessed in order to evaluate the desirability of these measures. Flood risk 
was estimated in terms of expected annual damage (EAD, section 2.2.1, similar to Aerts, 
Lin, Botzen, Emanuel, & de Moel, 2013; de Moel et al., 2013; Ward et al., 2017), which can be 
defined as the product of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability. 
Exposure was considered in terms of the value of individual buildings (i.e., single-family 
home, apartment, shop, school, etc.) at risk of flooding. The hazard was represented 
through inundation maps showing inundation extents and depths for flood events in four 
climate scenarios: the current climate and climates with sea level rises of 75 cm, 150 cm, 
and 200 cm (2.5ft, 4.9ft and 6.7ft). Lastly, vulnerability was defined as the susceptibility to 
damage of different building types based on the relationship between inundation depth 
and building value, expressed in the form of depth-damage curves. Individually focused 
adaptation measures change the vulnerability of individual buildings, and this change was 
used to calculate the reduction in EAD, in other words, the expected annual benefit yielded 
by the adaptation measure. In terms of adaptation costs, Aerts et al. (2018) and Aerts (2018) 
provide average figures per building type in Los Angeles County (also see Table 2.1). Using 
an individual building data set for LA County, the average adaptation costs were converted 
to costs per square meter. Next, adaptation costs per unique building were determined 
using unit costs per square meter.
Subsequently, a micro-scale CBA was conducted to calculate the economic efficiency of 
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each adaptation measure for each individual building in the 100-year flood zone, expressed 
as the net present value (NPV, section 2.2). The NPV is the sum of discounted costs and 
discounted benefits over an adaptation measure’s lifetime. The measure with the highest 
NPV represents the economically optimal measure for a specific building. 
 
2.2.1 Flood risk model
The USGS Coastal Storm Modeling System (CoSMoS 3.0) (Barnard et al., 2014; Erikson et al., 
2018; O’Neill et al., 2018; USGS, 2015) has produced flood hazard maps of flood extent and 
depth for flood events with 20- and 100-year recurrence intervals, which we used for our 
study (2x2 m resolution). These flood hazard maps are available for the current climate 
and the three sea level rise scenarios (75 cm, 150 cm, and 200 cm by 2100), in line with the 
scenarios recommended by the California Ocean Protection Council Science Advisory team 
(Griggs et al., 2017). While there is still uncertainty regarding the pace of future sea level rise, 
recent research shows that current projections might be underestimated (Hansen et al., 
2016). Griggs et al. (2017) show that a rise of more than 2m (6.6ft) in sea levels is not unlikely 
for the Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5. CoSMoS couples atmospheric and 
hydrodynamic computer models to estimate flood hazard potential from coastal storms, 
sea level rise, and shoreline change (Barnard et al., 2014). It computes total water levels until 
2100 on a regional scale using winds, sea-level pressures, and sea surface temperatures 
derived from global climate models (Barnard et al., 2014). CosMoS dynamically downscales 
regional storm conditions by using a set of nested models (DelftRD-WAVE and DelftRD-
FLOW (Barnard et al., 2014)).
Exposure data was obtained from the Los Angeles Region Imagery Acquisition 
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Figure 2.1 | The methodological framework used in this chapter. 
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California Spatial Sciences Institute’s (USC SSI) parcel data (USC SSI, 2016), resulting in a 
data set including individual buildings’ characteristics such as surface area and building 
type. The building types were reclassified to match those used in the HAZUS MH model 
(FEMA, 2013a), a flood damage model commonly used in the US that comprises 33 unique 
building types (see Supplementary Information 1). The HAZUS MH model also supplies 
depth-damage curves and maximum damage values per building type. Depth-damage 
curves represent the relationship between a building type’s inundation depth and its 
associated percentual damage. Per building, the total damage was calculated by multi-
plying its damage share from the depth-damage curves by the associated building type’s 
maximum damage. Depth-damage curves were adjusted according to Aerts et al. 2014 
(Aerts et al., 2014b) to represent an adapted building. Figure 2.2 shows an example of a 
depth-damage curve for a single-family dwelling and how it varies with different types of 
adaptation. In the case of elevation, the curve is shifted to represent the elevation height. 
Similar to Aerts et al. (Aerts et al., 2014b), we assumed a risk reduction of 75% and 30% for 
dry-floodproofing and wet-floodproofing heights, respectively. When inundation levels 
overtop the floodproofing height, dry-floodproofing will cease to provide any benefits, 
while wet-floodproofing will continue to reduce risk. For all adaptation measures, we 
assumed an 80-year lifespan (Aerts et al., 2014b; Kreibich, Christenberger, & Schwarze, 2011). 
The damages per flood event (1/20 and 1/100) were then converted to EAD defined as the 























4� Wet-floodproofing  4� Eleva�on
Figure 2.2 | An example of a depth-damage curve without adaptation and with 4 ft of each adapta-
tion measure, based on Aerts et al. (2014b). 
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Equation 2.1, D(p) represents damage caused by a storm event with probability of 
occurrence p, and pmin and pmax are the lowest- and highest-probability storms, respec-
tively. To work around the limited availability of different storm events, we assumed no 
damage below 10-year storms and 100-year storm damages for lower-probability events. 
This yielded a conservative estimation of risk. The difference between the EAD with and 
without adaptation are the benefits of the adaptation measure per year as used in the CBA. 
2.2.2 Micro-scale cost-benefit analysis
We applied a scenario-based CBA approach for each individual building by evaluating the 
costs and benefits of adaptation measures in four sea level rise scenarios. The first case 
assumed current climatic conditions, while the other three involved sea level rises of 75 
cm, 150 cm, and 200 cm (2.5ft, 4.9ft and 6.7ft) by 2100. We applied three main types of 
adaptation measures: elevation, dry-floodproofing, and wet-floodproofing1. Each measure 
is evaluated at 60 cm, 122 cm and 183 cm (2 ft, 4 ft, and 6 ft) above current ground-floor 
level; we further tested elevation at 244 cm (8 ft). We realize that dry-floodproofing is often 
not suitable at more than 122 cm (4 ft) above ground-floor level due to potential issues 
of structural stability (FEMA, 2014b). However, structural stability is highly building-spe-
cific, since it depends on a building’s age and construction quality; therefore, most flood 
adaptation studies still apply a 183 cm (6 ft) dry- or wet-floodproofing scenario to illustrate 
these measures’ potential when structural stability allows it (Aerts, et al., 2013).
Table 2.1 shows the average cost estimates for elevation of existing buildings, and dry- 
and wet-floodproofing buildings. These costs are based on estimates from the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and scaled to reflect higher Los Angeles 
construction costs. The costs for elevation of existing buildings depend on the foundation, 
building materials and if the building has a basement or crawl-space. For wet-floodproofing, 
the average costs are based on measures such as relocating utility installations above flood 
levels and using water-resistant building materials. Dry-floodproofing measures include 
sealing walls with waterproof coatings, reinforcing walls to resist the hydrostatic pressure 
of flood water and installing measures to prevent floodwater to enter the building through 
the sewer. For a detail description see FEMA (FEMA, 2014b) and Aerts et al. (2018).
The NPV of the individual-building-level CBA was calculated as per Equation 2.2: 
The equation shows the NPV for building b in the 100-year flood zone and adaptation 
measure a, starting in 2010, for a lifespan T of 80 years and a discount rate r of 4%, as 
(2.1)=  ( )  
(2.2), =  
, ,
(1 + ) , ,
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commonly used in studies in the US (Aerts et al., 2014b; Hallegatte et al., 2012). A sensitivity 
analysis with a discount rate of 7% is included in electronic supplementary matarial of the 
orignal article, but the rest of this chapter refers to results obtained with the 4% discount 
rate. Bb,a,t are the benefits over time for building b and adaptation measure a. Cb,a,0 are 
the initial investment costs for building b and adaptation measure a. Data on adaptation 
measures’ maintenance costs are lacking, although these costs are often assumed to 
be negligible (Aerts, 2018). Subsequently, the optimal mix of adaptation measures was 
composed by selecting the type of measure that yields the highest positive NPV per 
building in the 100-year flood zone (Equation 2.3):
We also conducted a conventional, spatially aggregated area-based approach, in which 
a single measure is evaluated for a whole area, in order to compare its results to those 
yielded by our micro-scale CBA. The aggregated NPV of the area-based approach was 
Elevation 
level
Costs based on FEMA per building 
category
Costs scaled-up for LA per building 
category
RES1 RES2 RES3A RES3B RES1 RES2 RES3A RES3B
+ 2 ft $33,239 $40,550 $41,337 $62,029 $37,560 $45,822 $46,711 $70,093 
+ 4 ft $35,464 $43,499 $43,861 $65,816 $40,074 $49,154 $49,563 $74,372 
+ 6 ft $37,319 $45,958 $45,964 $68,971 $42,170 $51,933 $51,939 $77,937 




Costs based on FEMA per building 
category
Costs scaled-up for LA per building 
category
RES1 RES2 RES3A RES3B RES1 RES2 RES3A RES3B
+ 2 ft $2151 $2851 $2440 $3661 $2861 $3792 $3245 $4869 
+ 4 ft $4451 $5900 $5047 $7574 $5920 $7846 $6713 $10,073 




Costs based on FEMA per building 
category  
Costs scaled-up for LA per building 
category
RES1 RES2 RES3A RES3B RES1 RES2 RES3A RES3B
+2 ft $8290 $9286 $8717 $10294 $9368 $10,493 $9850 $11,632 
+4 ft $10,433 $11,753 $10,999 $13,089 $11,789 $13,281 $12,429 $14,791 
+6 ft $12,576 $14,220 $13,281 $15,884 $14,211 $16,069 $15,008 $17,949 
Table 2.1 | An example of a depth-damage curve without adaptation and with 4 ft of each adapta-
tion measure, based on Aerts et al. (Aerts et al., 2014b). 
(2.3)= max , , , > 0  
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calculated by adding the NPV values of all buildings for a specific measure (Equation 2.4):
2.3 Case study: Venice Beach and Naples
With a population of 9.8 million, Los Angeles County is illustrative of a major metropolitan 
area vulnerable to coastal flooding due to its low-lying geography and high exposure 
of economic assets (DeConto & Pollard, 2016; Hallegatte et al., 2013a). Coastal flooding 
in Los Angeles County is mainly caused by tides, storm surges, wave-driven run-up, or a 
combination of these factors (Barnard et al., 2014; Erikson et al., 2018; O’Neill et al., 2018). 
The county’s current vulnerability was demonstrated in 2010, when an El Niño-fueled 
storm produced waves that were 7.5 m (22 ft) high, causing significant coastal erosion 
and flooding in certain coastal communities (Barboza, 2010; R.-G. Lin, 2010). Current sea 
level rise projections range from 0.93 m (3 ft) by 2100, according to the National Research 
Council (NRC, 2012), to a worst case scenario of 3 m (10 ft) by 2100, according to a Working 
Group of the California Ocean Protection Council Science Advisory Team (Griggs et al., 
2017). 
Two vulnerable coastal areas in Los Angeles County were considered as case studies: 
Venice Beach (including Marina Del Rey) and Naples (see Figure 2.3). Venice Beach is part 
of one of the most famous coastal stretches worldwide, providing the county with major 
economic benefits in terms of tourism, ecosystem services, and coastal protection (Aerts, 
et al., 2018; Grifman, Hart, Ladwig, Newton Mann, & Schulhoff, 2013). However, CoSMoS’s 
recent projections (Barnard et al., 2014; Erikson et al., 2018; O’Neill et al., 2018; USGS, 2015) 
show that sea level rise and erosion threaten to increase flood risk significantly. For example, 
de Ruig et al. (2019) have estimated an increase of over $100 million/yr between now and 
2100 in a 200 cm (6.6ft) sea level rise scenario in Venice Beach and Santa Monica, including 
indirect losses and infrastructure damages. 
Naples is a high-value residential area in the City of Long Beach, which is already vulner-
able to high tides and storms. According to projected sea level rise scenarios, Naples will 
be highly susceptible to flooding. Building elevation is a potential way to cope with the 
increasing flood risk (Aerts et al., 2018). Venice Beach and Naples have distinct characteris-
tics in terms of flood risk. Flood risk in Naples is already high and will only increase further 
with sea level rise; it is currently low in Venice Beach because of the area’s elevated beach 
front, but sea level rise could reach a threshold that results in significantly greater risk.
Currently, beach nourishment is used to maintain the beaches that also provide important 
coastal flood protection (Flick, 1993). Furthermore, communities participate in the National 
Flood Insurance Program and most of the coastal cities have agreed to comply with the 
FEMA’s minimum elevation requirements as well as the California building code regulations 
(2.4) = ,   
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for flood zoning and flood-proofing (Aerts et al., 2018). Aerts et al. (2018) shows the potential 
of different types of adaptation strategies, which were derived from a 3-year participatory 
stakeholder approach. All these strategies included improved beach nourishment to keep 
up with the pace of sea level rise. Other proposed measures include storm surge barriers, 
dikes underneath beaches, and roads elevated to act as levees. Moreover, the proposed 
resilient pathway includes the enforcement of building-level adaptation measures on a 
community level. 
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Exposure, flood risk, and the optimal mix of adaptation measures
Table 2.2 shows the number of buildings exposed to a 100-year flood zone and the associ-
ated risk in the different sea level rise scenarios. In addition, it shows the percentage of 
buildings with the possibility of implementing a cost-efficient adaptation measure, as well 
as the mix of economically optimal measures. 
2.4.1.1	 Naples
We found that a 200 cm sea level rise increased exposure in Naples from 2,920 buildings 
currently to 8,246 buildings, mainly caused by a larger flood extent. In the 75 cm sea level 
rise scenario, exposure increased from 2,920 buildings to 5,242 buildings. Total flood risk 
increased due to this rise in exposure. In addition, the average risk per building increased 
(from ~$2,400/yr to ~$8,600/yr) due to higher inundation depths caused by sea level rise. 




A large share of buildings in Naples (between 93.3% and 99%) had at least one cost-effi-
cient adaptation option in each scenario. Buildings for which adaptation measures were 
not cost-efficient tended to be larger than the average single-family dwelling and faced 
minimal expected water depths during a flood event. For these buildings, repairing the 
damage would be more economically efficient than investing in adaptation. The mix of 
optimal adaptation types shifted from mainly dry-floodproofing (97.8%) in the current 
climate scenario to a more even distribution of dry-floodproofing and elevation in the sea 
level rise scenarios (35%-45% dry-floodproofing and 55%-65% elevation). We often found 
the elevation of existing buildings to be economically efficient only in high sea level rise 
scenarios, due to large upfront investment costs. The damage reduction attained through 
wet-floodproofing is less significant than that attained through dry-floodproofing, but 
still reduce damage even if inundation depths exceed floodproofing heights. In addition, 
certain types of assessed buildings, such as multi-family dwellings and commercial build-
ings, are not normally elevated, leaving only dry-floodproofing and wet-floodproofing as 
adaptation options. Therefore, we observe only a small share of wet-floodproofed build-





















Current 2920 6832 93.3 97.8 0.7 1.5
Sea level 
rise 75 cm
5242 29,679 99 44.1 0.3 55.5
Sea level 
rise 150 cm
6469 48,085 98.4 39.5 0.4 60.1
Sea level 
rise 200 cm






















Current 3 18 33.3 0 100 0
Sea level 
rise 75 cm
112 2607 97.3 100 0 0
Sea level 
rise 150 cm
231 6645 97 100 0 0
Sea level 
rise 200 cm
5961 50,331 97.3 47 1 52
Table 2.2 | An overview of the exposure for a 100-year flood event, the associated flood risk per 
year, the share of buildings for which an adaptation measure is cost-efficient, and, the optimal mix 
of the three main adaptation measures in Naples and Venice Beach. 
23
A micro-scale cost-benefit analysis of building-level flood risk adaptation measures in Los Angeles
was not suitable and the building type did not allow for elevation.
 
2.4.1.2	 Venice	Beach
Table 2.1 also shows that Venice Beach was barely vulnerable to flooding in the current 
climate scenario, with only three buildings experiencing flood damage during a 100-year 
flood event. In the 75 cm and 150 cm sea level rise scenarios, exposure equaled 112 and 
231 vulnerable buildings, respectively; these values are considerably lower than those 
obtained for Naples. Still, we found the average flood risk per building to be approximately 
$25,000/yr. In the current climate scenario, for example, Naples had an exposure of 2,920 
buildings and $6.8 million/yr in risk; meanwhile, in the 150 cm sea level rise scenario, Venice 
Beach had an exposure of only 231 buildings but $6.6 million/yr in risk. This high average 
risk in Venice Beach mainly originated from large residential multi-dwellings being flooded 
in Marina Del Rey.
In the 75- and 150 cm sea level rise scenarios, approximately 97% of the vulnerable build-
ings in Venice Beach had a cost-efficient adaptation option, with dry-floodproofing being 
most cost-efficient. In these scenarios, only buildings in Marina Del Rey flooded; since they 
were mostly large buildings with relatively shallow inundation depths, dry-floodproofing 
was the preferred adaptation measure. However, the 200 cm sea level rise scenario showed 
a significant increase in exposure and associated risk, with 5,961 vulnerable buildings and 
$50 million/yr in risk. This sudden increase suggests a potential risk threshold between 
150 cm and 200 cm of sea level rise. Of the 5,961 vulnerable buildings in the 200-cm sea 
level rise scenario, 97.3% had a cost-efficient adaptation option, and the share of dry flood-
proofing, wet floodproofing, and elevation (~47%, 1%, and 52%, respectively) was similar to 
that found in Naples. In terms of exposure, Naples and Venice Beach are comparable: they 
boast high-value residential buildings constructed around the beach or harbors. However, 
in terms of hazard, Venice Beach’s relatively high beachfront and marina would prevent 
flooding in lower sea level rise scenarios. Nonetheless, results suggest that a comparable 
mix of dry-floodproofing, wet-floodproofing, and elevation measures would be optimal in 
both areas. We analyze these measures’ spatial distribution in more detail in the following 
section. 
2.4.2 Spatial distribution of optimal adaptation measures
2.4.2.1	 Naples
Figure 2.4 shows the inundation maps for a 100-year storm and the spatial distribution 
of the most cost-efficient mix of adaptation measures for Naples. Inundation depth was 
relatively shallow (<1 m) in the current climate scenario in some areas such as the Peninsula, 
the islands, and a few parts of Belmont. However, the flood extent increases significantly 
in Belmont and expands to Marina Pacifica in the sea level rise scenarios. In the 200 cm sea 
level rise scenario, inundation depths in the Peninsula, the islands, and parts of Belmont 
increased up to 3 m. The heavily inundated area shown south of Los Cerritos Channel 
represents an oil field and a wetland; these are not considered in this study. 
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Figure 2.4 | The left panels show inundation depths for a 100-year flood event in each sea level rise 
scenario in Naples. The right panels show the most economically efficient adaptation measure per 
building type in the 100-year flood zone.  
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In the current climate scenario, 2 ft and 4 ft dry floodproofing was often the most cost-ef-
ficient measure. As inundation depth increased due to sea level rise, however, elevation 
became cost-efficient more frequently; this was particularly noticeable when comparing 
the current climate scenario and the 75 cm sea level rise scenario. In other words, 
dry-floodproofing was often more efficient at shallow inundation depths. Even though 
dry-floodproofing is a relatively cheap and effective measure, we found it to be inadequate 
when inundation depths exceeded the floodproofing height. As a result, elevation was 
more economically desirable in areas and scenarios with higher inundation depths, despite 
higher investment costs.
Moreover, in certain areas, increasing sea levels led to a substantial average increase in 
optimal elevation and dry-floodproofing heights. Said heights, however, presented a 
large spatial variety. For example, in the 75 cm sea level rise scenario, both elevation and 
dry-floodproofing were predominantly optimal at 4 ft; meanwhile, in the Peninsula, certain 
island streets, and parts of Belmont, the optimal elevation and dry floodproofing height 
was 6 ft. In the 200 cm sea level rise scenario, the optimal elevation height was predomi-
nantly 8 ft; however, especially at the edges of the flooded area or in newly flooded areas, 
optimal dry-floodproofing and elevation heights were often found to be 2 ft and 4 ft, 
respectively. 
As previously observed, wet-floodproofing was only suitable if inundation depth exceeded 
dry-floodproofing height and the building’s land-use type did not allow for elevation. In 
the 200 cm sea level rise scenario, for example, wet floodproofing proved to be the most 
efficient adaptation measure for commercial buildings on East 2nd Street in Belmont. 
2.4.2.2	 Venice	Beach
As shown in Figure 2.5, inundation caused by a 100-year storm in Venice Beach was limited 
in the current climate scenario. In the 75- and 150 cm sea level rise scenarios, inundation 
expanded to Marina Del Rey but remained below 1 m. However, when sea level rise 
exceeded a certain threshold, inundation was substantial and extended to residential 
neighborhoods. In certain parts, inundation depths reached over 3 m. Overtopping of 
flood water in the 200 cm sea level rise scenario mainly occurred near Ballona Lagoon 
and Marina Del Rey, reflecting the beaches’ importance in protecting other areas from 
flooding. 
In the 75- and 150 cm sea level rise scenarios, the only noticeable inundation took place 
in Marina Del Rey. As it was relatively shallow inundation, dry-floodproofing was the most 
economically efficient option. In the 150 cm sea level rise scenario, floodproofing heights 
increased in certain parts of the marina. This was also the case in the 200 cm sea level rise 
scenario, with dry-floodproofing up to 4 ft and 6 ft being most economically efficient. In 
highly inundated parts of residential neighborhoods, 8 ft elevation was the most econom-
ically efficient option, while dry-floodproofing predominated at the edge of the flooded 
area. Meanwhile, a number of multi-family dwellings located around West Washington 
Boulevard experienced high inundation depths, making dry-floodproofing unsuitable and 
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Figure 2.5 | The left panels show inundation depths for a 100-year flood event in each sea level 
rise scenario in Venice Beach. The right panels show the most economically efficient adaptation 
measure per building type in the 100-year flood zone. 
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wet-floodproofing the most economically efficient measure. 
The spatial variety of adaptation measures and respective heights followed a similar 
pattern to that found in higher sea level rise scenarios in Naples. For example, even only a 
small area of about 500 m in radius (to the north of Marina Del Rey and to the east of West 
Washington Boulevard), show a wide variety of optimal measures: elevations of 4 ft, 6 ft, 
and 8 ft and dry-floodproofing of 2 ft, 4 ft, and 6 ft. The following subsection illustrates 
how our micro-scale CBA performed against an aggregated approach in which only one 
measure is evaluated for an entire area. 
2.4.3  Comparison of area-based adaptation vs. optimal adaptation 
efficiencies
As shown in Figure 2.6 we compared between the optimal mix of building-level adapta-
tion measures yielded by our micro-scale CBA and the measures yielded by an area-based 
CBA, in which only one adaptation type was used to evaluate the aggregated NPV of 
implementing a specific measure in that area. We have indicated, in the area-based CBA 
results, which height was most cost-efficient. The electronic supplementary information 
contains full results for all scenarios and adaptation options. 
In both Naples and Venice Beach, the micro-scale CBA always resulted in a substantially 
more efficient mix of adaptation measures than the area-based CBA. As an illustration, the 
NPV yielded by the micro-scale approach in the 200 cm sea level rise scenario in Naples 
was $250 million higher than that yielded by the area-based approach; this constitutes 
an increase of 33%. According to the area-based CBAs in the 75- and 150 cm sea level 
rise scenarios, a dry-floodproofing of 6 ft in Naples resulted in the highest NPV. However, 
this dry-floodproofing height is not always suitable for different types of buildings, and 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recommends not exceeding 4 ft of 
dry-floodproofing and use elevation instead (FEMA, 2014b). Specifically, in the 150 cm sea 
level rise scenario, using 4 ft rather than 6 ft of dry floodproofing decreased the NPV by 
almost $400 million, according to an area-based CBA. When the 6 ft dry floodproofing was 
removed from the optimal mix of adaptation measures, economic efficiency decreased by 
only $77 million. 
Venice Beach has a difference in NPV of about $300 million when comparing the optimal 
mix of adaptation measures and the area-based CBA with only 6ft dry-floodproofing for 
the 200 cm sea-level rise scenario. This is an increase of 85% in NPV (almost doubling) for 
the micro-scale CBA when compared with the area-based CBA. Out of 5,961 vulnerable 
buildings, only 5.4% had 6 ft dry floodproofing as the most economically efficient measure 
in the micro-scale CBA, even though 6 ft dry floodproofing was the most efficient measure 
according to an area-based CBA. In other words, while 6 ft dry-floodproofing was the best 
measure on an aggregated scale, the area-based CBA resulted in sub-optimal adaptation 
measures for 94.6% of the buildings in the area. For example, in areas with high inundation 
depths (i.e., between 2 m and 3 m), elevation was significantly more efficient, with 8 ft 
elevation in particular being optimal in 39.4% of buildings according to the micro-scale 
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CBA. However, if 8 ft elevation were to be applied to all vulnerable buildings, including 
those in areas with shallow inundation depths, aggregated economic efficiencies would 
decrease considerably. These findings suggest that measures’ performance and efficiency 
on an individual-building level depend strongly on local inundation depths.
2.5 Discussion
2.5.1 The importance of scales and data availability
In many cases, studies evaluate the effectiveness of a measure in a given case study area 
(i.e., a flood zone, a neighborhood, a (sub)watershed, etc.) (Bubeck & de Moel, 2010; de 
Moel et al., 2013; Poussin et al., 2012). They implicitly assume that hazard conditions (e.g., 
water depth) are homogenous throughout the studied area. This is, however, rarely the 
case; in particular, an increase of up to 85% in economic efficiency can be achieved by 
optimizing adaptation measures such as floodproofing at an individual-building level, 
instead of applying a single measure to an entire area. This increase would be even 
more pronounced in certain areas, such as large polder areas in the Netherlands, which 
would have high exposure and highly varied flood inundation depths in case of an event 
(Oranjewoud; HKV, 2011; Vergouwe, 2016). Evaluating a single building-level measure in an 
exceedingly large area can easily result in inefficiencies, but this does not mean that a 
measure cannot be effective in certain specific locations. 
Our results show that local-scale adaptation assessments should use the smallest scale 
possible. However, even in the US, building-level data are often only collected per county 
and not always made publicly available. In addition, data sets are often outdated because 
collecting such data are very costly and resource-intensive. Hence, using a multi-source GIS 
data set or volunteered geographic information sources such as Open Street Maps might 
become integral to such models, as it could provide updated and detailed building-level 


































































Figure 2.6 | A comparison of the economic efficiency of the optimal mix of adaptation measures at 
the building level (indicated in blue) and the area-based adaptation type (indicated in green, pur-
ple, and red for dry-floodproofing, wet-floodproofing, and elevation, respectively). For area-based 
types, the height yielding the highest economic efficiency is indicated. Figure 6a shows results for 
Naples, while Figure 6b shows results for Venice Beach.  
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However, if building-level data sets are persistently difficult to acquire, we recommend 
that these localized assessments disaggregate the evaluated area not only to flood 
zones (based on probability, such as 100- or 500-year flood zones), but also to different 
inundation depth ranges. Our results show a distinct pattern of adaptation types based on 
inundation depths: for example, dry-floodproofing performs most efficiently in areas with 
shallow inundation depths. Buildings’ inundation depths in smaller, disaggregated areas 
are relatively homogeneous, which results in two advantages. First, a single adaptation 
measure turns out to be most suitable within each area (e.g., 2 ft dry-floodproofing in 
an area with expected inundation depth < 2 ft). Second, we may evaluate the types of 
adaptation used in different areas, such as dry floodproofing in shallow inundation areas 
and elevation in deep inundation areas. 
2.5.2 Building-level versus community-level adaptation
Homeowners often do not have access to detailed studies about the costs and benefits 
of floodproofing their property, and their perceptions of flood risk and the effectiveness 
of floodproofing measures are often incorrect (Aerts, Botzen, et al., 2018; Haer et al., 2019). 
In reality, data suggests that homeowners are on average not inclined to install flood-
proofing measures, even when living in flood plains. Communicating about the flood 
risk homeowners face potentially increases the willingness of homeowners to protect 
their house (Haer, Botzen, & Aerts, 2016; Kellens, Terpstra, & De Maeyer, 2013). However, 
communicating only about flood probabilities has been shown to be less effective than 
also communicating about the risk reduction measures that can be taken (Bubeck, Botzen, 
Kreibich, & Aerts, 2013; de Boer, Botzen, & Terpstra, 2014, 2015). This study contributes to the 
design of more effective communication strategies by providing information about the 
most cost-effective floodproofing measure on per building, instead of about a best-prac-
tice measure for an aggregated area which has been shown to be less economically 
efficient. 
Furthermore, the outcomes of our study are applicable in the design, implementation and 
enforcement of adaptation strategies and measures for communities. Venice Beach and 
Naples are densely populated with high-value residences, but stakeholders have indicated 
to prefer adaptation options that have the least amount of impact on the coast, both 
aesthetically and practically. For the implementation of larger, structural measures, local 
assessments must be made to comply to the regulations set by local coastal programs and 
the California Coastal Commission. Currently, building codes are already used to enforce 
a minimum of building-level adaptation measures in an area, but we show that using the 
smallest scale possible for evaluating such measures could significantly increase economic 
efficiency. Even if the building-level adaptation measures are part of a larger adaptation 
strategy or designed for a larger area, evaluating these measures on the individual level can 
improve the accuracy of these analyses. 
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2.5.3 Barriers to the implementation of adaptation measures
The UN has stipulated in the Paris Agreement that if global temperature rises more than 
1.5 ̊C, the effects of climate change—including sea level rise—will become unacceptably 
high. Several studies focused on global risk (e.g., (Jevrejeva, Jackson, Grinsted, Lincke, & 
Marzeion, 2018; Kharin et al., 2018)) have found that, beyond such a threshold, risk can 
increase substantially. In Los Angeles County, a 200 cm sea level rise by 2100 is possible if 
global warming follows a high emission scenario (e.g., the Representative Concentration 
Pathway 8.5) (Griggs et al., 2017). The case of Venice Beach illustrates the local impact that 
rise in sea levels beyond such a threshold would have - water would overtop the beaches 
and the marina, flooding the lower back area. Consequently, risk increases substantially 
once this tipping point has been reached. Besides illustrating the importance of including 
extreme scenarios (e.g., a 200 cm sea level rise by 2100) in economic evaluation studies, 
our result also showcases how difficult it is for policymakers to plan for “tipping points”: if a 
tipping point is likely to be reached in the near future, adaptation is necessary; however, if 
it is not reached, adaptation will have proven economically inefficient. Certain studies (e.g., 
de Ruig et al., 2019; Haasnoot, 2013; Kwadijk et al., 2010) have assessed pathways to adjust 
adaptation strategies based on thresholds for variables such as sea level rise. Still, there 
are substantial gaps in knowledge when it comes to forecasting the environmental and 
economic impact of tipping points, or planning how to prepare for them.
Large upfront investment costs can also be a major barrier to the implementation of flood 
adaptation measures (Aerts et al., 2014b; Chambwera et al., 2015; Watkiss, Hunt, Blyth, & 
Dyszynski, 2015). Due to the uncertainty of climate change projections and the lack of 
knowledge on the effects of climate change, policymakers are afraid of making sub-op-
timal, irreversible investments (Aerts et al., 2014b; Chambwera et al., 2015). A number of 
economic evaluation methods have been developed to deal with current uncertainty 
regarding climate change (e.g., Real Option Analysis, Portfolio Analysis), but they are often 
resource-intensive and technically complex (Watkiss et al., 2015). Even when resources are 
available and these methods are applied, their technical complexity makes them difficult 
to implement in a practical policy setting, especially when large investments are involved 
(Watkiss et al., 2015). Cost-benefit analysis is generally accepted as a clear means of informing 
policymakers about the costs and benefits of large adaptation investments; however, as 
our study has shown, caution should be taken when individual-building-level adaptation 
is considered as part of an adaptation strategy. The comparison between our micro-scale 
CBA and the area-based CBA shows that the former can result in a significant decrease in 
upfront investment costs. In Naples, investment costs for the most economically efficient 
area-based elevation options in the 75-, 150-, and 200 cm sea level rise scenarios are 
approximately $231 million, $316 million, and $414 million, respectively. As a result of our 
micro-scale CBA, these costs decrease by 36.2%, 32.5%, and 26.9%, respectively. In the 200 
cm sea level rise scenario, our micro-scale CBA yields a decrease of 33% in the investment 
costs of an 8 ft elevation in Venice Beach, relative to the area-based CBA. Lower upfront 
investment costs can drive implementation of adaptation strategies (Chambwera et al., 
2015), which is a further strength of the micro-scale CBA approach. 
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2.6 Conclusion
Climate change and socio-economic development are expected to exacerbate the global 
impact of flooding. As a response to increasing flood risk, investments in flood adaptation 
are necessary. Individual-building-level adaptation measures, such as floodproofing or 
elevation, can be implemented to reduce flood damage to structures. Cost-benefit analysis 
is often used to evaluate the economic efficiency of flood adaptation strategies. However, 
to assess the economic efficiency of individual-building-level adaptation measures, it is 
standard to apply a spatially aggregated CBA, in which a single measure is evaluated for an 
entire area. This study presents, to our knowledge, the first micro-scale CBA that evaluates 
and optimizes the economic efficiency of adaptation measures on an individual-building 
level, yielding an optimal mix of measures for each given area. We compared our findings 
to those obtained through the conventional, spatially aggregated area-based approach. 
Our new micro-scale method is widely applicable to other geographical regions if detailed 
building data are available. The method’s local scale makes it helpful to policymakers 
planning individual-building-level adaptation measures. 
We applied our method to a case study of two areas of the Los Angeles County coast 
that are vulnerable to flooding and sea level rise: Venice Beach and Naples. Both areas 
have high-value beachfront residential properties, making individual-building adaptation 
to coastal flooding viable. According to our findings, the optimal mix of measures consists 
of 35%-45% dry-floodproofing and 55%-65% elevation. Elevation is optimal in areas with 
high inundation depths, while dry-floodproofing performs best in areas with shallow 
inundation depths. In all evaluated sea level rise scenarios, the optimal mix of measures 
results in higher economic efficiencies than those yielded by the conventional area-based 
CBA method; in a 200 cm sea level rise scenario in Venice Beach, for example, it results 
in an economic efficiency (NPV) up to 85% higher. Our approach can help policymakers 
explore flood adaptation strategies by providing them with a more complete view on the 
efficiency of individual adaptation measures. In addition, it can help educate homeowners 
on available adaptation options for their properties, as well as on the most suitable adapta-
tion type. 
Regarding future research, we recommend that evaluations of building-level adaptation 
measures be conducted at the smallest possible scale. Multi-source GIS data sets or volun-
teered geographic information sources (e.g., Open Street Maps) could be useful platforms 
in acquiring such micro-scale data if other sources are unavailable or inaccessible. If 
individual-building data are still not available, we recommend that CBAs be performed 
on disaggregated areas based on inundation depth in order to obtain the optimal mix of 
adaptation measures per area.
Rising waves of indecision
How financial incentives can support flood risk management
Chapter 3 
An economic evaluation of adaptation 
pathways in coastal mega cities: An illustration 
for Los Angeles
This chapter is based on: de Ruig, L. T., Barnard, P. L., Botzen, W. J. W., Grifman, P., Hart, J. F., de Moel, 
H., N. Sadrpour,v Aerts, J. C. J. H. (2019). An economic evaluation of adaptation pathways in coastal 
mega cities: An illustration for Los Angeles. Science of the Total Environment, 678, 647–659.
Sea level rise and uncertainty in its projections pose a major challenge to flood risk management 
and adaptation investments in coastal mega cities. This study presents a comparative economic 
evaluation method for flood adaptation measures, which couples a cost–benefit analysis with the 
concept of adaptation pathways. Our approach accounts for uncertainty in sea level rise projec-
tions by allowing for flexibility of adaptation strategies over time. Our method is illustrated for Los 
Angeles County which is vulnerable to flooding and sea level rise. Results for different sea level rise 
scenarios show that applying adaptation pathways can result in higher economic efficiency (up 
to 10%) than individual adaptation strategies, despite the loss of efficiency at the initial strategy. 
However, we identified investment tipping points, after which a transition could decrease the 
economic efficiencies of a pathway significantly. Overall, we recommend that studies evaluating 
adaptation strategies should integrate cost–benefit analysis frameworks with adaptation pathways 
since this allows for better informing decision makers about the robustness and economic desir-





Floods are devastating natural disasters, costing billions in damages annually (Munich RE, 
2018; Vitousek, Barnard, Fletcher, et al., 2017). Climate change and sea level rise further 
increase the frequency and severity of flood hazards (IPCC, 2014), while population 
increase and economic growth further exacerbate flood exposure in low-lying coastal 
areas. Urgent action is needed to anticipate future losses, but designing and evaluating 
long-term adaptation strategies is a complex and challenging process for decision makers 
(Hinkel et al., 2018). For example, a recent study by DeConto and Pollard (2016) reveals that 
future global sea level rise projections of approximately 0.5 m to 1 m (~1.6 to 3 ft) by 2100 
(Horton, Rahmstorf, Engelhart, & Kemp, 2014; IPCC, 2014) may be underestimated due to 
a better understanding of the instability of the Antarctic Ice Sheet. The rates of sea level 
rise are likely to accelerate more rapidly than initially anticipated, possibly resulting in a sea 
level rise of ~3 m (~10 ft) or even higher by 2100 (Hansen et al., 2016; Le Bars et al., 2017; 
Sweet et al., 2017). Such uncertainty in sea level rise projections poses a challenge to flood 
management, because flood adaptation often requires large capital investments over a 
long lifespan. In such cases, decision makers fear making suboptimal, irreversible choices. 
Consequently, adaptation decisions are often postponed until the next disaster strikes the 
region (Aerts et al., 2018).
Several techniques of economic appraisal have been developed to support policy makers 
with adaptation decisions, but these often have limitations in coping with climate change 
uncertainty (Simpson et al., 2016; Watkiss et al., 2015). Real options analysis (ROA), robust 
decision making (RDM), and iterative risk management (IRM) are examples of tools or frame-
works that specifically address future uncertainty. As illustrated by Kind et al. (2018), ROA 
can identify optimal short-term investments in flood risk management, and values options 
of taking adaptation measures in the future, for example under high climate scenarios. 
Other illustrations of how to apply ROA for evaluating flood risk adaptation measures are 
Buurman and Babovic (2016) and Hino and Hall (2017). However, ROA is often constrained 
by data limitations (Simpson et al., 2016; Watkiss et al., 2015). As illustrated by Kind et al. 
(2018), ROA requires the recognition of relevant sources of uncertainty which need to be 
quantified, integrated and discretized in scenarios, requiring subjective choices and expert 
judgement. RDM aims to identify options for adaptation strategies that are expected to 
perform well over a wide range of future scenarios, but it does not optimize the economic 
efficiency of these strategies. For example, Sriver et al., (2018) have applied RDM to evaluate 
a range of climate and socio-economic scenarios for the port of Los Angeles. Similar to 
ROA, due to RDM’s probabilistic nature, a lack of quantitative probabilistic data can limit 
the effectiveness or applicability (Watkiss et al., 2015), IRM is a framework that iteratively 
cycles through the different steps of identification, quantification and assessment of 
risk, to adjust or change adaptation management strategies when necessary. Within this 
framework, policy makers and analysts are able to await new information on uncertainties 
over time (Simpson et al., 2016).
In line with IRM, Haasnoot (2013) and others (e.g., Kwakkel et al., 2016; Reeder and Ranger, 
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2011) suggest the use of “adaptation pathways” to deal with the uncertainty of future 
conditions.  Adaptation pathways are defined as a sequence of adaptation actions or 
strategies over time, such as beach nourishment, building new levees, and floodproofing 
buildings, which anticipate uncertain and changing risk conditions, such as sea level rise 
(Haasnoot, 2013; Kwakkel, Walker, et al., 2016). The use of adaptation pathways aims to 
enable a transition from one strategy to another over time, allow for flexibility among 
policies, cope with uncertainty, and potentially spread the adaptation costs over time. The 
approach has predominantly been applied in conceptual adaptation studies (e.g., Dawson 
et al., 2011; Haasnoot, 2013; Haasnoot et al., 2012; Reeder and Ranger, 2011), or in physically 
based models in which thresholds are estimated for determining pathway transitions (e.g., 
Kwakkel et al., 2015). Adaptation pathways are getting more traction recently in economic 
evaluation studies, such as in combination with ROV (e.g., Buurman & Babovic, 2016; 
Erfani, Pachos, & Harou, 2018; Greater Wellington Regional Council, 2015; Infometrics, 2017; 
Lawrence et al., 2019) or as applied in Haasnoot et al. (2019) and  Lawrence and Haasnoot 
(2017). 
Cost–benefit analyses (CBAs) are commonly used to support decision makers in adapta-
tion decisions, as they are often easy to implement and communicate (Hallegatte et al., 
2012; Hunt & Watkiss, 2011b; Kunreuther et al., 2014). However, they are ‘static’ in nature, and 
not designed to consider uncertainty. A few studies have addressed future uncertainties 
by using scenarios to simulate changes in exposure, hazard, or vulnerability (e.g., Aerts et 
al., 2014a; Mechler, 2016; Ward et al., 2017). Such an approach offers insights into which 
adaptation strategies are economically desirable in certain flood risk scenarios. However, a 
disadvantage of such “static” scenario-based approaches is that they have little flexibility 
in assessing the economic feasibility of changing adaptation options or are bound to a 
set of climate change projections that have a high degree of uncertainty (Hunt & Watkiss, 
2011b; Kunreuther et al., 2014). Some initial studies have applied a scenario-based CBA to 
assess the feasibility of implementing adaptation measures at different points in time—for 
example, by delaying investments that are not cost effective in the present (Aerts et al., 
2014b; Reinhard Mechler, 2003). However, these assessments still use static, inflexible 
adaptation strategies that generate suboptimal outcomes.
In this chapter, we present a comparative risk evaluation method that couples a scenar-
io-based CBA approach with the concept of adaptation pathways. In doing so, the 
framework allows us to assess triggers that indicate if a pathway transition is economically 
efficient, without requiring localized probabilistic data of scenarios, like would be needed 
in a realistic ROA application (Kind et al., 2018). Applied to coastal flood adaptation in Los 
Angeles County (LAC), both current- and future coastal flood risk has been simulated for 
various sea level rise scenarios. Using the risk projections, three CBAs were conducted: 
CBA-I, a standard scenario-based CBA of potential adaptation strategies; CBA-II, with 
different investment timings of adaptation strategies, and; CBA-III, a CBA of an adaptation 
pathway following a transition from one strategy to another over time, that allows for 
flexibility of adaptation over time. The three different CBA approaches are compared and 




3.2 The impact of sea level rise in Los Angeles County
Los Angeles County is an illustrative example of a major metropolitan area (population of 
9.8 million) that is vulnerable to coastal flooding due to its low-lying geography and high 
exposure of economic assets (DeConto & Pollard, 2016; Hallegatte et al., 2013a). With 120 
km of coastline on the Pacific Ocean, flooding in Los Angeles County is primarily caused 
by tides, storm surges, wave-driven run-up, or a combination of these factors (Barnard et 
al., 2014; Erikson et al., 2018; O’Neill et al., 2018). Los Angeles County is currently already 
vulnerable to high tides and coastal storms. For example, in 2010, a storm fueled by El 
Niño produced waves of 7.5 m (22 ft) in height, causing significant coastal erosion and 
flooding in some of the coastal communities (Barboza, 2010; R.-G. Lin, 2010). Sea level 
rise is expected to exacerbate these conditions; the National Research Council projects 
a sea level rise of 0.93 m (3 ft) by 2100 for the State of California (NRC, 2012). However, a 
recent study presents a worst-case sea level rise scenario for Southern California of 3 m 
(10 ft) by 2100 (Griggs et al., 2017). In addition, socioeconomic projections (population and 
economic growth) indicate an increase in the exposure of assets in the future (e.g., in the 
ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach (Aerts et al., 2018)). The exposure of current buildings 
and infrastructure for a 100-year flood is estimated at > $6 billion (Aerts et al., 2018; Grifman 
et al., 2013) in a high sea level rise scenario of 1.5–2 m (4.5–6 ft). Studies have focused on 
the physical aspects of sea level rise, such as beach erosion rates (USGS, 2015), or have 
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Figure 3.1 | An overview of the different regions of the Los Angeles County coast, as referred to in 
this chapter.
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assessed beach nourishment volumes required to compensate for different erosion rates 
due to sea level rise (Flick & Ewing, 2009). In addition, King et al. (2016, 2011) assessed the 
economic costs (e.g., loss of tourism revenues) of a 100-year probability storm in various 
sea level rise scenarios for California.
As the Los Angeles County’s coast is geographically diverse in terms of natural environment 
and built-up development, various types of adaptation measures have been proposed for 
different areas to reduce the effects of sea level rise (Grifman et al., 2013). We identified 
six main coastal segments of Los Angeles County (see Figure 3.1): Malibu, Santa Monica & 
Venice Beach, South Bay, the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach (LA & LB), the residential 
back area of the ports (Wilmington/West Side), and Long Beach. Each of these subsections 
of the coast have a certain vulnerability to flooding, but often specific characteristics. For 
example, risk in Malibu is mainly composed of damages to high-value residential proper-
ties on the beach, while Santa Monica & Venice Beach experience most damages after 
overtopping of the marina in high sea level rise events. In the results, we will mainly focus 
on Long Beach, as it shows some observations most clearly. The full results of all areas are 
attached in the electronic supplementary marterial of the original article. 
3.3 Methods
Figure 3.2 shows an overview of the methodological framework used in this chapter. The 
designs of the adaptation strategies are developed by Aerts et al. (2018), and they are 
briefly summarized in section 3.3.1. Flood risk, in terms of expected annual damage (EAD), 
is calculated based on the flood hazard, vulnerability, and exposure of the assets. The flood 
hazard is derived from the Coastal Storm Modeling System 3.0 (CoSMoS) model (Barnard 
et al., 2014; Erikson et al., 2018; O’Neill et al., 2018), which simulates flood hazard (extent 
and depth) for storms of different return periods in different sea level rise scenarios (75-, 
150- and 200cm by 2100). Exposure of buildings is derived from a local building footprint 
map and vulnerability information is based on the HAZUS MH model (FEMA, 2013a). With 
this, flood damage (for a single flood map) and risk (combining various return periods) can 
be calculated, which is described in section 3.3.2. In addition, the loss in co-benefits from 
beaches (area and width of a beach) in terms of recreational values of coastal ecosystems 
are estimated (Ghermandi & Nunes, 2013), using CoSMoS’ (future) changes in beach extent 
due to erosion (section 3.2.2; Vitousek et al., 2017b). The risk projections (with and without 
adaptation) are used as input for three CBAs: (CBA-I) a scenario-based CBA for the different 
adaptation strategies, (CBA-II) a CBA where investments are delayed, and (CBA-III) a CBA 
of adaptation pathways, allowing change from one strategy to another – each described 
in section 3.3. Within our framework, the economic efficiency indicators act as triggers to 
determine the timing of a transition from one strategy to another. Therefore, monitoring 
of sea level rise is essential to collect new information over time. For example, a sudden 
increase of the observed rate of sea level rise, acting as a signpost or an early warning, can 
shift the economic efficiency of the adaptation strategies or pathways.
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3.3.1 Adaptation Strategies 
Based on the designs of adaptation strategies for Los Angeles made by a recent study 
(Aerts et al., 2018), three main adaptation strategies were evaluated in the CBA framework: 
Dynamic Coast (DC), Dynamic Coast Enhanced I (DCE-I), and Dynamic Coast Enhanced II 
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Figure 3.2 | An overview of the methodological framework used in this chapter. A flood risk model 
is used to compute the flood risk for three sea level rise scenarios and with- or without adapta-
tion measures. In addition, the ecosystem service benefits are calculated. The cost-benefit analysis 
framework consists of three components: (i) a scenario-based CBA, (ii) a delay of investments over 
time, and (iii) adaptation pathways.
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strategy was designed to protect the municipality against three sea level rise scenarios: 
75-, 150- and 200 cm (2.5ft, 4.9ft and 6.6ft, respectively), by 2100 (following Griggs et al., 
2017). Beaches are an important asset in LAC, and current policies strive to preserve the 
current shape and dynamics of beaches. Therefore, all adaptation strategies were based 
on beach nourishment and dune restoration projects, keeping the coastline as it currently 
is. Each strategy was tailored using specific measures for the six main coastal segments of 
LAC: Malibu, Santa Monica, South Bay, the Ports of Los Angeles & Long Beach (LA&LB), the 
residential back-area of the ports (Wilmington/West Side), and Long Beach. Table 3.1 gives 
an overview of the different measures per subsection of the LAC coast, with an estimate 
of the costs. The combination of measures per strategy is necessary to protect the LAC 
coast, while satisfying the needs of stakeholders. The adaptation strategies include 
measures being implemented over time based on the pace of sea level rise (e.g., beach 
nourishment), and between strategies some measures overlap while others supersede. 
While the number of possible pathways might seem limited at first sight, the intricacy of 
individual measures (over time or stationary) within the strategies and the major differ-
ences between areas (in terms of risk and measures, e.g., floodproofing, sluices or dikes 
underneath beaches) should provide insights into the complex interactions of a transition 
from one strategy to another. 
In the DC strategy, open entrances to harbors and ports were maintained, but because 
sea level rise will increasingly threaten low-lying neighborhoods, buildings in the (future) 
100-year flood2 zone are floodproofed or elevated (FEMA, 2014a). We applied two flood-
proofing measures each with a height of 1.2m (4ft): wet-floodproofing (minimizing damage 
when flood waters enter buildings) and dry-floodproofing (preventing flood water from 
entering the structure). According to FEMA regulations (FEMA, 2014a), dry-floodproofing 
is not suitable for coastal storm surge zones and should be wet-floodproofed or elevated 
instead. Hence, in areas with coastal storm surge zones, dry-floodproofing is avoided. 
Dry-floodproofing and wet-floodproofing were only applied to residential and commercial 
buildings and not to other types of buildings, such as education-, agriculture-, and industry 
buildings. All floodproofing and elevation measures are implemented in phases based on 
the different sea level rise scenarios. In 2020, the first investment is made for all build-
ings in the 100-year flood extent including 75 cm of sea level rise. Based on the average 
inundation depths, additional investments are made in the 150 cm scenario to increase 
the mandatory floodproofing extent (in 2059), and additional investments are made twice 
in the 200 cm scenario (in 2051 and 2076). If a flood zone reaches an average inundation 
depth of 1.2m (4ft), the effectiveness of each measure changes: (a) For dry-floodproofing, 
the risk reduction efficiency drops to 0%, as flood water overtops the measure and still 
enters and damages the property, and (b) for elevation and wetproofing the benefits of 
the adaptation measure stagnate and do not increase further. The average inundation was 
calculated per area for the 100-year flood extents for each sea level rise scenario.
In DCE strategies, beach nourishment is complemented with protective measures, such 
as sluices to protect harbors, and highly vulnerable areas are reinforced with additional 
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a Some strategies have investments in the future, and all strategies have maintenance costs. The estimates shown 
here are total present value costs, discounted using a 4% discount rate.
b Referred to as Ports of LA&LB DCE-I.
Table 3.1 | An overview of the three adaptation strategies and their estimated costs per subsection 
of the Los Angeles County coast (some subsections do not have all strategies, depicted as n.a.)
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levees—in some locations buried under dunes to preserve landscape values. As seen in 
table 3.1, DCE-I is a strategy that protects the Ports and their back area, including outwards 
expansion of the Ports and major land-use and infrastructural changes in its surroundings. 
This strategy is further referred to as DCE-I Ports of LA & LB. The suggested combination of 
measures in the DCE strategies was designed for a future 1/1000-year protection standard. 
For both DC and DCE strategies, the lifespan of all measures was assumed to be 100 
years. For the delayed investments and adaptation pathways, floodproofing or structural 
adaptation measures can therefore provide benefits after 2100. However, beach nourish-
ment volumes and reinforced flood management infrastructures (e.g., groins, breakwaters, 
jetties, and levees) were upgraded for every 0.6m (2ft) of sea level rise. If we would expand 
these measures beyond 2100, more upgrades per 0.6m (2ft) of sea level rise are necessary 
beyond 2100. However, this would change the undiscounted investment costs of the 
static and delayed strategies and would make them incomparable in terms of economic 
efficiency. Therefore, the benefits to tourism, ecosystems and limiting erosion from beach 
nourishment, only last until the last upgrade before 2100 has been exceeded by sea level 
rise. In the 75 cm scenario, the benefits can last until 2140, in the 150 cm scenario until 2113, 
and in the 200 cm scenario until 2112. To stay consistent, we linearly extrapolated beach 
nourishment volumes at the same rate as we did with sea level rise (see section 3.3.2.1).
3.3.2 Models & Data
In this study, storm simulations for current and future climate conditions were calculated 
using the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) CoSMoS (Barnard et al., 2014). These simulations 
form the basis for determining what assets and people are vulnerable to sea level rise in 
combination with storms and which locations may require adaptation measures to reduce 
future flood risk. CoSMoS couples atmospheric and hydrodynamic computer models to 
estimate flood hazard potential from coastal storms, sea level rise, and shoreline change. 
Winds, sea level pressures, and sea surface temperatures are derived from global climate 
models to compute total water levels on a regional scale until 2100 (for details, see Barnard 
et al., 2014). Regional storm conditions are then dynamically downscaled using a set of 
nested Delft3D wave (SWAN) and tide (FLOW) models and linked at the coast-to-river 
discharge projections, fine-scale estuary models, and along the open coast to closely 
spaced XBeach (eXtreme Beach) cross-shore profile models. The results provide projected 
total water levels along the California coast for different storms (e.g. 20-, and 100-year flood 
events), and they include modeling of 10 different sea level rise scenarios ranging from 0-2 
m (0-6.6 ft), as well as an extreme five-meter (16ft) sea level rise.
Building exposure data was derived from the Los Angeles Region Imagery Acquisition 
Consortium (LARIAC) (Greninger, 2014) and University of Southern California Spatial 
Sciences Institute (USC SSI) parcel data (USC SSI, 2016), providing a dataset with charac-
teristics of individual buildings. Exposure and flood hazard data were combined in the 
HAZUS MH model to estimate losses per building, using depth-damage curves and 
maximum damage values for each type of building (Aerts, Lin, et al., 2013; de Moel et 
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al., 2013; FEMA, 2013a). We modified the depth-damage curves in the HAZUS MH model 
to simulate the risk reducing effect of building scale adaptation measures. For dry-flood-
proofing and wet-floodproofing, we used the lower bound of the effectiveness of the 
measures in reducing risk, as used in Aerts et al.(2014b): namely, 75% and 30% reduction in 
risk, respectively. For elevation, the depth-damage curve remains zero until the elevation 
height. Example depth-damage curves are shown in Figure 3.3.
 
3.3.2.1	 Expected	annual	damage
Current expected annual damage (EAD) or ‘risk’ ($/yr) is calculated based on the damage 
per storm, as the integral of the exceedance probability curve. The EAD was calculated 
for different sea level rise scenarios, and for each area (Malibu, Santa Monica, etc.) for 
both the current and future situation. Due to the limited number of events provided by 
CoSMoS, we assume (i) no damage for more frequent events with probability higher than 
10-year, and (ii) the 100-year storm damages are used as the potential maximum lower 
probability event. While we are aware that nuisance flooding and more extreme events 
can contribute to total risk (Moftakhari, AghaKouchak, Sanders, & Matthew, 2017), this 
approach will provide us with a conservative estimate of risk despite the limited number of 
available events. However, similar studies (e.g., Ward et al., 2017) often assume no damages 
for frequent events as nuisance flooding is often prevented by homeowners themselves. 
For example, in Malibu homeowners have privately funded temporary revetments and are 






















4� Wet-floodproofing  4� Eleva�on
Figure 3.3 | An example of a depth-damage curve for a residential single-family dwelling without 
adaptation, and with 4ft of each adaptation measure based on FEMA (2013) and Aerts et al. (2014a).
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In addition, since HAZUS simulations only pertain to direct damages to buildings, we use 
two scaling factors: (a) for estimating indirect economic damages (e.g., business inter-
ruption) following Aerts et al. (2014a). The literature shows that indirect damage could 
increase direct damages by a factor of 1.5 (Hallegatte, 2006, 2015). However, we recognize 
that different areas would face different indirect impacts (Koks, 2016). For example, the 
industrial ports are two of the largest ports of the US and are expected to suffer a signifi-
cantly higher indirect impact than, for example, the residential Malibu area. Therefore, we 
applied an indirect damage factor of 2 to the port, and a factor of 1.16 to the other areas 
so that the total indirect damage averaged to a factor 1.5, calibrated on the present risk. 
(b) another scaling factor was applied to include direct damages to infrastructure and 
vehicles. A factor has been applied, based on the detailed damage assessments by the 
U.S. government after Hurricane Sandy (NYS, 2012). These factors were applied to our risk 
estimates, assuming a constant ratio between total direct damage of an event and risk.
The benefit for each adaptation strategy was calculated according to how much the EAD 
was reduced over the lifetime of the adaptation measures. Because some adaptation 
measures have a lifespan beyond 2100, the sea level rise projections were extrapolated to 
estimate (reduced) risk beyond 2100, and these extended risk estimates were used in the 
CBA. The estimates were based on the change in sea level 2099 and 2100 and assuming 
a constant slope afterwards, which is in the conservative bounds of Griggs et al.’s (2017) 
projections. For the sea level rise extrapolations of 75-, 150- and 200 cm into the future, the 
CoSMoS 500 cm sea level rise scenario (+16.4ft) was used.
3.3.2.2	 Co-benefits	from	beach	nourishment
Co-benefits from beach nourishment, such as ecosystem services, were also calculated. 
We used the study by Ghermandi and Nunes (2013) to determine the potential economic 
loss for ecosystem services from the decline of future beach width and surface due to 
erosion and sea level rise, as simulated by CoSMoS. In our analysis, these losses are avoided 
by beach nourishment, resulting in an average economic benefit of 48,316.09 $/ha/yr 
through beach nourishment. In addition, beaches will retain their protective qualities 
when nourished. While CoSMoS’ inundation maps include erosion, we sampled a proxy to 
account for these benefits (see SI1.1.). 
To test the robustness of the overall modeling approach, we performed a sensitivity 
analysis using an uncertainty range similar to Aerts et al. ( 2014a) who did a comprehensive 
uncertainty analysis of another flood damage model with a similar overall setup as ours. 
Depth-damage curves and hydraulic boundary conditions are found to be the two most 
important sources of uncertainty. As these are completely uncorrelated, their effect can be 
added up to derive total uncertainty in risk –estimated to be around -50% and +50% (Aerts 
et al., 2014a). In addition, costs estimations of adaptation strategies are associated with 
uncertainty for both investment costs and maintenance costs. We adopt an uncertainty 
interval of -20% and +20% on the cost estimates of the adaptation strategies following 





We here describe the CBA framework: (CBA-I) a scenario-based approach, with an analysis 
of (CBA-II) the effect of a delay of investments in the three strategies (DC, DCE I and DCE 
II), and (CBA-III) a CBA of adaptation pathways, transitioning from one strategy to another.
CBA-I, Scenario-based: With the conventional scenario-based CBA, investments are made in 
2020 and the same measures remain in place for their lifespan (100 years). We adopted 
discount rates of 4% and 7%, respectively, which are commonly applied in such studies in 
the United States (Aerts et al., 2014b; Hallegatte et al., 2012), and we used the Net Present 
Value (NPV) and Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) as economic efficiency indicators:
Equation (3.1) shows the NPV and Equation (3.2) the BCR with t the time in years, starting 
in 2020, T the lifespan of the measures, r the discount rate, C0 the initial investment costs, 
and Bt and Ct the benefits and costs per year, respectively.
CBA-II, delayed investments: In some instances, it can be economically more efficient to 
postpone the implementation of adaptation strategies: flood risk will increase over time 
and thus the effects of adaptation measures become relatively more beneficial in the 
future. The delayed NPVd (3.3) and BCRd (3.4) require the initial investment costs also to be 
discounted in the delayed year td:
CBA-III, Pathways: To address the option of adaptation pathways, we first simulated a 
transition from the DC strategy to DCE strategies, in varying time periods. Because the 
DCE strategy is designed according to higher flood protection standards, it only makes 
(3.1)=  (1 + )  
(3.2)=  (1 + )
(1 + )
 
(3.3)=  (1 + )  (1 + )  
(3.4)=  
(1 + )
(1 + )  + (1 + )
 
td > 1 
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sense to transition from DC towards the DCE, and not in reverse. In such a transition, 
some adaptation measures (e.g., beach nourishment and upgrade of groins) are already 
implemented, and their costs are (partly) accounted for in the old DC strategy. A transition 
into a new DCE strategy (e.g., dike under beach, elevation of roads as levees or sluices) 
would require additional investments at the time of transition. DC is always implemented 
in 2020, while a transition to DCE-I or DCE-II can occur in 5-year intervals from 2025 until 
2095. In such transitions, full investment costs are taken into account for floodproofing 
and elevating buildings according to the DC strategy, while the economic efficiency of 
these measures significantly decreases if their lifespan overlaps with the implementation 
of an investment in a new levee. In such cases, floodproofing measures for buildings only 
reduce damages of storms with a probability of 1/1000-years or lower (i.e. when the new 
levees are overtopped by floodwaters). In Equation (3.5) and (3.6), subscript 1 indicates the 
initial DC strategy, while subscript 2 indicates the transition into the DCE strategy.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Scenario-based cost-benefit analysis (CBA-I) and delays in 
investments (CBA-II)
We first applied the scenario-based CBA-I method to assess the economic desirability 
of implementing the three adaptation strategies (DC, DCE-I, DCE-II) in 2020, assuming 
the three sea level rise scenarios 75-, 150- and 200 cm by 2100. Uncertainty bands were 
provided for economic efficiency indicators (NPVs and BCRs), related to uncertainty in 
risk and cost estimates. Here, we discuss the results for Long Beach (Table 3.2), the other 
areas are presented in the electronic supplementary information of the original article. The 
results for Long Beach indicate that the DC, DCE-I, and DCE-II strategies are all economi-
cally efficient in each sea level rise scenario when the strategies are implemented in 2020, 
with NPVs ranging between $137.1 (DCE-I, 75 cm sea level rise) and $662.8 million (DCE-II, 
200 cm sea level rise) and BCRs ranging between 1.21 and 2.17. While the DC strategy 
performs best for the lower sea level rise scenarios (higher BCRs and more robust), the 
DCE-II results in the highest economic efficiency for a 200 cm sea level rise scenario. The 
uncertainty interval for cost estimates are relatively robust for all strategies, but the interval 
for risk shows a bigger uncertainty range. In most scenarios the lower bound of the risk 
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uncertainty interval drops below zero. DC in the 75 cm sea level rise scenario and DCE-II in 
the 200 cm sea level rise scenario show robustness for both uncertainty intervals. 
We further explored the effects of a delayed investment in CBA-II. Figure 3.4 depicts 
the NPV of implementing the strategies in different moments in time due to a delay in 
investments for Long Beach. As an illustration, when the DC strategy in a 75 cm sea level 
rise scenario is implemented in 2020 it will yield an NPV of $331.8 million, but if the invest-
ments are delayed until 2040, the strategy will only yield an NPV of $249.5 million. The 
upper panels of Figure 3.4 show that for the DC strategy, a delay in investments will only 
decrease economic efficiency under each of the three sea level rise scenarios. However, 
for the DCE-I strategy, Figure 3.4 shows that economic efficiencies increase after a slight 
delay of investments but decrease if the delay in investments is too long. For example, 
under the 200 cm sea level rise scenario, the optimal moment to invest in DCE-I is around 
the year 2035 yielding the highest NPV of $636.1 million, compared to $576.5 million if 
DEC-I is implemented in 2020. The delay to 2035 results in a 10.3% increase in efficiency. 
Nonetheless, waiting too long to invest may result in significant decreases in economic 
efficiency. For instance, delaying DCE-I until around 2055 sea level results in an NPV that is 
below the level that can be reached by investing in 2020 under the 200 cm sea level rise 
scenario. The other areas and the outcomes with a 7% discount rate are presented in the 
electronic supplementary information of the original article.

























(280.0;383.7) (1.9;2.85) (8.9;265.2) (1.01;1.52) (83.7;313.6) (1.12;1.68)








(237.9;369.7) (1.6;2.4) (199.0;460.3) (1.25;1.88) (270.6;505.5) (1.38;2.08)








(251.0;398.0) (1.57;2.35) (443.3;709.6) (1.55;2.33) (549.0;776.5) (1.8;2.71)
Table 3.2 | Scenario-based CBA-I results for Long Beach showing the economic efficiency of the 
three adaptation strategies in terms of NPV and BCR per sea level rise scenario. Uncertainty ranges 
are provided between parentheses for risk estimates (+/−50%) and cost factors (+/−20%). 
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3.4.2 Adaptation pathways (CBA-III)
The DC strategy often performs better under the lower sea level rise scenarios when it is 
directly implemented in 2020, especially considering robustness (see CBA-I results). The 
delayed investment results indicate that some DCE-I and DCE-II strategies yield more 
optimal NPVs under high sea level rise scenarios and when investments of these strategies 
are delayed in time. Hence, pursuing an adaptation pathway that initially implements a DC 
strategy and eventually transitions to one of the DCE strategies might be economically 
beneficial. Figure 3.5 presents the NPV values of such a pathway for Long Beach under 
each sea level rise scenario. The x-axis represents the year in which a transition is made. 
Therefore, the first time step (2020) is a direct transition to DCE, without implementing DC. 
Subsequently, in 5-year increments, the NPV is shown when DC is implemented in 2020, 
and a transition is made to one of the DCE strategies in the associated transition years. 
The initial drop of the NPV in 2025 is explained by a significant loss of investments of the 
DC strategy. The adaptation strategy is only fully effective for 5 years; after a transition 
to DCE is made, the building level adaptation measure will only provide benefits if the 
1/1,000-year protection standard of DCE is exceeded. If a transition is made later in time, 
economic efficiency increases, even exceeding the highest efficiencies reached by any of 
the delayed investment options, which will be discussed in more detail in section 3.4.3. 
For a pathway with a transition from DC to DCE-I, the maximum efficiencies reached are 
$380.2 million (transition in 2095), $459.4 million (transition in 2050), and $699.7 million 
(transition in 2050) for the 75-, 150- and 200 cm sea level rise scenarios respectively. 
Similarly, for a pathway from DC to DCE-II, the maximum efficiencies reached are $379.6 






































































75 cm sea level rise 150 cm sea level rise 200 cm sea level rise
75 cm sea level rise 150 cm sea level rise 200 cm sea level rise
Dynamic Coast
Dynamic Coast Enhanced I
Figure 3.4 | Economic efficiency of delayed investment using CBA-II; for Long Beach of strategies 
DC and DCE-I shown for different implementation moments; NPV in million $ per year if the im-
plementation of either strategy is delayed; 4% discount rate; the blue interval indicates risk uncer-
tainty, whereas the orange interval indicates cost uncertainty.
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in 2045) for the 75-, 150- and 200 cm sea level rise scenarios respectively. Both pathways 
show economic efficiencies, with slight changes in timing and NPVs. The other areas and 
the outcomes with a 7% discount rate are presented in the electronic supplementary 
information of the original article.
For the 150- and 200 cm sea level scenarios, a noticeable drop in NPVs from the pathway 
is shown in Figure 3.5 if transitions occur around 2060 and 2055, respectively. We define 
such a drop as ‘investment tipping points’: an inefficient investment in time of the initial 
strategy, that will prevent further transitions later in time to reach economic efficiencies 
that were possible before the investment tipping point. This is illustrated in Figure 3.5, 
where the economic efficiency of a transition after 2060 or 2055 (for 150- and 200 cm sea 
level rise scenario respectively) will always stay below the level of before the investment 
tipping point. As mentioned before, the 150- and 200 cm sea level rise scenarios of the 
DC strategy have different investment moments over time, in which more buildings are 
floodproofed or elevated to protect the 100-year flood zone. These investments are highly 
inefficient if they are made right before a transition to one of the DCE strategies, as again 
they will only reduce risk if a flood event exceeds the 1/1,000-year protection standard 
of DCE. Consequently, these inefficient investments right before a transition will cause 
an investment tipping point. However, in the used adaptation strategy design, not all 
measures of the DC strategy will become inefficient if the transition to DCE is made. Some 
measures, such as the reinforced breakwaters or beach nourishments, are continued in 
the DCE strategy and do not influence the economic efficiency of a transition. Therefore, 
before committing to a transition within an adaptation pathway, it is necessary to identify 






































































75 cm sea level rise 150 cm sea level rise 200 cm sea level rise
75 cm sea level rise 150 cm sea level rise 200 cm sea level rise
Dynamic Coast to Dynamic Coast Enhanced I
Dynamic Coast to Dynamic Coast Enhanced II
Figure 3.5 | Economic efficiencies of adaptation pathways (CBA-III); NPV in million $ for a transi-
tion from an investment in DC in 2020, to DCE I/II in different future years, for Long Beach; 4% 
discount rate, the purple interval indicates risk uncertainty, whereas the yellow interval depicts cost 
uncertainty.
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3.4.3 Maximalization of economic efficiency
Figure 3.6 shows the optimal NPVs under a 200 cm sea level rise scenario for the delayed 
investments and adaptation pathways. The implementation years or transition years for 
which these optimal returns are reached are also shown. The 75- and 150 cm sea level 
rise scenario results are found in the supplementary materials of the original article. Figure 
3.6 shows that the DC strategy is clearly the least favorable for Long Beach, even though 
economic returns are positive. Comparing the pathways with the associated delayed 
investments, a 10.0% (or $63.6 million) and 3.4% (or $23.2 million) increase in economic 
efficiency is reached for the DCE-I and DCE-II respectively. 
The Ports of LA & LB show high economic efficiency for the DC strategy with an NPV of 
$768.2 million. The DCE-I and the pathway however are a combination of the industrial 
Ports and the back-area of the Ports. As Fig 6. shows, the DC strategy for the back-area 
of the Ports never reaches a positive NPV, but almost breaks even when implemented 
in 2085. As the DC strategy of the back-area of the Ports is part of the Ports’ pathway 
transition from DC to DCE-I, it negatively influences the economic efficiency. Still, based 
on our results, the most economically efficient outcome would be implementing the DC 
strategy in 2020 for the industrial Ports, while implementing DCE-II in 2045 for the residen-
tial back-area of the Ports. It should also be noted that the adaptation pathway from DC to 
DCE-I for the Ports also offers new expansion opportunities, which are not considered as a 
benefit in this study but could influence the economic desirability of this pathway. 
Figure 3.6 shows for South Bay, Santa Monica & Venice Beach and Malibu that DC is 
economically inefficient even when investments are delayed until the far future (>2080). 
Therefore, starting with DC in 2020 to then transition to a DCE strategy would always 
be less economically efficient than solely implementing one of the DCE strategies, but 















































Figure 3.6 | The optimal economic efficiencies per area under 200 cm of sea level rise; The NPV 
in million $ for the delayed investments (CBA-II, blue) and adaptation pathways (CBA-III, orange) 
are shown for all strategies and areas. The implementation year or transition year for which these 




3.5.1 The potential of adaptation pathways
Future uncertainty in climate change and sea level rise requires the improvement of risk 
evaluation tools to support coastal mega cities in adaptation decisions (Hallegatte et 
al., 2012; Kunreuther et al., 2014). Our CBA framework, which combines scenario-based 
methods with adaptation pathways, demonstrates the potential benefit of introducing 
flexibility into adaptation strategies. The outcomes already show that implementation of 
adaptation in 2020 is cost efficient in many cases, which is a signal for other coastal megac-
ities, underpinning the necessity of early adaptation in highly exposed and economically 
important areas. In terms of the adaptation pathways we evaluated, we found that higher 
economic efficiency can be reached by first investing in a strategy that focuses on beach 
nourishment and floodproofing of buildings, and later in time transitioning to a different 
strategy that underscores engineered protective measures such as sluices and dikes 
underneath beaches. Some of the measures of the initial strategy will not be fully effective 
for the duration of their lifespan, which could be viewed as a loss of investments, but 
still the benefits of an adaptation pathway outweigh these losses. For the case of Long 
Beach, under a 200 cm sea level rise scenario, economic efficiency can increase up to 10% 
using an adaptation pathway compared to implementing a single strategy. In addition 
to the increase in economic efficiency, adaptation pathways hold flexibility over time, 
allowing for the further development of transition strategies while still early adaptation is 
implemented. 
However, caution should be taken to identify ‘investment tipping points’ before transi-
tioning to a different strategy. The concept of tipping points was first introduced by 
Gunderson (2000) as an irreversible shift from one state to another. Although originally 
developed as an ecological concept, it is later widely applied in many other disciplines 
including socio-economic systems (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2018; Folke, 2006). In this study, we 
define investment tipping points as a moment in time where a transition to a different 
strategy will never reach pre-tipping point economic efficiency. In our case this was 
caused by investments in time of the initial strategy that were not economically beneficial 
for a pathway. Hence, after those investments, a pathway transition would result in lower 
economic returns than if a transition would have been made sooner in time. In a decision 
maker context, large investments in time that are part of a strategy should be reevaluated 
by exploring potential pathways before committing to the investments. Alternatively, 
Gunderson (2000) state that after a tipping point ‘[...] the only strategy is to adapt to the new, 
altered system.’ (p. 432). Although not explored in this chapter, a redesign of the transition 
strategy after an investment tipping point might result in different outcomes. 
It should be noted that we assessed economic efficiency triggers for an initial adaptation 
strategy and a possible transition to another. However, sea level rise is not expected to 
stop beyond 2100. Hence, when considering the far future, even the DCE strategies are 
likely only temporary adaptation strategies. While we assumed a lifespan of 100 years for 
floodproofing and structural measures, this could be modified to a shorter lifespan for 
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different applications of the framework (e.g., when considering a second or third transi-
tion), or increase the total time horizon to extend beyond 2100. Other types of adaptation, 
such as managed retreat, could also be included in such an analysis, but was excluded 
from this study as it does not fit the current needs of the local stakeholders. However, this 
could be an interesting addition for future research. 
In addition, we have not explicitly considered implementation time of a strategy or transi-
tion. Monitoring and re-evaluation of the adaptation strategies should be an ongoing 
process, and identification of investment tipping points should be identified in time to 
transition or make changes to the adaptation strategies accordingly.   
3.5.2 Co-benefits from nature-based solutions
Similar to King et al. (2011), our results also reveal that climate adaptation strategies with 
nature-based adaptation strategies at their core (restoring dunes, strengthening sandy 
beaches) (Cohen-Shacham et al., 2016; Temmerman et al., 2013) are economically attractive 
for reducing the risks of sea level rise. For Santa Monica, we find that the co-benefits of such 
measures for enhancing tourism and reducing beach erosion represent approximately 
21–24% of the total benefits for all strategies under a 75 cm sea level rise scenario, and 
roughly 11% for a DC strategy under a 200 cm sea level rise scenario. For Long Beach, the 
co-benefits represent only between 0.8 and 1.5% of the total benefits for all strategies and 
sea level rise scenarios; Long Beach has a relatively high exposure of assets, outweighing 
the co-benefits of adaptation in beaches. These estimated co-benefits are probably 
conservative estimates, indicating the need to further develop methods for appraising 
the value of ecosystem services for coastal areas, especially where beaches play such a 
dominant role in coastal management.
3.5.3 Over- and under-investments
Sea level rise projections are still uncertain (DeConto & Pollard, 2016; IPCC, 2014), potentially 
leading to inefficient choices when committing adaptation investments to a single sea 
level rise projection. We explored for the Long Beach DC strategy the potential economic 
inefficiencies due to under- or over-investments, representing the hypothetical future 
situations in which policy makers realize that too much or too little has been invested 
in adaptation and that an acceleration or delay in adaptation investments is required 
(Figure 3.7 and see also the electronic supplementary information of the original article). 
We found that for both under- and over-investments only minor inefficiencies are found 
over time. For under-adaptation economic inefficiencies primarily occur because the 
mandatory floodproof or elevation extent does not increase over time, leaving many 
structures vulnerable. For over-adaptation, a similar investment tipping point occurred, 
where an investment is made to increase the extent of the mandatory floodproof or 
elevation extent, while these properties are not yet at risk due to a slower rising sea level 
than anticipated. Again, this shows the importance of reevaluating the economic return of 




While climate change and socio-economic development are expected to exacerbate 
the impacts of flooding, future uncertainty requires the improvement of evaluation 
tools to support adaptation decisions. Adaptation pathways are defined as a sequence 
of adaptation actions or strategies over time, which anticipate uncertain and changing 
risk conditions such as sea level rise. This chapter presents a comparative CBA framework 
which combines scenario-based methods with adaptation pathways, to allow a transition 
from one strategy to another over time. The adaptation pathways are compared to a 
more conventional evaluation of delay in investments, where adaptation measures are 
implemented later in time to improve economic efficiency. 
We applied our method to an illustrative example of a major metropolitan area: Los Angeles 
County (LAC). To account for the geographical diverse characteristics of the LAC coast, the 
evaluated adaptation strategies were tailored to six main coastal segments: Malibu, Santa 
Monica & Venice Beach, South Bay, the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach (LA & LB), the 
residential back area of the ports (Wilmington/West Side), and Long Beach. Long Beach 
was used as the primary focus, but the results of all areas are found in the supplementary 
materials of the original article. The scenario-based CBA showed that economically desir-
able adaptation measures can be implemented in 2020, highlighting the necessity of early 
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Figure 3.7 | Conceptualized overview of under- and over-adaptation. The graphs indicate the 
changes in costs and benefits of adaptation as a result of under-adaptation (upper graph) and 
overadaptation (lower graph).
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economic efficiency up to 10% in net-present values, compared to implementing a single 
adaptation strategy. Besides the increase in economic efficiency, the adaptation pathway 
CBA-III shows the benefits of early adjustment of the initial strategy, while the transition 
strategy can be further optimized by learning about the pace of sea level rise. However, 
caution should be taken with ‘investment tipping points’, a point in time after which a 
transition of strategies will only lead to lower economic efficiencies than if the transition 
was made before the tipping point. 
Overall, we recommend that studies evaluating adaptation strategies should integrate 
scenario-based cost–benefit analyses (or delayed investment CBAs) with adaptation 
pathways into their frameworks. This approach can better inform decision makers about 
the robustness and economic desirability of their investment choices. The flexibility of 
adaptation pathways presents the possibility of making early investments in adaptation 
and keeping options open to increase protection standards in the future, while maintaining 
economic efficiency.
Rising waves of indecision
How financial incentives can support flood risk management
Chapter 4 
An agent-based model for evaluating reforms 
of the National Flood Insurance Program 
A benchmarked model applied to Jamaica Bay, 
NYC
This chapter is based on: de Ruig, L. T., Haer, T., de Moel, H., Orton, P. M., Botzen, W. J. W., & Aerts, J. C. 
J. H. (2021). An agent-based model for evaluating reforms of the National Flood Insurance Program: 
A benchmarked model applied to Jamaica Bay, NYC. Prepared for Risk Analysis.
Coastal flood risk is expected to increase as a result of climate change effects, such as sea level rise, 
and socio-economic growth. To support policy makers in making adaptation decisions, accurate 
flood risk assessments that account for the influence of complex adaptation processes on the 
developments of risks are essential. In this study, we integrate the dynamic adaptive behavior of 
homeowners within a flood risk modeling framework. Focusing on building-level adaptation and 
flood insurance, the agent-based model is benchmarked with empirical data for New York City, 
USA. The model simulates the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and frequently proposed 
reforms to evaluate their effectiveness. The model is applied to a case study of Jamaica Bay, NY. Our 
results indicate that risk-based premiums can improve insurance penetration rates and the afford-
ability of insurance compared to the baseline NFIP market structure. While a premium discount for 
disaster risk reduction incentivizes more homeowners to invest in dry-floodproofing measures, it 
does not significantly improve affordability. A low interest rate loan for financing risk-mitigation 
investments improves the uptake and affordability of dry-floodproofing measures. The benchmark 
and sensitivity analyses demonstrate how the behavioral component of our model matches 






Floods are devastating natural disasters, costing billions in damages annually. Flood risk is 
projected to increase as a consequence of driving forces such as socio-economic devel-
opment (Winsemius et al., 2016), population growth (Jongman et al., 2012), and climate 
change (IPCC, 2014). Although human adaptation responses can limit trends in flood 
risks, risk projections often do not consider the interplay between the flood risk environ-
ment and the dynamic adaptive behavior of the social system (Hallegatte et al., 2013a; 
Hirabayashi et al., 2013; Jongman et al., 2014; Rojas, Feyen, & Watkiss, 2013). Addressing such 
an interplay is important for accurate risk assessments and the evaluation policies that 
influence adaptive behavior. Disaster risk reduction (DRR) and risk transfer instruments are 
examples of measures for coping with flood risk (UNISDR, 2015). However, there are many 
unanswered questions regarding the effectiveness of DRR over time or the way in which 
risk transfer policies can incentivize the implementation of DRR. For instance, insurance 
is a useful tool to cope with flood losses as it provides financial compensation for those 
impacted during a flood event. Moreover, pure risk-based premiums may incentivize 
policyholders to implement DRR measures, often referred to as a discount on the original 
premium to reflect the risk decrease from the DRR measure (Mol, Botzen, & Blasch, 2018); 
however, few flood insurance schemes actively encourage DRR, and the amount of risk 
that can be reduced through such insurance incentives remains unclear (Hudson, de Ruig, 
et al., 2019). 
Flood insurance is one of the main means of transferring risk for households in the US. 
Since 1968, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has provided federal govern-
ment-guaranteed flood insurance to homeowners and businesses, holding over 5 million 
policies in force and covering $1.2 trillion in assets by 2015 (FEMA, 2016). This makes the 
NFIP the largest flood insurance market worldwide. However, the program has been criti-
cized for incentivizing policyholders to stay in flood-prone areas, making inaccurate risk 
assessments, setting premiums that do not reflect risk, and having a lack of incentives to 
implement DRR (Dixon & Clancy, 2006; FEMA, 2019a; Michel-Kerjan & Kousky, 2009). Even 
after Congress canceled $16 billion to enable the NFIP to pay claims for Hurricanes Harvey, 
Irma and Maria, the NFIP has been $20.5 billion in debt since 2019 (Horn & Webel, 2019; 
Miller et al., 2019). As a result, these problems contribute to political turmoil regarding the 
reauthorization and continuation of the NFIP(Kruse & Hochard, 2019). 
Implementing risk-based premiums has extensively been discussed as a possible reform 
measure (Kousky & Kunreuther, 2014; Michel-Kerjan, Czajkowski, & Kunreuther, 2014; 
Michel-Kerjan & Kunreuther, 2011; Miller et al., 2019), as it informs households of the true 
exposure of their residence to potential flood damage (Michel-Kerjan & Kunreuther, 2011). 
The NFIP moved towards implementing risk-based premiums in 2012, but the changes 
were reverted in 2014 due to concerns about the affordability of premiums (Michel-Kerjan 
et al., 2014). Current policies are again steering towards risk-based premiums, such as the 
expected implementation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Risk 
Rating 2.0 program in October 2021 (FEMA, 2019b), especially because the subsidized 
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premiums are a barrier for the private sector to enter the market. However, some worry 
exists that affordable risk-based premiums are not feasible in high risk areas (Kruse & 
Hochard, 2019; Kunreuther, 2019). Therefore, Kousky and Kunreuther (2014) have suggested 
coupling risk-based premiums with a discount  for policyholders who take risk-reduction 
measures, which means that the premium remains a pure risk-based premium. Moreover, 
they proposed the introduction of an accessible loan structure to cover the high upfront 
investment of DRR measures.
Several risk assessment studies have attempted to simulate the effects of different NFIP 
reform measures (Kousky & Kunreuther, 2014; Michel-Kerjan et al., 2014; National Research 
Council, 2015). However, they have not addressed the dynamic interaction between 
homeowners and the changing flood risk environment. For example, studies suggest that 
risk perception is high after a major flood event occurs, which leads to a higher uptake 
of insurance and DRR measures (Brilly & Polic, 2005; Ruin, Gaillard, & Lutoff, 2007; Siegrist 
& Gutscher, 2006). Such adaptation processes in turn imply reduced vulnerability and a 
decline in flood risk. Therefore, recent socio-hydrology studies have stressed the impor-
tance of accounting for the interactions between social and hydrological systems, but 
these studies often focus on macro-processes and lack individual household decisions 
(Di Baldassarre, Kooy, Kemerink, & Brandimarte, 2013; Di Baldassarre et al., 2015; Viglione 
et al., 2014). While studies such as those by Haer et al. ( 2019; 2020), Tonn et al. (2019), 
Tonn and Guikema (2018) or Han and Peng (2019) have demonstrated that agent-based or 
multi-agent models are able to capture the behavior of households in relation to flood risk, 
they are often limited by computational power and a lack of empirical data to calibrate or 
benchmark the behavioral elements of the models. This challenge with calibrating behav-
ioral rules in agent-based models applies more broadly to climate change risk applications, 
and studies consequently have had to resort to ad hoc rules with simplified assumptions 
based on expert judgment (Aerts, Botzen, et al., 2018). 
To overcome these limitations, the goal of this paper is to assess the mean impact of insur-
ance changes on homeowners based on benchmarked empirical data. Our agent-based 
model on flood risk and the dynamic adaptive behavior of households is used to examine 
the following research aims: 1) benchmark the behavioral elements in the model to obtain 
an accurate set of parameters. 2) use the benchmarked model to evaluate four proposed 
reform changes to the NFIP: a) a full mandatory purchase requirement in the 100-year 
flood zone, b) risk-based premiums, c) risk-based premiums with a premium discount for 
implementing DRR measures, and d) a low interest rate loan for financing DRR – the latter 
reform measure is applied in conjunction with the other reforms, and not a separate case. 
The reform measures are compared to an NFIP baseline, resulting in a total of 8 variations. 
The last aim 3) is to test the robustness of the model using a sensitivity analysis. The model 
is applied to Jamaica Bay, NYC. 
4.2 Case study: New York City – Jamaica Bay
Jamaica Bay is located at the south end of the boroughs of Queens and Brooklyn. Many 
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of the neighborhoods surrounding Jamaica Bay are low-lying and already vulnerable to 
flooding from high tides (Freudenberg et al., 2016). Storm surges, wetland degradation, 
and sea level rise are therefore major threats to the coastal communities. For example, 
Jamaica Bay was one of the most heavily flooded areas during Hurricane Sandy in 2012. 
Since then, several plans have been proposed, such as by Fischbach et al. (2018) and Jones 
et al. (2018), to reduce flood risk in the area. In total, $14.7 billion was assigned to city repairs 
and resiliency, of which only 54% has been spent because of slow federal bureaucracy and 
a lack of urgency, despite the future threats of climate change (Stringer, 2019). 
Seven years after Hurricane Sandy, insurance penetration rates have decreased by 18%, 
8%, and 2% for Staten Island, Queens, and Brooklyn respectively, even though Staten Island 
and Queens were one of the hardest hit boroughs (Choi, Chung, Michel, & Smith, 2019). 
Current flood insurance rate maps (FIRMs) are from 19833. Updating of these maps began 
in 2010, and they were preliminarily released in 2013 (known as preliminary flood insur-
ance rate maps: PFIRMs) (Miller et al., 2019). However, in 2016, the de Blasio administration 
won its appeal against FEMA, claiming that the maps present overestimations of risk and 
incorrect base flood elevations (City of New York Mayor’s Office of Recovery and Resiliency, 
2015). Current insurance rates for Jamaica Bay are still based on a 1983 modelling study 
(Dixon et al., 2013) while the new maps are being revised, with new FIRMs expected in 
2022 or 2023. To highlight the severity, Table 4.1 shows the exposure in terms of buildings 
at risk of floods for different return periods. Even under current climate conditions, 26,319 
buildings are in a high risk flood zone. With the current flaws of the NFIP and the political 
turmoil worsening the program’s effectiveness by delaying updated FIRMs in Jamaica Bay, 
our model is suitable for analyzing the effects and interactions regarding improving the 
insurance market structure and reflecting risk to homeowners. 
4.3 Methods
Figure 4.1 illustrates our methodological framework. The input data, and climate change 
and socio-economic scenarios  are shown in the top-left box. The first analysis entails a 
benchmark of the model to derive a reliable set of parameters, indicated in the left-most 
box. The model, consisting of a flood risk model and behavioral modules, subsequently 
3 Only minor changes were made in 2007 to the riverine part of the FIRM, though not relevant for this study 




2010 26,319 51,552 84,576
2055 33,843 57,000 90,958
Table 4.1 | An indication of flood exposure (number of buidlings exposed) for three different return 
periods for current and future climate conditions.
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simulates four NFIP market structures: NFIP baseline, NFIP full mandatory, NFIP risk-based, 
NFIP risk-based with premium discounts. In addition, the impact of an accessible loan 
structure is applied to those four market structures. Lastly, a sensitivity analysis is conducted 
to test the robustness of the model. The model runs and sensitivity analysis are both 
visualized by indicators of flood risk, insurance and disaster risk reduction by homeowners. 
This section is structured as follows: first, the flood risk model, the input datasets, and the 
scenario settings of the models’ runs are described in Section 3.1. We build upon the model 
by Haer et al. (2019), which is an agent-based model on adaptive human behavior within 
a flood risk modeling framework; however, it does not include an advanced insurance 
market. Therefore, we expand the agent-based model to include the NFIP scenarios and 
account for affordability. Section 3.2 briefly describes the essential modeling features and 
focuses on the changes made to the model compared with the one by Haer et al. (2019). 
Lastly, the benchmark and sensitivity analyses are described in Section 3.3. 
4.3.1 Flood risk model, data, and scenarios
The flood risk component of the model is a commonly applied hazard-exposure-vulner-
ability model (de Moel et al., 2013; Kron, 2005). The flood hazard is represented by water 
depth data from hydrodynamic model simulations for a set of nine storms that span a wide 
range of intensity from 5-year to 10,000-year return periods. The relationship between 
probability and water level was previously determined using a joint probability method-
based hazard assessment that was an ensemble simulation of a diverse set of thousands 
of possible storms, including both tropical and extratropical cyclone events (Orton et 
al., 2016). Here, nine representative storms were selected that matched the water levels 
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Figure 4.1 | Methodological framework.
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inside the bay for the 5-, 10-, 30-, 50-, 100-, 300-, 500-, 1000-, and 10,000-year flood events. 
Lastly, two-dimensional flood simulations for these storms were run on a 30-m resolution 
nested grid for Jamaica Bay (Fischbach et al., 2018; Orton, Sanderson, Talke, Giampieri, & 
MacManus, 2020), and water levels were differenced with the model’s land elevations 
to compute water depth. In the agent-based model runs, risk calculations over time are 
based on an interpolation of the present day inundation data and future projections. In 
addition, a flood can stochastically occur each year during each model run, based on the 
probability of occurrence of each storm. 
The National Land Cover Database (NLCD) 2016 (USGS & The Multi-Resolution Land 
Characteristics (MRLC) Consortium, 2016) was used for exposure. Depth-damage curves 
and maximum damage values represent the vulnerability of the model and were taken 
from FEMA’s HAZUS Multi-Hazard model (FEMA, 2013a). Depth-damage curves describe 
the relationship between inundation depth and percentage damage to a land-use class. 
These curves can subsequently be altered to represent a household that has implemented 
dry-floodproofing measures to its property. Dry-floodproofing is preventing water from 
entering the property, which will lead to a decrease in damages up to 85% for the first 
meter of inundation (Aerts, Botzen, et al., 2013; de Ruig, Barnard, et al., 2019). However, 
inundation >1 m will cause overtopping and will result in full damages. It should be noted 
that FEMA recommends the implementation of dry-floodproofing measures, but does not 
provide a discount on insurance premiums for taking these measures. By calculating the 
damages per return period, the expected annual damage (EAD) or flood risk (in $/year) can 
be computed as the integral of the exceedance probability curve. 
The initial setup of the population was based on U.S. Census data(U.S. Census Bureau, 
2010b). Shared socio-economic pathway (SSP) (Crespo Cuaresma, 2017; Dellink, Chateau, 
Lanzi, & Magné, 2017; Jiang & O’Neill, 2017; Leimbach, Kriegler, Roming, & Schwanitz, 2017; 
Riahi et al., 2017; Samir & Lutz, 2017) scenarios were used to represent population growth 
and economic growth, which have proven to be major drivers in flood risk (Winsemius et 
al., 2016). We applied the SSP2 and SSP5 scenarios, as they are most commonly applied 
in similar studies. SSP2 is a middle-of-the-road scenario (Fricko et al., 2017), and SSP5 is 
an energy- and resource-intensive scenario (Kriegler et al., 2017); the former is used 
throughout the paper, and the results of the SSP5 scenario can be found in the supple-
mentary information (SI4). The GDP growth from the SSPs was used to increase value of 
properties and income over time. 
 
4.3.2 Agent-based flood risk model and market reforms
Flood risk models are commonly modeled as a function of the hazard, the exposure of 
assets, and the vulnerability of assets (e.g., to flood events). However, these often assume 
vulnerability to be static over time, as though no adaptation measures are taken in response 
to changing risk from climate change. In contrast, the agent-based flood risk model, as 
developed by Haer et al. (2019), integrates the dynamic adaptive behavior of homeowners 
and governments within a flood risk framework. Homeowners can decide to (a) take flood 
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risk insurance and (b) invest in DRR measures, such as dry-floodproofing. Furthermore, 
they make decisions following a subjective, (discounted) expected utility theory, which 
is the standard economic theory of decision making under risk. Governments can make 
decisions on macro-scale adaptation, such as elevating dike heights, following a cost-ben-
efit analysis. For this study, we adapted the model by Haer et al. (2019) and primarily focus 
on homeowners and their adaptive behavior in relation to that of insurance markets, as 
we are particularly interested in the interaction between the two. While governmental 
interaction is included, it only statically maintains the protection standard over time. The 
sensitivity analysis includes the effects of different protection standards. The following 
subsections explain specific parts of the model that were adjusted to the needs of the 
research aims set in this paper. For a detailed description of the original model, refer to the 
supplementary material of Haer et al. (2019). 
4.3.2.1	 Homeowners’	decisions	regarding	flood	insurance
The dynamic behavior of homeowners is represented per 30-m resolution grid cell, with 
in total 324,900 unique representative agents. Each year homeowners make a decision 
about purchasing or canceling flood insurance. The analysis ran the following four market 
reforms twice (once with personal loans and once with a reformed accessible loan, Figure 
4.1): 
(a)  The NFIP baseline. This market structure simulates the current NFIP practices as 
closely as possible. Part of the NFIP is a mandatory purchase requirement for federally 
funded mortgages in a 100-year flood zone(Zhao, Kunreuther, & Czajkowski, 2015). 
Dixon and Clancy (2006) have estimated that, on average, only 55% of the properties 
are bound to the mandatory requirement, and 78% of those households comply (Dixon 
& Clancy, 2006; Zhao et al., 2015). Based on this mandatory share and compliance rate, 
households in the 100-year flood zone are randomly selected as mandatorily required 
policyholders in the setup. 
(b)  The NFIP with a full 100-year flood zone mandatory requirement. This second 
market structure enforces a full mandatory requirement in the 100-year flood zone 
(regardless of mortgage type), but without risk-based premiums. 
(c)  The NFIP with risk-based premiums. This third market structure applies risk-based 
premiums to all flood zones, without a mandatory requirement.
(d)  The NFIP with risk-based premiums and a premium discount. Similar to market 
structure C, but in addition a premium discount on the original risk-based premium 
is offered to policyholders who floodproof their homes, to incentivize disaster risk-re-
ducing behavior. 
For homeowners without a mandatory requirement, the choice to take insurance follows 
a subjective expected utility (Haer et al., 2019; Hudson, Botzen, et al., 2019; Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1947) (EU) model, which accounts for bounded rationality in understanding 
risk, as indicated in Equation 1. For each time step and for each grid cell, the EU was calcu-
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lated and compared for two strategies: 
 Strategy 1: take insurance, accepting the deductible; or
 Strategy 2: do not take or cancel insurance.
The strategy that yields the highest EU will be chosen. If Strategy 1 is followed, then afford-
ability of the annual premium is first calculated. If the premium is deemed unaffordable, 
then insurance is not adopted (see Section 4.3.2.4). The subjective EU equation is as follows:
Equation 4.1 calculates EUs for each strategy s. Each event i has a probability pi of occur-
ring. The total set of events I are the return periods of each flood event and the probability 
of no flood event. The EUs is subsequently calculated as the approximation of the integral 
over I. Individuals are assumed to be boundedly rational in understanding of the flood 
risk they face, which is represented by the risk perception factor β. β is uniform between 
agents but is based on survey data as described in Section 4.3.3. 
Utility is calculated as a function of wealth W, uncovered damage D, premium C, and a 
premium discount d (if applicable for the scenario). Damage D per event i for year t is 
calculated using the hazard-exposure-vulnerability model; however, it can be misper-
ceived per individual by factor γ, described in more detail in Section 4.3.3. For Strategy 
1, homeowners must pay a deductible of 10% of the incurred damages (δ1 = 0.1), while 
Strategy 2 has full damages (as no damage is covered, so that δ2 = 1, C = 0, and d = 
0). The NFIP offers policyholders a choice in flat rate deductibles ($500; $1,000; $2,000; 
$3,000; $4,000; and $5,000 (Michel-Kerjan & Kousky, 2009)) and a choice of coverage. Collier 
and Ragin (2019) have highlighted the difficulty of accurately explaining these decisions 
in behavioral models; for example, they have demonstrated that approximately 12% of 
new policyholders over-insure, selecting a coverage exceeding the expected replace-
ment value of their property. Furthermore, adding the additional choice of selecting the 
coverage amount and a deductible would have significantly increased the computational 
cost of the model. Therefore, we followed Haer et al. (2019) and Hudson et al. (2019), who 
applied a 10% deductible and full coverage. 
A general utility function is assumed, as shown in Equation 4.2, as a function following 
constant relative risk aversion (Bombardini & Trebbi, 2012; Harrison, List, & Towe, 2007; 
Wakker, 2008): 
(4.1) =  , ×  ,  ,  
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The following different variations of risk aversion σ were analyzed: risk seeking (-1), risk 
neutral (0), and risk averse (1, 2, and 4). Note that when σ = 1, the Equation 4.2 is U(x) = 
ln(x) instead.
While homeowners are aware of increasing risk over time, it is assumed that they are 
not fully informed due to their bounded rationality, which implies that they have limited 
cognitive capabilities in processing risk (i.e., imperfect information). Therefore, at the start 
of each simulation, each agent is assigned a different ‘risk-increase’ value picked from a 
random-uniform distribution of the objective risk increase and no increase at all.  
4.3.2.2	 Premium	setting
For this study, we applied the 100-year flood zone as defined by our own probabilistic 
flood data, which is slightly larger than the NFIP 100-year flood zone based on the 1983 
FIRMs, as shown in Figure 4.2. We require a wide range of probability storms from 5-year 
(20% annual chance) to 10,000-year (0.001% annual chance) for our integration across all 
probability events, and similar data are not available from FEMA’s studies. Moreover, given 
the large differences between the 1983 FIRM and the 2013 PFIRMs (that were successfully 
appealed as inaccurate), it is ambiguous which FEMA flood data should be used. 
However, this has significant implications for the premium setting of the current NFIP 
market structure, as about 16,000 properties are located in the 1983 FIRM 100-year flood 
zone, whereas the newly defined 100-year flood zone includes about 26,000 properties. 
Dixon et al. (2017) show that properties that would be included in the PFIRM 100-year 
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Figure 4.2 | Jamaica Bay, NYC with green indicating the 1983 FIRM 100-year flood zone, and blue 
the newly defined 100-year flood zone by our inundation model. Buildings outside the 100-year 
flood zone that have a chance of coastal flooding are also included in the analysis.
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risk premiums. However, the NFIP applies a discount to properties built before the flood 
risk was mapped in that area (referred to as pre-FIRM properties) (FEMA, 2013b; Kousky & 
Kunreuther, 2014). In addition, grandfathering is a practice where homeowners are allowed 
to keep their old premiums when an update to FIRMs reclassifies them into a higher risk 
zone (Kousky & Kunreuther, 2014). If grandfathering and pre-FIRM discounts are allowed, 
increases of premiums might be less severe (Dixon et al., 2017). Notwithstanding the 
potential change in mean premiums, the benchmark of this study will be conducted with 
a survey based on 1983 FIRM rates. Altogether, we assume no grandfathering, pre-FIRM 
or other building-specific effects on the premium, as this would overcomplicate the 
behavioral module of the model, but use a county-wide mean premium of $1,275 per 
household in high risk zones, and $820 per household for low risk zones for the current 
NFIP market structure (Czajkowski, Villarini, Montgomery, Michel-Kerjan, & Goska, 2017). To 
correct for future changes in risk, the current NFIP premiums are adjusted with percentual 
risk changes over time. 
For the risk-based market structures, the annual premium Cpremium,t was calculated as an 
actuarially fair premium for each 30m resolution cell by the flood risk module, as described 
in section 4.3.1. The premiums are converted to household-level using population data, 
with the addition of a loading factor and minus the deductible. The loading factor was 
the same for all market structures and was based on the current NFIP loading factors and 
additional costs that are estimated at 37% (FEMA, 2013b). Only for the fourth scenario, a 
premium discount dpremium,t was offered when homeowners implemented dry-flood-
proofing, equivalent to the reduction of risk due to the implementation of floodproofing 
measures (i.e., the premium remains a pure risk-based premium). 
Figure 4.3 compares the distribution of risk-based premiums for all households in the 
100-year flood zone with the mean NFIP baseline high-risk premium (as the dotted line). 
Michel-Kerjan et al. (2014) have demonstrated that NFIP premiums can be more than 15 
times the actuarial premium for some areas, while for other areas, premiums can be three 
times lower than the actuarial premium. As seen in Figure 4.3, risk-based premiums have 
significant spatial variation within the 100-year flood zone. As a result, a share of house-
NFIP risk−based premium distribution 
for all households in high−risk flood zones 2010










Figure 4.3 | NFIP risk-based premium distribution for all homeowners in the 100-year flood zone. 
The dotted line indicates the current mean NFIP premium for high-risk flood zones.
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holds might experience a decrease in premiums, while others will experience an increase. 
Because of some extreme outliers, mean risk-based premiums for the 100-year flood zone 
is estimated at $3373.
4.3.2.3	 Homeowners’	decisions	regarding	adaptation
In terms of adaptation, homeowners can decide to implement dry-floodproofing 
measures. These measures are often found to be the most economically efficient option 
compared with wet-floodproofing or elevation of existing buildings (Aerts & Botzen, 2011b; 
de Ruig, Haer, de Moel, Botzen, & Aerts, 2020). Dry-floodproofing measures are assumed 
to reduce damages by 85%, unless inundation exceeds 1 m, in which case full damages 
are assumed (Aerts & Botzen, 2011b). Per annual time step, Equation 4.3 calculates the 
subjective discounted expected utility (Haer et al., 2019; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
1947) (DEU) per homeowner for two strategies:
 Strategy 1: implement dry-floodproofing measures; or
 Strategy 2: do nothing.
The homeowners will follow the strategy that yields the highest DEU. For Strategy 1, the 
affordability of investing in dry-floodproofing measures is first determined. If the invest-
ment appears to be unaffordable, then no action is taken for that year. The unaffordability 
is further described in Section 4.3.2.4. The DEU equation is as follows:
The DEU model is calculated for strategy s. The variables D, β, γ, W, p, and i and the general 
utility function U(x) are similar to those in Equation 4.1. The NPVs is the sum of the wealth 
Wt minus the (reduced) damages Di,t,s over the lifespan of dry-floodproofing T, discounted 
to the present value using discount rate r. The lifespan of dry-floodproofing is assumed to 
be 75 years, following Aerts & Botzen (2011). The discount rate is the pure time preference 
for residents and is assumed to be 3%, following Tol (2011). Lastly, the investment cost 
for dry-floodproofing C0,s (assumed to be $100 per m2, following Aerts (2018)) is funded 
through a loan structure with an interest rate n and a length of L. Therefore, residents are 
valuing their annual loan payment Cannual,s against the benefits. For Strategy 2 without 
action, the NPVs contains full perceived damages and no investment costs. 
4.3.2.4	 (Un-)affordability:	providing	accessible	loans
The affordability of insurance and DRR investments is important to consider because 
(4.3)
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market structures or incentives for risk reduction do not work if one is simply not able to 
afford it. While the affordability of insurance is well discussed in the literature (Hudson, 
2018; Kousky & Kunreuther, 2014; National Research Council, 2015; Zhao et al., 2015), the 
affordability of homeowner-level DRR, such as floodproofing of buildings, has not been 
extensively studied (Hudson, 2020). Following Kousky and Kunreuther (2014) and Hudson 
(2018), we applied an expenditure cap definition for unaffordability. For insurance, it is 
assumed that households can afford flood insurance if their annual premium is within 
the 2.5% expenditure cap of their annual income. Income is distributed per county (i.e., 
Queens, Nassau and Kings county) through a log-normal distribution based on mean and 
median income from the United States Census Bureau 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010a). 
The investment for dry-floodproofing is a long term-investment, and its affordability 
is more difficult to assess using an annual income. For example, households save, on 
average, 6.9% of their disposable annual income (OECD, 2019), but these savings might 
not be intended for adaptation investments. Therefore, we assume that homeowners can 
take personal loans and that the annual loan payment is used to evaluate affordability. We 
applied different variations of personal loan interest rates and lengths in the benchmark 
assessment to accurately represent the implementation rates of dry-floodproofing. A 
reform measure was also evaluated, as suggested by Kousky and Kunreuther (2014), with 
federally funded loans for floodproofing measures, with a 4% interest rate for 20 years. 
4.3.3 Benchmark using post-Sandy survey data and sensitivity analysis
Many have argued that calibrating or benchmarking a multi-agent or agent-based model 
that simulates human behavior is important; however, this is difficult due to a lack of 
data (Crooks et al., 2008; Moss, 2008; Smajgl & Barreteau, 2017). In our case, such data are 
available, and we benchmarked a set of six model parameters using a survey conducted 
by Botzen et al.(Botzen et al., 2015). These parameters are risk aversion, governmental 
protection standards, investment costs of dry-floodproofing, both the length and the 
interest rate of personal loans, and the expenditure cap of dry-floodproofing.
The survey by Botzen et al. (2015) was conducted six months after Hurricane Sandy, 
and it focused on the flood risk perception, flood experiences, and flood preparedness 
of property owners in flood-prone areas in NYC. For our study, we subset the survey for 
Brooklyn and Queens, which are most relevant for Jamaica Bay. Literature suggests that 
residents are likely to overestimate their risk after a flood event (Brilly & Polic, 2005; Ruin 
et al., 2007; Siegrist & Gutscher, 2006), while they underestimate their risk after a period 
of no flood events (Fox & Hadar, 2006; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004). This form 
of bounded rationality of residents is modeled as a variable perception of storm proba-
bilities and damages per individual. Table 4.2 shows the perceived probability factor β 
and perceived damage factor γ for the 100-year and 500-year flood zones. For example, 
a household in a 100-year flood zone with a perceived probability factor of 7.9773, will 
perceive a 500-year flood as a 63-year flood instead. 
In the model, immediately after a storm event (i.e., the grid cell experiences some level of 
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inundation), β and γ increase to the observed overestimation from the NYC survey (1.2456 
for flood damage and 12.1462 for storm probabilities), and will adjust the objective proba-
bilities and damages per flood event (pi and Di in Equation 4.1 and 4.3) to their subjective 
equivalent. In years with no storm events (i.e., the grid cell experiences no inundation), β 
and γ will subsequently decay to the inverse of the observed values in approximately six 
years after the storm event, in line with empirical evidence (Bin & Landry, 2013; Kunreuther, 
1996; Kunreuther, Sanderson, & Vetschera, 1985). Equations 4.4 mathematically portray the 
perceived probability and damage factor function respectively. If a flood occurs, then αt = 
1, and if no flood occurs, then αt = αt-1 / 1.6. 
The benchmark aims to match the observed penetration rates of insurance and the imple-
mentation rate of dry-floodproofing measures (Table 4.3) with modeling outcomes when 
risk perceptions (β and γ) are at post-Sandy levels, as listed in Table 4.2. Starting values for 
the benchmark of β and γ are based on Table 4.2 and differ per flood zone, while for regular 
model runs β and γ have an average starting value of αt = 0.1).  In addition, the benchmark 
is used to gain a better understanding of the underlying theories and processes and how 
they respond to different sets of parameters. The benchmark was run for the NFIP baseline 
scenario; it ran 1,215 different combinations of all six parameter variations for 50 repetitions. 
Dry-floodproofing is often seen as a package of individual measures (e.g., shields in front 
of doors, water-resistant coating on walls, and a backflow valve). The survey asked respon-
dents whether they implemented individual measures of dry-floodproofing, and Table 2 
lists how many of those measures respondents implemented. FEMA (2014b) recommends 
implementing all three measures for optimal protection, and 11.27% was thus used in the 
benchmark evaluation. When benchmark outcomes were equifinal, literature was used to 
support the final selection of the parameter set. 
Subjective over objective 
damage factor











Std. Deviation 2.606 37.627
Table 4.2 | The observed perception factors of damages and probabilities of an flood event.
(4.4)
=  12.0639 ×  . + 0.08233 
=  0.442774 ×  . + 0.802826 
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A local, one-at-a-time sensitivity analysis was conducted with the same set of parameters 
as those used for the benchmark. The sensitivity analysis only used the SSP2 middle-of-the-
road scenario and risk-based scenarios, and it purely focused on the variation of parameter 
values. This allowed for a better understanding of the robustness of the model and how 
individual parameters influence modeling results.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Benchmarked parameter setting
Table 4.4 presents the outcome of the benchmarked parameter set, and Appendix A.1 
provides a sample of the most relevant outcomes out of the 1215 unique runs. In addition, 
Table 4.3 lists the implementation rate of dry-floodproofing and the penetration rate of 
insurance for a single model run with a forced 500-year flood, similar to the estimated 400- 
to 500-year return period of Sandy (N. Lin, Emanuel, Oppenheimer, & Vanmarcke, 2012; N. 
Lin, Kopp, Horton, & Donnelly, 2016). Both values are slightly higher than the observed 
values in Table 4.2; however, they are within acceptable margins. 
To further explore the benchmark results, we made density plots for each parameter over 
the penetration rate of dry-floodproofing and insurance policies, as illustrated in Figure 4.4, 
wherein the dotted line denotes the observed penetration rates from Table 4.3. For each of 
the density plots in Figure 4.4, all the observations are shown, with different groupings per 
variable. Figure 4.4 indicates that a large variety of unique parameter combinations could 
match the benchmark outcome with the observed penetration rate of dry-floodproofing. 
However, the observed insurance penetration rate is in the tail end of most density plots, 
meaning that only a limited combination of parameters will result in the observed insur-











0 210 29.96 Yes 462 65.91
1 257 36.66 No 232 33.1
2 155 22.11 Don’t know 7 1
3 79 11.27
Total 701 100 Total 701 100
* For dry-floodproofing, three questions on individual measures were asked, and when combined, 
they counted as a fully floodproofed property.
Table 4.3 | Observed dry-floodproofing and insurance penetration rates based on a household sur-
vey in Jamaica Bay. 
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Moreover, the results from Figure 4.4 can be used to gain a better understand of the 
underlying interactions and theories due to changes in parameter settings, such as tipping 
points. Two tipping points are highlighted. First, Figure 4b illustrates that dry-floodproofing 
penetration rates increase with rising risk aversion (the highest peak of -1 is found at an 
implementation rate of 18%, while the highest peak of 2 is found at 40%), except for a risk 
aversion value of 4 (which reveals a more flattened out pattern). With rising risk aversion, 
homeowners start to increasingly value protection against low-probability events. This 
initially causes a higher uptake of dry-floodproofing. However, dry-floodproofing is not 
effective for extreme events with high inundation depths that cause overtopping. A tipping 
point consequently occurs where homeowners’ risk aversion is so high that they begin to 
value extreme events even more. Simply put, increasing the coefficient for risk aversion 
does not necessarily increase the penetration rate of dry-floodproofing, as a resident with 
high risk aversion can find dry-floodproofing to be ineffective in reducing flood risk. We 
did not observe this behavior for flood insurance demand in Fig 4.4a, as insurance provides 
benefits for all storm probabilities. 
The second tipping point is observed in Figure 4.4c. The three highest peaks in Figure 
4.4c are associated with insurance penetration rates of approximately 47%, 52%, and 47% 
for a protection standard of 10, 30, and 50 years respectively. As Equation 4.1 indicates, 
the EU for insurance policy uptake is a balance between how much perceived damage is 
covered due to the deductibles and how high premiums are. Higher protection standards 
prevent more flood events, thus reducing risk and resulting in a lower premium; however, 
this also translates to a less effective insurance policy (i.e., the prevented floods no longer 
require insurance). We observed an increase in penetration rate if the assumed protection 
standard increases from 10 to 30 years – the lower premium outweighs the lower coverage. 
Moreover, a tipping occurs when the protection increases from 30 to 50 years – the lower 
coverage outweighs the lower premium. 
Parameter Benchmarked setting
Risk aversion 4
Protection standard 30 years
Investment costs of dry-floodproofing 100 $/m2
Expenditure cap of dry-floodproofing investment 2.50%
Loan interest rate 15%
Loan duration 5 years
Test run outcome: Dry-floodproofing implementation rate 12.80%
Test run outcome: Insurance penetration rate 68.20%







































































































































































































Figure 4.4 | Density plots for the different parameters over the penetration rate of insurance and the 
implementation rate of dry-floodproofing. The dotted, vertical lines indicate the observed values, 
also found in Table 4.2.
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Figure 4.5 | The mean of 50 model repetitions for the four different insurance market structures. 
(a) The number of households with a policy in force (including mandatory policyholders), (b) the 
number of households that are not able to afford insurance, and (c) the number of households that 
are willing to take insurance (excluding mandatory policyholders).
4.4.2 Application on Jamaica Bay
4.4.2.1	 Insurance	indicators
Figure 4.5 illustrates the mean outcomes of 50 modeling runs for the four different scenarios 
using the benchmarked parameter settings (see Appendix A.2 for convergence tests that 
confirm stability of results, and Appendix A.4 for SSP5 modelling outcomes). Figure 4.5a 
portrays the number of households with a policy in force over time (including the manda-
tory share), while Figure 4.5b depicts the number of households with an unaffordable 
premium, and Figure 4.5c presents the number of households willing to obtain insurance 
based on their EU (excluding the mandatory share). 
The number of policies within the baseline NFIP market structure increases over time, from 
approximately 60,000 policies in 2010 to 75,000 policies in 2080, which implies penetration 
rates of about 19% and 25% respectively. Although the penetration rate might seem low 
compared to the observed values in Table 4.2, note that the observed values from Table 
4.2 are directly after Hurricane Sandy (estimated as a 400- to 500-year storm (N. Lin et al., 
2012, 2016)) and thus under high risk perception conditions. In the model, storms occur 
stochastically, based on their return period, and they influence risk perceptions accord-
ingly. Our model demonstrates that for Jamaica Bay for the NFIP baseline market structure, 
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roughly 60,000 policies are in force, 27,000 of which are due to the mandatory requirement. 
The mandatory share is expected to be slightly larger than current NFIP practice, as our 
100-year flood zone is based on our inundation data instead of FEMA’s FIRM. 
For the NFIP mandatory market structure, penetration rates are higher, with 85,000 total 
policies in force in 2010, increasing to around to 115,000 policies in 2080 (34% and 35% 
respectively). However, the mandatory share increases to around 65,000 policies, which 
also translates to the highest unaffordability out of all scenarios. Note that the mandatory 
requirement is only enforced in the 100-year flood zone but for all properties and without 
a compliance rate.
The NFIP risk-based (with or without premium discount) market structures performed best 
out of all scenarios, with penetration rates of around 65% in 2010 to about 74% in 2080, 
corresponding to roughly 180,000 policies in force in 2010 and increasing to 215,000 in 
2080. The market structure with a discount yielded slightly higher uptake and penetration 
rates, as seen in Figure 4.5a. Unaffordability was also lowest, with about 11,000 households 
in 2010 and increasing to 18,000 households in 2080. Part of the increase in penetration 
rates and affordability is that a large share of high risk zone households have a lower 
premium for the risk-based market structure, than the mean observed NFIP premium. For 
2010, the mean premiums in the high-risk zone are $820 for risk-based premiums (based 
on agents with insurance) and $1,275 for the current NFIP baseline market-structure. 
However, the distribution of premiums (as shown in Appendix A.3), shows that there is a 
tail-end with a share of households with significantly more costly premiums, than the NFIP 
baseline average. The share of households with very large changes in premiums, as shown 
in Fig. 4.3, did not purchase insurance.
While unaffordability was relatively low, it increased over time by approximately 7,000 
households. To analyze unaffordability, only households with mandatory forced policies 
and those that were willing to buy insurance were considered. Offering a premium discount 
when risk-reduction measures are in place does not seem to improve affordability, as seen 
in Figure 4.5. If the annual insurance premium is unaffordable for a household, then it most 
likely does not have the funds to invest in dry-floodproofing measures, not even through 
a personal loan, and thus cannot apply for the premium discount. 
4.4.2.2	 Dry-floodproofing	indicators
Figure 4.6a illustrates the number of households that implemented dry-floodproofing, 
and Figure 4.6b indicates the number of households that were unable to afford 
dry-floodproofing, assuming households have access to a personal loan structure. 
Note that flood-proofing costs between market structures does not change, and thus 
unaffordability is almost identical in Fig. 4.6b. The NFIP baseline, the NFIP full mandatory, 
and the NFIP risk-based without a premium discount revealed no significant differences 
in terms of implementation rates. Approximately 15,000 households initially invested in 
dry-floodproofing measures for all market structures, increasing to about 20,000 in 2080. 
This number translates to an implementation rate of roughly 5% and 8% in 2010 and 2080 
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Figure 4.6 | The mean of 50 modeling repetitions depicting (a) the number of households that 
implemented dry-floodproofing measures and (b) the number of households unable to afford 
dry-floodproofing for all four insurance market structures.
respectively. The increase of households who invested in dry-floodproofing over time, as 
depicted in Figure 4.6, is primarily caused by the increase in flood risk over time. Similar to 
the observed insurance market penetration, the observed dry-floodproof implementation 
rates in Table 4.2 are higher than those found in the modeling runs. Note again that the 
values in Table 4.2 should be interpreted as high risk perceptions, causing homeowners to 
overestimate the probability and damages of floods. 
Providing a premium discount to incentivize the adoption of dry-floodproofing resulted in 
a distinct increase in implementation rates compared to the other three market structures 
(Figure 4.6a). With about 15,000 policies in force in 2010 to roughly 23,000 policies in force 
in 2080 (implementation rate of 5.5% to 9.2% respectively), the premium discount demon-
strates the effectiveness of incentivizing DRR through an insurance market structure. The 
increase is the result of households that are likely to have insurance with or without a 
discount, but because of the discount are incentivized to invest in flood-proofing measures 
as well. Hence, unaffordability is unchanged between market structures.
The implementation rate as seen in Figure 4.6a stagnates over time. The willingness of 
homeowners to invest in dry-floodproofing is hence decreasing over time, despite sea level 
rise exacerbating risk. Dry-floodproofing is not effective during events that cause overtop-
ping of the floodproofing height. Therefore, with increasing risk, some homeowners are 
no longer willing to invest in dry-floodproofing measures. This also explains the patterns 
found in Figure 4.6b – affordability is decreasing over time to close to zero. Unaffordability 
was only measured for households that were willing to implement dry-floodproofing. If no 
households were willing to invest in dry-floodproofing measures, then there would also 
be no households that cannot afford dry-floodproofing. The lifespan of dry-floodproofing 
is assumed to be 75 years. Homeowners who were initially investing in dry-floodproof 
measures might have changed their minds later in time and would not have reinvested in 
measures after their lifespan had been depleted. However, as the lifespan covers the total 
modeling run, this is not visible in the results. Exactly this emergence of patterns is the 
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unique benefit of agent-based models. 
4.4.2.3	 Alternative	loan	structure
For the regular scenarios, we used a personal loan structure for funding dry-floodproofing 
measures. However, personal loans (modeled here as a 15% interest rate over 5 years) can 
be expensive by themselves; therefore, we also analyzed the effects of providing a govern-
mentally funded loan with a 4% interest rate and a length of 20 years, based on proposals 
by Kousky and Kunreuther (2014). Figure 4.7 presents both the number of households that 
implemented dry-floodproofing and those that were unable to afford dry-floodproofing in 
graphs 4.7a and 4.7b; graphs 4.7c and 4.7d depict the penetration rate and unaffordability 
of insurance. As expected, investments in dry-floodproofing increase significantly, starting 
at approximately 25,000 households in 2010 and increasing to about 40,000 households 
in 2080 (equivalent to implementation rates of 10% to 15% respectively). Including a 
premium discount has a positive effect on the implementation rate of dry-floodproofing, 






















































































































































Figure 4.7 | The mean of 50 modeling repetitions for the reformed loan structure, with an interest 
rate of 4% and a length of 20 years, for all four NFIP market structures. (a) The number of house-
holds that implemented dry-floodproofing measures, (b) the number of households unable to af-
ford dry-floodproofing, (c) the number of households with a policy in force (including mandatory 
policyholders), and (d) the number of households that are not able to afford insurance (excluding 
mandatory policyholders).
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(or 13% and 17% respectively). In addition, the reformed loans decrease unaffordability 
for all scenarios compared with Figure 4.7b, with approximately 11,000 households being 
unable to afford dry-floodproofing in 2010, which is a decrease of 45%. 
In terms of insurance, the NFIP baseline market structure yielded a slightly larger growth 
compared to Figure 4.5a, but overall no significant differences were found. In terms of 
affordability, all market structures improved slightly due to the new loan structure. Even 
though the insurance market structures without a premium discount do not offer a 
premium discount, their affordability still improves. Risk is lowered as more households 
invested in dry-floodproofing due to the more affordable loans. The lower expected 
damage causes households that were willing to buy insurance but were unable to afford 
it, to no longer want insurance. 
4.4.3 Sensitivity analysis
The figures displaying the results of the sensitivity analysis can be found in Appendix A.5. 
They present the mean of 50 repetitions of the model with variations in one variable to test 
the robustness of the model. 
Insurance outcomes demonstrated robustness for all variables except risk aversion. The 
benchmark picked a specific set of variables that resulted in the observed penetration 
rates of insurance and the implementation rate of dry-floodproofing for high risk percep-
tion. As we applied a one-at-a-time, local sensitivity analysis, it is not surprising that lower 
values of risk aversion result in the lowest penetration rates of insurance. 
For dry-floodproofing, the results vary more than the insurance outcomes but are 
relatively robust with no major outliers. As we based our values on the benchmark and 
literature, we are confident in the selection of variables; however, the sensitivity analysis 
results do suggest that these variables have an impact on the decision of investing in 
dry-floodproofing. For example, it is unsurprising that when investment costs decrease, 
the implementation rates of dry-floodproofing increase, and vice versa. 
4.5 Discussion and conclusion
Hurricane Sandy induced nearly $70 billion in damages in 2012, and recent flood events 
in the Midwest have caused an estimated $2.9 billion in damages. These events illus-
trate flood risk as we are experiencing it today, and it is expected to worsen over time, 
driven by climate change and socio-economic development. Flood insurance can be an 
essential tool in transferring risk and incentivizing individuals to implement risk-reduction 
measures. However, the NFIP is criticized for incentivizing policyholders to stay in flood-
prone areas and having inaccurate premiums, and the program is over $30 billion in debt. 
Many suggestions have been made to reform the NFIP (Kunreuther, 2018; Michel-Kerjan & 
Kunreuther, 2011), although predicting their effects is difficult due to the lack of systematic 
evaluations of these reforms using flood risk assessment models that account for dynamic 
human adaptation behavior. We applied an agent-based model coupled with a flood 
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risk model to evaluate several reform changes: a full mandatory purchase requirement in 
100-year flood zones, risk-based premiums with and without a premium discount, and an 
accessible loan structure to help finance DRR measures. 
While most studies have employed ad hoc rules with parameter values based on assump-
tions and expert judgement, we applied a benchmark with survey data to ground our 
behavioral rules in economic theories. The benchmark demonstrated the wide variety 
of model outcomes that can be obtained by different sets of parameters. While most 
of the variables are in line with literature, the risk aversion parameter that best matched 
observed flood adaptation behavior has a relatively high coefficient value of 4. Many 
similar modeling studies have applied a risk aversion coefficient of 1, representing slight risk 
aversion (Haer et al., 2019; Hudson, Botzen, et al., 2019), which is often based on evidence 
found in Bombardini and Trebbi (2012), Falk et al. (2018), or Vieider et al. (2015). However, risk 
aversion estimates vary highly across different studies and contexts. For example, some 
studies have found a difference in risk aversion between genders (Falk et al., 2018; Vieider 
et al., 2015), while others have not (Niederle, 2014). In addition, Eckel et al. (2009) found 
risk-loving choices from Hurricane Katrina evacuees, suggesting a varying value of risk 
aversion over time. For agent-based models, collecting more empirical data designed for 
modeling applications is essential to allow for more extensive calibration and validation of 
the models, preferably over an extended period of time. Further refinements in behavioral 
rules of the model are possible in case more empirical information becomes available 
through future research. For example, the increase of perceived probabilities and damages 
by homeowners following a flood event is based on Hurricane Sandy, but applied in our 
model to each of the flood return periods, while in reality a lower intensity storm might 
trigger a different response. This aspect of the behavioral rule could be calibrated in more 
detail if information on the updating of flood risk perceptions following floods with various 
intensities becomes available. Moreover, future research could assess how start-values of 
risk aversion, perceived flood probability and perceived flood damage based on distribu-
tions instead of start-values affect the initial agent’s purchasing behavior.
We found that for Jamaica Bay, risk-based premiums would overall increase penetration 
rates and decrease unaffordability compared to the NFIP baseline market structure, 
although a share of policyholders might still experience significant increases in their rates 
and higher unaffordability. This is surprising because the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance 
Reform Act of 2012 was designed to move towards risk-based premiums and was almost 
entirely reverted in 2014 due to unaffordability issues (Dixon & Clancy, 2006; Kousky & 
Kunreuther, 2014; Miller et al., 2019). In terms of unaffordability, NYC is relatively wealthy, 
and thus unaffordability might not be as much of a problem compared to other regions; 
however, a US-scale study would be necessary to confirm this. Furthermore, a major 
problem of the NFIP is the inaccuracy of current inundation mapping, based on historic 
losses and national averages (FEMA, 2013b; Kousky, Lingle, & Shabman, 2016). The increased 
accuracy of the 30m resolution flood risk model shows that within the 100-year flood zone 
there is still a large variability of risk. This variability results in a large share of households 
benefiting from risk-based premiums (Michel-Kerjan et al., 2014). Still, a subset of house-
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holds will experience a significant increase in premiums. These households  are unlikely 
to purchase insurance, either due to affordability issues or not perceiving the risk as high 
enough. The current NFIP high risk coastal zone for NYC is based on FIRMs from 1983 (City 
of New York Mayor’s Office of Recovery and Resiliency, 2015; Miller et al., 2019); this zone 
is smaller than the 100-year flood zone of our high-resolution inundation data, capturing 
only extremely high risk properties. Our larger 100-year flood zone is more nuanced and 
includes properties that are still vulnerable for a 100-year flood event but have a relatively 
lower risk than those within the NFIP high risk zone. In addition, the outdated FIRMs could 
also be missing new adaptation efforts made post-Sandy. Both can cause the current NFIP 
premiums to be overestimations of premiums for high risk areas. With the release of FEMA’s 
risk rating 2.0 program (FEMA, 2019b), a more extensive comparison can be made with 
local scale inundation models, and how they related to the 1983 FIRMs and 2013 PFIRMs. 
In addition, we recommend that application of the model to different areas to assess the 
impact of risk-based premiums. 
The current NFIP has a little under 20% of all policies receiving discounts for being pre-FIRM 
properties or properties that follow grandfathering benefits (Kousky et al., 2016). These 
properties sustain more damages and have higher claims, although they pay less, and the 
NFIP is not compensated for these lower premiums. Changing to a risk-based premium 
setting will have a financial impact on these specific households. To relieve financial but 
also political stress, compensation for managed retreat or a voucher incentivizing risk 
reduction can be offered to policyholders for whom premiums are unaffordable due to a 
transition, although that is not explored in this chapter. Our model captured the discounts 
by applying mean observed NFIP premiums for the NFIP baseline premium setting and 
therefore should not have caused the differences found in penetration rates or unafford-
ability. Despite some of these stylistic changes to the NFIP baseline market structure, our 
model demonstrates the interactions between insurance and risk-reduction indicators for 
different market structures and reform changes. For example, most of the unaffordability 
caused in both NFIP scenarios is due to the mandatory requirement, forcing homeowners 
to obtain insurance despite not being able to afford it. Even for the NFIP baseline market 
scenario, the initial unaffordability is caused by 65% of the mandatory policies. As NYC is 
relatively wealthy, future research should explore and compare the results with different 
areas. 
Following our findings, premium discounts and a loan structure to incentivize the 
implementation of risk reduction are recommended reform changes, in addition to 
the aforementioned risk-based premiums. Offering a premium discount that reflects 
the reduction in risk can significantly increase the uptake of risk-reduction measures. In 
addition, we find that a premium discount does not reduce the affordability of insurance or 
risk-reduction measures. If a household is unable to afford an annual insurance premium, 
then they are unlikely to be able to afford a personal loan to fund dry-floodproofing 
measures to receive the discount. Instead, the proposed loan structure is demonstrated 
to significantly improve the penetration rates and affordability of DRR. While we evaluated 
the current state of the NFIP and some of the most discussed reform changes, there are 
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still many other proposed reform changes, such as the entry of private insurers, that should 
be addressed in future research. 
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Rising waves of indecision
How financial incentives can support flood risk management
Chapter 5 
Climate-proofing the National Flood Insurance 
Program
This chapter is based on: de Ruig, L. T., Haer, T., de Moel, H., Brody, S. D., Botzen, W. J. W., Czajkowski, 
J. & Aerts, J. C. J. H.  Climate-proofing the National Flood Insurance Program. Prepared for Nature 
Communications.
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was created in 1968 to transfer flood risk by offering 
affordable flood insurance and to reduce flood damage by restricting the urbanization of flood-
plains. However, the program has been criticized for failing to meet these objectives, being a 
burden for taxpayers, and being unable to cope with climate change or socio-economic drivers 
that exacerbate future flood risk. Consequently, a major challenge is to seek reforms that ensure 
financial viability and socio-economic equity while achieving the program’s key objectives. We 
demonstrate the necessity of implementing reform measures, such as risk-based premiums, to 
climate-proof the NFIP. In addition, we highlight how the performance of the NFIP is interlinked 




The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) provides almost 5 million policies to 
homeowners and businesses, covering $1.2 trillion in assets and making it the largest flood 
insurance market worldwide (Horn & Webel, 2019). The program requires policyholders 
with a bank-backed mortgage living within a 100-year flood zone to purchase manda-
tory flood insurance coverage and requires that new development in these zones meet 
certain building codes. These low-lying areas have a 1% chance of annual flooding and are 
mapped by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). However, the program 
is in a difficult financial position due to the inaccuracy of the flood maps, the setting of 
premiums based on national averages that do not reflect local risk, new development 
in flood-impacted areas, and the lack of incentives for homeowners to implement flood 
adaptation measures other than building elevation (Michel-Kerjan & Kunreuther, 2011). As 
a result, the program has a $20.5 billion debt even after Congress refunded $16 billion 
to cover the claims of policyholders after hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2019. 
Despite criticisms, the NFIP was recently reauthorized through September 30, 2024 (Horn 
& Webel, 2019). Several reforms have been introduced to solve some of the issues, such as 
promoting private market participation and the Risk Rate 2.0 Program to more accurately 
set premiums that reflect yearly risk for individual buildings. The new program is expected 
to increase mean insurance uptake and solve financial issues, but it is likely to put stress 
on affordability for low-income households living in high-risk flood zones. Moreover, there 
is uncertainty regarding how the proposed reforms will reverse the NFIP’s debt and how 
sufficiently they can cope with increases in future flood risks due to climate change and 
socio-economic development in flood-prone areas (Di Baldassarre, Kooy, Kemerink, & 
Brandimarte, 2013; Mechler & Schinko, 2016; Mills, 2005). Existing studies on NFIP reforms 
only focus on a specific region or element of the program and are limited to assessing 
the current conditions. A comprehensive national-scale analysis of the complete program, 
including its ability to cope with climate change, is lacking. 
We make two contributions to the ongoing debate on the NFIP. First, we assess the NFIP 
under current and future climate conditions on a national scale for both coastal and fluvial 
flood risks,4  with a focus on how a transition to risk-based premiums affects the following 
key performance indicators: insurance penetration rates, unaffordability of premiums 
and investment costs of risk reduction measures, incentivization rate of disaster risk 
reduction (DRR), and the program’s debt. These indicators reveal whether the program 
is financially healthy, whether it contributes to flood risk reduction, and whether it meets 
its societal objective of providing affordable insurance coverage. Second, we highlight 
the importance of governmental flood protection policies and the performance of the 
NFIP. Our recommendations are based on a high-resolution agent-based model, which 
simulates the spatial-temporal dynamics of adaptive behavior of individual households, 
the government, and their interactions to evaluate the effectiveness of flood protection, 
4 The model does not consider pluvial flood risk, although we recognize that this accounts for 
a share of the total flood risk and is part of the Risk Rate 2.0 Program. The analysis does not aim to fully 
assess the Risk Rate 2.0 Program but focuses on the transition from the current NFIP structure to risk-based 
premiums for coastal and fluvial regions.
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local-scale DRR, potential reform policies, and flood insurance markets (see Appendix 
B for a full description of the methods, a sensitivity analysis, and additional results). The 
main behavioral rules in our model are homeowners deciding on implementing DRR and 
purchasing flood insurance. Furthermore, governments can decide to invest in regional 
flood protection measures based on a cost–benefit analysis. We account for heterogenous 
consumer behavior and individual bounded rationality in risk perceptions (Aerts et al., 2018; 
Haer, Botzen, & Aerts, 2019). All the agents are provided with yearly risk projections from 
an underlying flood risk model, which is driven by climate change scenarios (RCP4.5) and 
socio-economic projections (SSP2) until 2050. We apply this method to the conterminous 
United States on a grid resolution of 30 arcseconds. 
5.1 Impact of risk-based premiums
The 2012 Biggert–Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act was the first attempt to replace 
subsidized NFIP premiums with risk-based premiums to reverse the increasing NFIP debt. 
However, in many locations, premiums increased such that they became unaffordable, 
thus resulting in policy cancellations (National Research Council, 2015). This trend led to 
the Homeowners Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, which proposed to increase 
premiums at a slower rate. Nevertheless, current NFIP premiums are still based on historical 
losses and averaged over a region, therefore not fully reflecting risk. For example, Michel-
Kerjan et al. (2014) found that the NFIP overcharged some homeowners up to 15 times 
the risk-based premium, while others were undercharged up to three times the risk-based 
premium. Our results support the hypothesis that a transition to risk-based premiums may 
lead to higher geographical heterogeneity of premium levels on a local scale. Moreover, 
we demonstrate the high differentiation of premiums between coastal and fluvial areas. 
Figure 1 shows the effects of a transition from the current NFIP to risk-based premiums for 
2050, in line with the patterns found for the short-term effects in 2030 (see Figure B.3). It 
highlights that insurance penetration rates in fluvial regions are expected to decrease from 
24.7% to 13.2% in part due to an increase in unaffordability, which implies that the NFIP is 
currently underpricing these regions. Conversely, coastal regions display an increase from 
10.2% to 17.1% in penetration rates due to more attractive premiums under risk-based 
insurance pricing for a share of households. Despite the lower penetration rates in fluvial 
regions, average residential flood risk (coastal and fluvial) is expected to decrease by about 
$1 billion (-7.3%) in 2050 across the US. This decrease can be achieved by introducing 
risk-based premiums and offering premium discounts based on the actual reduction of 
risk created by flood-proofing buildings. While the NFIP currently only offers a premium 
discount for elevated properties, our results highlight the effectiveness of offering a risk-re-
flecting premium discount to implement a variety of DRR types. 
Of the 18.8 million households at risk of floods nationwide in 2050, the model shows that 
unaffordability is expected to decrease from 4.5 million households (23.8%) to 1 million 
households (5.6%) following a transition to risk-based premiums. However, the magnitude 
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per household. These findings indicate that although risk-based premiums are lower 
than current premiums for many, moving towards risk-based premiums implies sharp 
increases in premiums for a subgroup of households living in high-risk areas. As stated by 
Michel-Kerjan and Kunreuther (Michel-Kerjan & Kunreuther, 2011), unaffordability issues can 
potentially be overcome by offering insurance vouchers and cheap, accessible loans for 
low-income households currently living in high flood-risk zones to further incentivize the 
implementation of DRR, so that people become eligible for premium discounts. 
 
5.2 Future debt of the NFIP
As seen in Figure 1E, continuation of the program without anticipating climate change 
or socio-economic development will further increase the NFIP’s debt by 60%, from $20.5 
billion at present to $32.8 billion. Introducing risk-based premiums will significantly limit the 
rise in future debt but will not solve the problem entirely (i.e., an increase of 28% instead 
of 60%). An additional markup of the premiums might be required to pay off current debt 
and make the program financially sound in the future. Another challenge for the NFIP in 
securing its financial position is the role of the private insurance sector. Over the last few 
years, private insurers have been slowly entering the market, offering more accurate pricing 
through advanced and localized flood risk models and better coverage options (e.g., lower 
premiums with higher deductibles for low-risk areas) (Born & Klein, 2019). Subsequently, 
private companies can offer lower rates to households than the overpriced ones offered 
by the NFIP (Michel-Kerjan et al., 2014). This shift will increase financial stress on the system, 
as without reforms, the NFIP may be left with underpriced properties at risk of floods (Born 
& Klein, 2019). It is thus likely that if the NFIP does not transition to risk-based premiums, 
climate change and changing insurance markets may increase the program’s debt more 
severely than what Figure 1E depicts. 
5.3 Adaptation is interlinked with insurance
Even though the NFIP has been somewhat proactive in promoting DRR for homeowners, 
the Reauthorization and Reform (NFIP-Re) Act of 2019 (National Flood Insurance Program 
Reauthorization and Reform Act of 2019, 2019) indicates that FEMA remains focused 
on stimulating household-level DRR, while flood risk management at the regional and 
national scale receives significantly less attention (National Flood Insurance Program 
Reauthorization and Reform Act of 2019, 2019). A few regional programs are being devel-
oped to address regional-scale adaptation efforts, but the NFIP and FEMA are not actively 
involved. 
To make the NFIP climate proof, a combination of household-level DRR and regional-scale 
flood protection is necessary to reduce (future) risk (Hallegatte et al., 2013). To fortify this 
statement, we included two types of regional flood protection policies in our analysis: 
(1) a reactive policy in which investments in flood protection (e.g., dikes and levees) are 
evaluated only after a region is flooded; and (2) a proactive policy in which investments in 
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flood protection are evaluated after a region is flooded and every six years (i.e., mandatory 
national evaluation). For both flood protection policies, the evaluations are based on 
(trends in) flood risk information. The evaluated measures are only implemented if deemed 
economically efficient using a cost–benefit analysis. The current situation (i.e., baseline 
scenario) is simulated by applying current NFIP premiums with a reactive government 
(Aerts et al., 2018; Haer, Botzen, & Aerts, 2019). The three remaining scenario combinations 
are then compared relative to the baseline: current NFIP with proactive investments, 
risk-based NFIP with reactive investments, and risk-based NFIP with proactive investments. 
Table 1 shows the present values (for the period from 2020 to 2050) for the different 
elements that comprise the total societal costs of flood risk and flood management: the 
expected value of uncovered flood damages to properties and public assets (i.e., covered 





















































































































[$bn] [$bn] [$bn] [$bn] [$bn] [$bn]
Baseline




$44 $60 $124 $5.2 $642
Relative to baseline




-$3.2 -$2.5 +$75 -$1.2 -$14
Relative to baseline




-$19 -$23 +$0.0 +$3.2 -$9
Relative to baseline




-$23 -$28 +$74 +$1.0 -$24
Table 5.1 | Total flood risk societal costs over the period 2020 to 2050 are the sum of uncovered 
total risk (i.e., [B] covered residential risk subtracted from [A] total risk), insurance premium ex-
penses (C), governmental flood protection investment costs (D), and household flood-proofing 
investment costs (E). Values are expressed as present values (i.e., $billion, 2020 at 4% discount 
rate) relative to the baseline scenario (i.e., current NFIP and reactive government). Green indicates 
a societal improvement, while orange indicates a cost for society compared with the baseline. 
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of covered risk), and costs of flood risk reduction measures incurred by governments and 
households. Notably, only the transition to risk-based premiums while remaining reactive 
in adaptation has a net present societal benefit of about $9 billion for the period from 
2020 to 2050. This figure can be further improved by also proactively implementing flood 
protection, which increases the net present societal benefit to $24 billion for the same 
period. Large-scale flood protection measures also have risk reduction benefits over a 
longer lifespan than the 30-year period evaluated (i.e., 2020 to 2050); hence, extending 
the analysis to the far future (e.g., 2100) will favor the proactive government policies even 
more. Accordingly, the government can reduce a large share of (future) flood risk through 
increasing flood protection by installing levees, adopting nature-based solutions, or 
implementing other measures. In this respect, the Community Rating System (CRS) can 
also play an important role, as it promotes risk awareness and comprehensive floodplain 
management by communities and local governments in exchange for NFIP premium 
discounts to policyholders in the community. However, the full potential of the CRS is not 
yet utilized, as, for example, only a small share of participating communities are actively 
reducing risk, and the system does not consistently reward measures that consider future 
climate change risks (Blessing, Brody, & Highfield, 2019). As demonstrated by Blessings et 
al. (2019), utilizing the CRS to focus more on regional flood protection goes hand-in-hand 
with the aforementioned NFIP reforms since reducing flood risk through flood protection 
investments helps keeping insurance premiums affordable. 
5.4 Towards a climate-proof NFIP 
Our results highlight the need for the NFIP to reform by transitioning to risk-based 
premiums combined with premium discounts for DRR (i.e., pure risk premiums) so that 
homeowners will be incentivized to invest in DRR. However, care must be taken since 
risk-based premiums are likely to cause unaffordability for a subset of households. This 
issue could be addressed by offering insurance vouchers and low-interest, accessible 
loans to further incentivize the implementation of DRR (Michel-Kerjan & Kunreuther, 2011). 
Overall, it is expected that a transition to risk-based premiums will yield a societal benefit 
of $9 billion, expressed as the present value for the period from 2020 to 2050 (Table 1). 
However, with the current focus on insurance policies and individual DRR, the NFIP places 
responsibility at the individual level, thus limiting the societal capacity to effectively cope 
with future flood risk (Cremades et al., 2018; Lucas & Booth, 2020). Our analysis shows that 
it is beneficial if the government is proactive in adapting flood protection. Despite higher 
investment costs of approximately $75 billion compared to the baseline scenario, proac-
tive investments are highly effective in reducing overall risk, are complementary with 
risk-based premiums, and yield higher average societal benefits (i.e., $24 billion). Instead 
of considering the overall costs of large-scale adaptation investments, it is important to 
contemplate which level of government should implement them, who will pay for them, 
and when they should be implemented. Without proactive adaptation, households at risk 
pay for a substantial share of the flood risk, resulting in expensive insurance premiums, DRR 
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investments, relocation costs, or damages after flood events. Other shares are public assets 
at risk (e.g., ports and their infrastructure), which, considering their possible expansion as 
a result of socio-economic growth, may increase the government’s future exposure to 
flooding (Hallegatte et al., 2013). Without additional flood protection, governments must 
pay for increasing losses over time. Instead, if governments are proactive, collective tax 
funds can be used to protect (or even relocate) valuable public assets and homeowners at 
risk. Proactive flood protection investments decrease flood insurance premiums and make 
them more affordable, subsequently reducing pressure on the suggested NFIP reforms. 
Reevaluating and reforming the program is not enough to make the NFIP climate-proof. 
It is necessary to integrate the NFIP in nationwide flood risk management and review the 
system as a whole to ensure an overall higher societal benefit. Such nationwide alignment 
of region adaptation efforts with insurance incentives might be particularly challenging 
with substantial private market development over time. Actively involving regulators in 
flood risk management through public–private partnerships offers an opportunity to build 
resilience in the early stages of the relatively new private markets.
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Rising waves of indecision





The results of this dissertation highlight the interconnectivity of social and physical 
systems related to water management by integrating human decision-making into a flood 
risk assessment framework. The research presented in this dissertation applies a range of 
different methods to extend the spatial and temporal boundaries of cost-benefit analyses 
and to incorporate dynamic interactions between homeowners, governments, and 
insurers into an agent-based model for cases in the US. 
In summary, Chapter 2 presents a micro-scale CBA, in which building-level adaptation 
measures are individually optimized for flood zones, extending the spatial limitations of 
traditional CBAs. Chapter 3 subsequently improves the temporal flexibility of traditional 
economic appraisal approaches by integrating the concept of adaptation pathways with 
a CBA framework, to evaluate and compare the economic implications of transitioning 
adaptation strategies after a certain time period. Chapter 4 couples an agent-based 
decision model with a flood risk model to simulate the dynamic, adaptive behavior of 
individual households in relation to building-level adaptation and insurance choices. 
Chapter 5 expands on the model in Chapter 4 by integrating governmental decisions on 
large-scale adaptation strategies into the framework to explore the interlinkages between 
insurance reforms and adaptation policy settings in a changing climate. 
The main findings of the previous chapters are as follows:
1. Individually optimized disaster risk-reduction measures are shown to have up 
to 85% higher economic efficiencies compared to the conventional aggregated 
approach, where only a single measure is evaluated for the entire area. An 
example is provided for Venice Beach (Los Angeles) and Naples (Long Beach), 
where an optimized mix of building-level measures and implementation heights 
significantly increase economic desirability. (Chapter 2)
2. The explicit incorporation of the temporal dimension into a cost-benefit analysis, 
by allowing either a delay of investments or a transition of adaptation strategies 
over time, has proven to be a valuable addition to decide on early adaptation 
efforts. For instance, adaptation pathways reach up to 10% higher economic 
efficiencies for certain subsections of the Los Angeles County coast. (Chapter 3)
3. Flood insurance plays a vital role in flood risk management, not only by trans-
ferring risk but also by incentivizing households to implement loss-reducing 
measures (i.e., through risk-based premiums and premium discounts). In addition, 
an affordable loan structure in combination with risk-based premiums can double 
households’ uptake of disaster risk reduction. (Chapter 4 and 5)
4. Establishing a well-designed insurance system that is financially climate-proof, 
offers affordable risk-based premiums, and provides incentives that improve resil-
iency has proven to be difficult. However, integrating flood insurance schemes 
into proactive governmental adaptation efforts is key to decrease societal flood 
risk losses and expenses. An example is provided of the US, where NFIP reforms 
and proactive governments can save $24 billion from 2020 to 2050. (Chapter 5)
92
Chapter 6
5. Integration of dynamic human decision-making into a flood risk assessment 
framework is essential to more realistically capture the impacts of policy changes 
on the physical and social systems that together determine flood risk. (Chapters 
4 and 5)
The following sections will address the research questions of this dissertation.
6.1 Key research findings
Research Question 1: To what extent are building code strategies able to cope with increasing risks from 
climate change, and how is economic desirability dependent on the spatial scale of the analysis?
Chapter 2 explores the impact of different spatial scales on the economic efficiency of 
individual-building DRR for a case study of a) Venice Beach, Los Angeles and b) Naples, 
Long Beach. Over the past years, individual-building DRR measures, such as elevation, 
dry-floodproofing, or wet-floodproofing, have been evaluated on an aggregated level, 
assuming a single type and implementation height. In contrast, in Chapter 2, a micro 
cost-benefit analysis was conducted for each individual property in Santa Monica, Los 
Angeles and Naples, Long Beach. Each micro CBA evaluated three different adaptation 
types for various implementation heights. The analysis was conducted for coastal floods 
under current conditions, and three different sea level rise projections were assumed: 75 
cm, 150 cm, and 200 cm by 2100. As a result, an optimal set of adaptation measures was 
composed and compared with the traditional, aggregated approach. Chapter 2 demon-
strates that for all properties within a 100-year flood zone, a mix of 35%–45% dry-floodproof 
measures and 55%–65% elevation is optimal. Elevation was found to be most efficient in 
potentially deeply inundated areas, whereas dry-floodproofing is a cheaper alternative 
for more shallow flood depths. Such an optimal mix of measures based on an individual 
building assessment approach can increase economic efficiencies up to 85% compared to 
traditional, aggregated approaches. 
Chapter 2 also demonstrates the implications of future uncertainty for the design or 
policy-setting of building-level adaptation. Even though Chapter 2 has economically 
desirable options for each of the sea level rise scenarios, the implementation heights vary 
greatly. For instance, Santa Monica expects only small amounts of flooding up until a 
certain sea level rise threshold (in-between the projected 150 cm and 200 cm by 2100). If 
the threshold is exceeded, then overtopping occurs, and the flood extent increases greatly. 
For Santa Monica, and assuming the 150-cm sea level rise scenario, only 231 buildings are 
vulnerable in the 100-year flood zone. However, this number increases to 5,961 buildings 
in the 200-cm sea level rise scenario. Preparing adaptation strategies for these future 
uncertainties requires a more flexible approach, which is explored in Chapter 3. 
Research Question 2: How can the economic evaluation of adaptation strategies include temporal 
uncertainties such as climate change to improve the implementation timing of strategies or pathways? 
Whereas Chapter 2 explores the spatial dimension of CBAs, Chapter 3 focuses on the 
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temporal dimension. Three adaptation strategies for the entire coast of Los Angeles 
County are economically evaluated in Chapter 3 for three sea level rise scenarios (75 cm, 
150 cm, and 200 cm by 2100). One type of strategy is based on the idea of resiliency, 
which involves maintaining an open connection with the ocean and relying on individual 
DRR measures. The other two strategies are variations of a more structural approach and, 
for example, include developing a dike system underneath a dune, closing marinas with 
sluices, or elevating roads to act as flood walls. Each of the proposed adaptation strategies 
is based on beach nourishment and maintaining the ecological and tourism values of the 
beaches. 
Three types of economic evaluation are applied: (1) a traditional scenario-based approach, 
(2) a delay of investments, and (3) adaptation pathways. The scenario-based outcomes 
revealed that the resiliency strategy is most economically efficient in many subsections of 
the Los Angeles County coast. Many of the structural adaptation strategies appeared to 
increase their economic efficiency by delaying investment by 10 to 20 years, but waiting 
longer can cause decreases in economic efficiency. The adaptation pathway approach 
explored the option of starting with the resilience strategy in 2020, and subsequently 
transitioning to a structural strategy later in time. In doing so, some subsections of the 
Los Angeles coast yield up to a 10% higher expected economic return compared to the 
scenario-based or delay-of-investments approaches. In addition to the higher economic 
efficiency, the pathway approach has the benefits of differentiating investments over time 
and learning more about the rate of sea level rise and climate change while preparing for 
the transition to a different strategy. 
Overall, Chapter 3 demonstrates the capacity of integrating temporal dynamics into a 
cost-benefit analysis approach. Traditional flood risk assessments in combination with 
cost-benefit analyses have proven to be useful for decision-makers to help guide adapta-
tion investments. However, as illustrated in Chapter 3, the preferred adaptation strategy or 
pathway could change considerably by exploring the dynamics of the temporal dimension. 
Research Question 3: How can flood insurance and the way it incentivizes household adaptation 
decisions be included in a flood risk assessment framework that estimates future development of risk 
under climate and socio-economic change?
Chapters 2 and 3 explain how the traditional flood risk assessments in combination with 
cost-benefit analyses can be utilized to support economically rational decisions regarding 
adaptation investments. However, this approach, despite the additions made in Chapters 
2 and 3, lacks dynamic interactions between key agents within the flood risk management 
spectrum, such as homeowners, insurers, and governments. For instance, flood insurance 
is an essential part of transferring (residual) risk for homeowners, and it allows them to 
reduce volatility in their welfare. However, households are unlikely to behave rationally in 
a flood context, and certain changes in flood insurance or adaptation policies might result 
in adverse effects. For example, changes in insurance premiums to incentivize DRR can 
cause a change in willingness to purchase insurance coverage or its affordability among 
homeowners, which can potentially result in an overall decrease in insurance penetration 
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rates. Chapters 4 and 5 explore the potential of integrating dynamic interactions between 
agents and the inclusion of flood insurance into a flood risk assessment framework. 
Chapter 4 examines the interactions between homeowners and the flood insurance reforms 
of the NFIP, applied to a local case study of Jamaica Bay, NY. A subjective, (discounted) 
expected utility (EU) model is used to simulate the boundedly rational decision-making 
of homeowners. In this agent-based model, homeowners can decide annually to invest in 
DRR measures and take (or cancel) flood insurance. The decision module is coupled with a 
traditional flood risk assessment, in which flood risk is the product of hazard, exposure, and 
vulnerability. The coupling of the ABM with a flood risk model allows agents to dynamically 
interact not only with one another, but also with changing climatic conditions over time 
that influence risk (e.g., sea level rise). Survey data was used to approximate the magnitude 
of homeowners’ under- or overestimation of their probability of being flooded and the 
associated damage of a flood event. Important parameters that may influence human 
adaptive decision-making (e.g., loan length, interest rate to fund DRR measures, or the risk 
aversion coefficient) were subsequently benchmarked so that current climate conditions 
and the baseline scenario would match the observed empirical data. 
Chapter 5 expands on the ABM developed in Chapter 4 and introduces an ABM for 
evaluating governmental decision-making in addition to the NFIP reforms and house-
hold dynamics. In this expanded ABM, governments make more well-informed, rational 
decisions compared to homeowners, and a cost-benefit analysis approach is thus used 
to evaluate the economic efficiency of increasing protection standards. The investments 
that governments make to increase protection standards will influence the flood hazard 
of the physical water system (i.e., a reduction in flood risk) and hence also influence the 
homeowners’ decision-making. Such feedback is a prime example of the added value of 
ABMs. In Chapter 5, the ABM model is applied to the conterminous US to evaluate the 
NFIP’s proposed reform changes under different climate change and socio-economic 
scenarios. 
In both Chapters 4 and 5, the baseline scenarios are represented by the current NFIP, which 
includes a mandatory share of policyholders in a high-risk zone (i.e., 1% annual chance of 
being flooded). The mandatory share in Chapter 4 is based on literature, which estimates 
that 55% of the properties are bound to the mandatory requirement, but only 78% of those 
households comply. To benchmark the continental model in Chapter 5, the compliance 
rate of the mandatory share is internalized in the expenditure cap of premiums, which 
is the share of a household’s annual income spend on insurance deemed as affordable. 
Three different levels of expenditure cap were correlated with national observed data. In 
addition, a historical time-series was run for the period from 2000 to 2018 to simulate some 
of the most costly flood events in U.S. history. In this simulation, a comparison was made 
between the simulated and observed unloaded premium income and damage payouts. 
This validation exercise showed that the damage from individual extreme events is often 
influenced by specific physical or social interactions, such as collapsing levees in New 
Orleans during hurricane Katrina or specific bathymetry and meteorological conditions 
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that caused a devastating storm surge in New York City during hurricane Sandy. While 
these specific interactions are not captured by a continental model such as ours, they 
still demonstrate that, on average, the ABM was able to predict the unloaded premium 
income and damage payouts within an acceptable range compared to the empirical data. 
Overall, Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate the integration of the dynamic adaptive behavior 
of households, governments, and insurers under changing socio-economic and climate 
change conditions in a flood risk assessment framework. Particular focus is placed on insur-
ance reforms, such as risk-based premiums and homeowners’ incentives. Furthermore, 
the chapters show the importance of using empirical data from surveys to ground the 
behavioral rules of agents in economic theories and applying a benchmark technique that 
is appropriate for the specific scales (i.e., local or continental). 
Research Question 4: How can a large flood insurance market, such as the National Flood Insurance 
Market, be reformed to improve in efficiency and equity, considering climate change effects?
Chapter 4 evaluates NFIP reforms on a local scale, applied to Jamaica Bay, NY, with a focus 
on how homeowners respond to different reform measures. Four NFIP market structures 
were simulated: the NFIP baseline, the NFIP with a full mandatory requirement in 100-year 
flood zones, the NFIP with risk-based premiums, and the NFIP with risk-based premiums 
and premium discounts for implementing DRR. In addition, the impact on the house-
hold-level DRR investments of a more accessible loan structure was assessed for each of 
the four market structures. Chapter 5 focuses on a continental evaluation of the NFIP with 
the addition of governmental adaptation policy settings. As found in Chapter 4, Chapter 
5 only applied the two most relevant insurance market structures: (1) the NFIP baseline 
and (2) the NFIP with a risk-based premium and a premium discount for DRR measures. 
Both of the case studies assumed an RCP4.5 climate change scenario with matching SSP2 
socio-economic and population growth scenarios. 
Chapter 4 demonstrates that a transition to risk-based premiums increases penetration 
rates (from 19% to 65% in 2010 and from 25% to 75% in 2080). For this specific case, many 
homeowners found lower premiums than the historically based averages currently used 
by the NFIP. This is surprising because risk-based premiums are often assumed to be 
more expensive than the NFIP pricing. The higher degree of spatial diversity between 
properties in the high-resolution flood risk model allows for accurate premium pricing. As 
a result, unaffordability decreased by about 50% compared to the NFIP baseline scenario. 
However, a subset of homeowners, often found in high-risk zones, are confronted with a 
steep increase in the magnitude of unaffordability. Measures, such as a voucher program 
or accessible loans, should be taken to compensate these homeowners to allow them to 
lower their risk and premium by implementing DRR, or even relocating. 
Similar patterns were found in Chapter 5. For coastal regions, mean penetration rates 
increased from approximately 10% in 2050 for the NFIP baseline to 17% for risk-based 
premiums nationally. Fluvial regions displayed a decrease in penetration rates, mostly 
accounted for by higher premiums and resulting unaffordability (i.e., in line with the 
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expectancy of introducing risk-based premiums). In terms of mean penetration rates, 
this translates into a decline from about 25% for the NFIP baseline to 13% for risk-based 
premiums. Similarly, as found in the Jamaica Bay case from Chapter 4, unaffordability 
improved from 23.8% to 5.6% in 2050, but the magnitude of the remaining unaffordable 
households increased tenfold to an average of $2,000 per year. The NFIP program in its 
current form is found to be unsustainable, with its current debt of $20.5 billion expected 
to grow by 60% in 2050. While introducing risk-based premiums does not solve this 
issue completely, it reduces the debt growth to 28% instead. An additional mark-up to 
the risk-based premiums is likely required to pay off current debt and make the program 
financially sound. 
Chapters 4 and 5 both show that premium discounts incentivize homeowners to invest 
in DRR measures. For Jamaica Bay, the baseline NFIP insurance market structure without 
additional incentives had DRR implementation rates of roughly 5% and 8% in 2010 and 
2080, respectively. With the introduction of risk-based premiums and a risk-reflecting 
discount, DDR implementation rates of about 5.5% and 9.2% were found for 2010 and 2080, 
respectively. Nationally, the additional DRR incentives in a reformed NFIP would translate 
to prevent approximately $9 billion in flood damages cumulative over the period 2020 
to 2050, expressed as present values. It should be noted that homeowners who would 
invest in DRR without additional incentives are more likely to obtain insurance when a 
discount is offered. However, a premium discount does not have a significant impact on 
the affordability of insurance or DRR measures. If a household is unable to afford an annual 
insurance premium, then it is unlikely to afford a personal loan to fund DRR investments. 
Chapter 4 also indicates that providing access to cheap loans (i.e., lower interest rate and 
longer duration) will improve DRR investments significantly and also amplify the effect 
of a premium discount. The combination of cheap loans and risk-based premiums with a 
discount doubles DDR implementation for Jamaica Bay to 13% in 2010 and 17% in 2080. 
Overall, Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate that reforming a large insurance market, such as 
the NFIP, will have a multitude of impacts on the behavior of households at risk and the 
financial soundness of the program. The results provide insights into the extent to which 
compensation or additional measures are required to leverage the negative effects a share 
of the households might experience after introducing risk-based premiums. The results 
also highlight the effectiveness of incentivizing homeowners to implement DRR measures. 
Research Question 5: To what extent are flood insurance and large-scale flood protection complemen-
tary? 
While Chapter 4 focuses on the interactions between households and flood insurance, 
Chapter 5 also includes large-scale flood protection decisions from governments. In the 
model, governments are simulated as either reactive (i.e., flood protection investments 
are reevaluated after a flood has occurred in that region) or proactive (i.e., investments in 
flood protection are reevaluated after a region is flooded and every six years nationally). 
The economic efficiency of increasing protection standards in a certain region is evaluated 
with a cost-benefit analysis and implemented when deemed economically desirable. The 
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baseline is the combination of the current NFIP pricing with reactive governmental flood 
protection investments. 
By introducing governmental adaptation decisions within the flood risk management 
system, Chapter 5 shows the added complexity when reform changes are evaluated. 
Proactive flood protection investments will decrease total flood risk by $94 billion and 
residential flood risk by $37 billion over 2020 to 2050 (in present values). However, the 
investments are also significant, estimated around $74 billion for the same period (in 
present values). Proactive flood protection will also lead to adverse effects regarding insur-
ance reform. For instance, the incentives of risk-based premiums and a premium discount 
for implementing DRR measures are less effective when governments are investing 
proactively in flood protection. Therefore, it is essential to evaluate the flood management 
system as a whole. Chapter 5 addresses this by providing the total societal costs from 2020 
to 2050 in present values, composed of the expected flood damages to either households 
or public assets (i.e., costs of uncovered risk), insurance premium payments (i.e., costs of 
covered risk), and costs of flood risk-reduction measures incurred by governments and 
households. The total societal costs show that the proposed NFIP reforms in combination 
with proactive investments will result in the most economically desirable scenario of saving 
$24 billion over the period 2020–2050, whereas the reform measures with only reactive 
investments will save $9 billion. To yield the most climate-proof scenario, it is consequently 
necessary to integrate NFIP reforms with nation-wide flood risk management and review 
the system as a whole to ensure an overall higher societal benefit. 
In summary, Chapter 5 highlights the complexity of the dynamic interaction between 
agents in a risk environment. Not only can financial incentives play a crucial role in steering 
the individual DRR behavior of homeowners, but they are also influenced by other 
flood-reducing activities, such as improving protection standards by the government. 
These combined strategies are required to cope with the effects of climate change and 
the expected increase in future exposure to floods due to socioeconomic growth.
6.2 Outlook to future research
As made apparent in the previous sections, this dissertation has explored and extended 
the traditional flood risk assessments to account for spatial and temporal uncertainties 
and behavioral dynamics. The methods, results, and recommendations from this disser-
tation provide valuable insights into existing knowledge gaps; they also highlight some 
key challenges and topics that require further research. This section will provide some 
recommendations. 
6.2.1 Availability of empirical data
Flood risk assessments are used throughout this dissertation to estimate the economic 
impacts from flooding on a variety of scales. The individual building dataset that is used 
in Chapters 2 and 3 is a major improvement compared to the traditional grid-based 
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approach. However, detailed data on building materials or specific building characteris-
tics was lacking. As a result, the depth-damage functions were used that only allow for 
estimating average losses from flooding per building type. To improve the availability and 
quality of exposure datasets (i.e., data on buildings, other assets, and their characteristics), 
it is necessary to move towards new methods to collect individual building data. In turn, a 
major improvement could then be made in the accuracy of depth-damage functions. In 
addition, this dissertation partly applies global-scale flood hazard maps for the continental 
behavioral ABM; however, many of the behavioral computations are local-scale processes. 
Improving the hazard datasets with high-resolution meteorological data, detailed river 
and coast geomorphology, better inclusion of hurricanes, and a higher resolution digital 
elevation model would improve the local-scale flood risk computations. In addition, areas 
that can experience a combination of fluvial and coastal flood risk, often referred to as 
compound flooding, have a unique risk profile that has not been accurately simulated in 
inundation models. Chapter 5 addresses this by applying a conservative approach similar 
to that used by FEMA, but better estimates of compound flood risk would also improve 
the outcomes of impact assessments or behavioral computations.
Human behavior is complex, especially when faced with low-probability/high-impact 
decisions. Even though this dissertation makes a valuable contribution of applying empir-
ical data to ground behavioral rules in economic theories, long-term empirical datasets 
are still lacking to validate behavioral models such as ABMs. By focusing future research on 
how households decide on adaptive choices, specifically for low-probability/high-impact 
events, further improvements can be made to more accurately integrate behavior. 
6.2.2 Future research questions
This dissertation supports flood risk management by addressing uncertainty and 
indecision through advancing economic evaluation methods and integrating human 
adaptive behavior with flood risk assessments. The analyses demonstrate how dynamic 
interactions between agents influence one another and the physical system. However, 
there are still processes that are not captured in the ABMs developed in this dissertation. 
For instance, agents in the model are assumed to be stationary in space, while in reality 
households might consider relocation over DRR or flood insurance. In addition, financial 
incentives other than those analyzed in this dissertation might achieve the same goals, 
such as tax rebates, subsidies, and marketable permits. The concept of charity hazards 
(i.e., the tendency of individuals to not insure themselves against floods or other natural 
disasters because they believe friends, family, or the government will help or financially 
compensate them anyways) is also not included in this dissertation but is likely to influ-
ence homeowners’ insurance choices. Other factors might include non-governmental 
organizations informing households on their risks and possibilities, thus rationalizing their 
decisions. 
While the different methods applied in this dissertation have been applied for cases in 
the US, the approach is also applicable to other regions in the world, which might provide 
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different but valuable insights into the interactions between the social and physical 
systems. To do so, the influence of factors such as political views, social vulnerability, and 
cultural differences, or the impact of development or multilateral aid, should be consid-
ered for future research. 
Lastly, the ABMs integrate and couple dynamic behavior with a flood risk model. Further 
development into a fully integrated hydro-dynamic model influenced by the behavior of 
agents would allow for an analysis of the impact of behavior on the hydrological cycle, or 
it would improve the accuracy of the large-scale adaptation decisions that governments 
can make. Another modelling improvement would be to include a wider variety of adapta-
tion options, including nature-based adaptation, especially when modelled as dynamic 
adaptation pathways. By explicitly incorporating adaptation pathways in a behavioral ABM 
can be valuable to identify path dependencies, trade-offs made by different agents and 
the economic efficiency of certain pathways.
Rising waves of indecision




The model is benchmarked using a NYC survey conducted by Botzen et al. (2015) to 
match observed dry-floodproof and insurance penetration rates with a set of parameter 
values. Six parameters were evaluated: risk aversion, protection standard, investment costs, 
expenditure cap of dry-floodproofing, loan interest rate and loan length. The benchmark 
evaluates 1,215 unique combinations of the six parameters with 50 repetitions, with a 
total of 60,750 runs. The final set of parameters is selected using expert knowledge and 















































































… … … … … … … … …
157 -1 30 200 0.1 0.1 5 12.53 51.66
322 0 10 200 0.1 0.15 5 12.53 49.6
380 0 30 200 0.025 0.05 10 12.57 50.72
250 0 10 100 0.025 0.15 5 12.57 45.48
889 2 30 200 0.1 0.15 5 12.58 58.97
1113 4 30 200 0.025 0.1 15 12.6 66.82
85 -1 30 100 0.025 0.1 5 12.6 48.1
1060 4 30 100 0.025 0.15 5 12.61 66.3
1129 4 30 200 0.1 0.1 5 12.61 70.82
72 -1 10 200 0.05 0.15 15 12.65 46.82
557 1 10 200 0.05 0.15 10 12.66 50.33
1048 4 10 200 0.1 0.1 5 12.74 66.32
… … … … … … … … …
Table A.1 | a snapshot of the mean benchmark outcomes. The row in bold is the final selected pa-




Considering the trade-off between high computational power and number of repetitions, 
we test for convergence to find the optimal number of repetitions. We tested the conver-
gence of the model as displayed in Fig. A.1 and A.2. The mean and standard deviation 
for three key variables (i.e., number of households with insurance, number of households 
unable to afford insurance and number of households willing to take insurance), were 
100 times randomly sampled for sets of 10, 20, 30, 40 and all 50 repetitions. Repetitions 
are here defined as the number of time the model runs for a certain scenario without 
changes to the parameters. This was done for three time-steps (2030, 2050 and 2080) and 
for each of the NFIP market structures. As seen in Fig. SI1, the mean remains stable for 
each of the repetition sets. Fig. A.2 shows that the standard deviation increases for 10 
through 40 repetitions but mostly flattens at 50 repetitions. The increase for 10 through 
40 repetitions is caused by more low probability floods occurring in the different runs. The 
stabilized results at 50 repetitions signal the optimal trade-off between converging results 
and computational power.
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Mean levels (100 samples) 
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50th percentile (Sea Level Rise Scenario), 
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Mean levels (100 samples) 
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Mean levels (100 samples) 
2080
50th percentile (Sea Level Rise Scenario), 






NFIP full mandatory share
NFIP risk-based premiums
NFIP risk-based with discount
Figure A.1 | The mean for three key variables for different repetition samples for each of the NFIP 

















































































































































Standard deviation levels (100 samples) 
2030
50th percentile (Sea Level Rise Scenario), 
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NFIP risk-based premiums







    

























































































































Standard deviation levels (100 samples) 
2050
50th percentile (Sea Level Rise Scenario), 






NFIP full mandatory share
NFIP risk-based premiums







    







































































    

















































Standard deviation levels (100 samples) 
2080
50th percentile (Sea Level Rise Scenario), 






NFIP full mandatory share
NFIP risk-based premiums
NFIP risk-based with discount
Figure A.2 | The standard deviation for three key variables for different repetition samples for each 
of the NFIP market-structures. Three years were tested: 2030, 2050 and 2080. 
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A.3 Risk-based premium distribution
NFIP risk−based premium distribution









Figure A.3 | The premium distribution of the NFIP risk-based market structure for start year 2010. In 
addition, the dotted line indicates the mean observed current NFIP premium.
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A.4 SSP5 modelling outcomes
Figures A.4, A.5 and A.6 show the modelling outcomes for the SSP5 scenario. 
Figure A.4 | The mean of 50 model repetitions for the four different insurance market structures for 
the SSP5 scenario. The top graph shows the number of households with a policy in-force (including 
mandatory policyholders), bottom left shows the number of households that are not able to afford 

























































































































































































































Figure A.5 | The mean of 50 modelling repetitions for the SSP5 scenario showing (left) the number 
of households that implemented dry-floodproofing measures, and (right) the number of house-
holds unable to afford dry-floodproofing for all four insurance market structures.
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A.5 Sensitivity analysis
We conducted a local, one-at-a-time sensitivity analysis for the same parameters than the 
benchmark. The analysis is ran for risk-based premiums with boundedly ration behavior 
and the shared socio-economic pathway SSP2, with 50 modelling repetitions. Figure A.7 




















































































































































Figure A.6 | The mean of 50 modelling repetitions for the reformed loan structure with an interest 
rate of 4% and length of 20 years and the SSP5 scenario, for all four NFIP market structures. 
Top left shows the number of households that implemented dry-floodproofing measures, top right 
the number of households unable to afford dry-floodproofing, bottom left shows the number of 
households with a policy in-force (including mandatory policyholders), and bottom right shows the 
















































































































































































































































Figure A.7 | The insurance and dry-floodproof penetration rates over time for the different varia-







































































































































































































































Figure A.7 | Continued. 
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B.1 Materials and Methods
Conventional flood risk assessment methods are often ill-equipped to address policy 
changes and changes in interactions between key stakeholders, and often do not consider 
household decision-making (Di Baldassarre, Viglione, et al., 2013; Di Baldassarre et al., 2015; 
Grames, Prskawetz, Grass, Viglione, & Blöschl, 2016). Especially the interplay between 
households, governments and insurance markets is key in getting a comprehensive 
understanding of the impacts of reforms to the NFIP. Agent-based models (ABMs) are able 
to include these interplays by applying a bottom-up approach which allows to simulate 
dynamic, heterogeneous behavior from agents (e.g., households or governments). Recent 
literature demonstrates the applicability of ABMs for flood risk related topics, such as 
evacuation (Dawson, Peppe, et al., 2011), housing markets (Filatova, 2015), climate change 
migration (Hassani-Mahmooei & Parris, 2012), community mitigation (Tonn & Guikema, 
2018; Tonn et al., 2019), and insurance markets (Han & Peng, 2019). 
Our model integrates dynamic, adaptive behavior of different agents within a flood risk 
modelling framework on continental scales, with changing socio-economic and climate 
change scenarios. The model builds upon a version of Haer et al. (2019) for the EU and 
de Ruig et al. (2020) for New York City, and has been developed, updated, and improved 
for the US-scale assessment of the NFIP. As novel components it includes an advanced 
flood insurance market, coastal flood risk in addition to fluvial flood risk, and a nation-
wide benchmark. The model allows us to critically assess how decision-making of agents 
is influenced by flood risk management strategies, insurance reforms and incentives for 
flood risk reduction. 
Figure B.1 shows the modelling flow and the input for the behavioral agent-based model. 
The first box displays the different input datasets and the associated climate change and 
socio-economic scenarios. The policy setting box highlights the different variations of 
governmental adaptation policies and NFIP market structures. The behavioral part of the 
model is the interaction between the flood risk model, adaptive behavior of residents, 
governmental adaptation and the insurance market structures (i.e., the NFIP). A time-series 
is made as a validation exercise. The main modelling outputs are key indicators such as 
flood risk (EAD), insurance penetration rates, affordability, DRR implementation and public 
protection standards. The next sections will first describe the flood risk model, and subse-
quently the behavioral parts of the model are explained. 
B.1.1 Flood risk model, data and scenarios
While widely applicable in other regions, for this chapter the model was applied to contig-
uous United States on spatially explicit high resolution grid (30”x30” resolution), including 
the entire coastline and all main river basins. The flood risk component of the model is a 
commonly applied hazard-exposure-vulnerability model (de Moel et al., 2013; Kron, 2005). 
The hazard-exposure-vulnerability model is used to calculate flood risk in monetary terms, 
expressed as expected annual damage (EAD in $/year), for each individual grid cell. In 
addition, during each time step, floods can stochastically occur in each county based on 
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their return period (e.g., a 100-year flood event has a yearly 1% chance of occurring). 
The hazard is represented by fluvial and coastal inundation from the GLOFRIS dataset for 
the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP) 4.5 and 8.5. The GLOFRIS modelling 
cascade is used for fluvial inundation, which is described extensively in other papers (e.g., 
Ward et al., 2017, 2020). In brief, three of the cascade processes are applied: hydrological 
and hydraulic modelling to develop daily time-series of flood volumes; extreme value 
statistics to estimate flood volumes for different return periods; and inundation modelling 
for different return periods (Ward et al., 2017).
In the first step, daily time-series of flood volumes are constructed using hydrological and 
hydrodynamic modelling at a 0.5° x 0.5° resolution. The GLOFRIS model is forced with 
EU-WATCH data for the period 1960–1999, representing climate conditions in 1980. For 
future conditions, the GLOFRIS model is forced with five global climate models (GCMs): 
HadGEM2-ES, IPSL-CM5A-LR, MIROC-ESM-CHEM, GFDL-ESM2M, and NorESM1-M. From 
the daily gridded flood volume time-series, annual hydrological year time-series were 
extracted and a Gumbel distribution was fit accordingly. The resulting Gumbel parameters 
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Figure B.1 | A schematic overview of the primary modelling steps.
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years. The last step uses the inundation downscaling module of GLOFRIS to convert the 
course resolution flood volume maps to high resolution (30” x 30”) inundation maps (Ward 
et al., 2017, 2020). 
For coastal inundation, as described in detail in Tiggeloven et al. (2020), the extreme sea 
levels are taken from the Global Tide and Surge Reanalysis (GTSR) dataset (Muis, Verlaan, 
Winsemius, Aerts, & Ward, 2016). GTSR is a global dataset of daily sea levels (tide and storm 
surge) for 1979-2014, which is based on the Global Tide and Surge Model (GTSM). Within 
GTSM, tides are simulated separately using the Finite Element Solution (FES2012) hydro-
dynamic model) (Carrère & Lyard, 2003). Surges are simulated using metrological data 
from the ERA-Interim global atmospheric reanalysis (Dee et al., 2011). The GTSR dataset 
is enhanced with historical tropical cyclone tracks over the period of 1979-2004, using 
the International Best Track Archive for Climate Stewardship archive, as GTSR is known for 
under-representing tropical cyclones. The extremes are subsequently calculated using a 
Gumbel fit. 
To calculate coastal inundation, overland inundation from near-shore tide and surge levels 
were computed, after which the nearest GTSR location are projected at the coastline. A 
resistance factor is used to simulate the reduction of flooding land inwards, as tides and 
storm surges have a limited time span, and therefore their flood peak and associated 
volume can only penetrate inland to a certain degree. Similar to fluvial inundation, the 
maps are made on a high resolution (30” x 30”) for the same return periods: 5, 10, 25, 50, 
100, 250, 500, and 1,000 years (Ward et al., 2020). For future conditions, mean sea level rise 
conditions are obtained from the RISES-AM project (Jevrejeva, Grinsted, & Moore, 2014), 
and simulated as a range of probabilistic outcomes. For this chapter, the 50th percentile is 
used. Subsidence rates are taken from the SUB-CR model. 
Compound flooding is the co-occurrence of fluvial and coastal flooding. Several studies 
have been trying to estimate the compound flooding potential in respect to their timing, 
joint statistical dependence and joint return period (Couasnon et al., 2020; Ward et al., 
2018). However, there is no accepted method to accurately combine fluvial and coastal 
flood maps. Therefore, we applied a conservative approach similar to FEMA (FEMA, 2015), 
whereby we assume independence between fluvial and coastal flooding. Per cell in the 
overlapping areas, the highest inundation was selected, to maintain our set of return 
periods. In addition, coarser resolution in flood damage models usually results in higher 
flood damage (L. M. Bouwer, Bubeck, Wagtendonk, & Aerts, 2009). We also saw an overesti-
mation in our initial calculations and therefore, a rescaling factor was estimated to readjust 
the model to more realistic values, which is described in section 3.1.
The GlobalLand30 (Jun, Ban, & Li, 2014) is used for exposure. Urban grid cells are set to 
75% residential, 15% commercial and 10% industrial, with an assumed building density of 
20% for residential and 30% for commercial or industrial (Huizinga, de Moel, & Szewczyk, 
2017; Tiggeloven et al., 2020). The vulnerability is represented by depth-damage curves, 
the relationship between inundation and the share of damage per land-use type, and 
maximum damage values, the total amount of damage per land-use type. FEMA’s HAZUS 
114
Appendix B
Multi-Hazard model (FEMA, 2013a) is used for the curves and the maximum damage 
values are taken from Huizinga et al. (2017), as often used in combination with the GLOFRIS 
model (Tiggeloven et al., 2020; Ward et al., 2017). The depth-damage curves can be altered 
to represent a household that has implemented adaptation measures. Dry-floodproofing 
(i.e., preventing flood water to enter a building), or elevation of new buildings are the two 
types of individual adaptation, as they are proven to be most cost-effective (de Ruig et 
al., 2020). An implementation height of 1 m is used, as is recommended by FEMA(FEMA, 
2014b). For dry-floodproofing, up to 1 m of inundation damage is decreased by 85% (Aerts, 
Botzen, et al., 2013; de Ruig et al., 2019). However, overtopping due to higher levels of 
inundation will result in full damages. For elevation, the curve is shifted so that damages 
will occur after 1 m of inundation. 
While the governmental agents in the model will be able to adjust public protection levels, 
the initial river protection standards are based on the FLOPROS dataset (Scussolini et al., 
2016). To date, there has not been a similar coastal database (Hallegatte, Green, Nicholls, 
& Corfee-Morlot, 2013b). Tiggeloven et al. (2020) and others have used an approach were 
their protection levels are based on GDP, but these result in very high protection levels for 
the US, whilst observations suggest otherwise. Therefore, the coastal protection standards 
are set to 30-year exceedance levels (Hallegatte et al., 2013b; R. Nicholls & Cazenave, 2010). 
Shared socio-economic pathway (SSP) scenarios (Crespo Cuaresma, 2017; Dellink et al., 2017; 
Jiang & O’Neill, 2017; Leimbach et al., 2017; Riahi et al., 2017; Samir & Lutz, 2017) were used 
to represent the initial population, population growth and economic growth. We applied 
the SSP2 and SSP5 scenarios, as they are most commonly applied in similar studies, and 
match well with the RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 respectively. SSP2 is a middle-of-the-road scenario, 
and SSP5 is an energy- and resource-intensive scenario; the former is used throughout the 
chapter, and the results of the SSP5 scenario can be found in the supplementary results. 
The GDP growth from the SSPs was used to increase the value of properties and income 
over time. 
B.1.2 Agent-based model and policy setting
The core of the framework is an agent-based model that simulates dynamic agents with 
different choices: homeowners who can invest in disaster risk reduction measures or take/
cancel insurance, and governments who can invest in large scale adaptation such as dykes. 
The original model was developed by Haer et al. (2019), and upgraded and applied on 
a small-scale NFIP context in de Ruig et al. (2021). For this chapter, the model is further 
upgraded to include conterminous US on a high-resolution (30”x30”), while maintaining 
detailed insurance scenarios. The following section will explain the main features and 
additions of the model, but for a detailed description of the original model, please refer to 
Haer et al. (2019). 
A total of four scenarios are simulated, that consist of one of the variations for insurance 




• NFIP baseline. This scenario simulates the current NFIP market structure as closely as 
possible. Observed premiums for 100-year flood zones and low-risk flood zones are 
used.
• NFIP with risk-based premiums. Risk-based premiums are the combination of risk 
that is calculated by the flood risk model and the loading factors of the current NFIP 
premium setting (estimated at 49.7%).
Government
• Reactive. Reevaluation of protection standards only occurs after a flood event in the 
respective county. 
• Proactive. Reevaluation of protection standards occurs every six years, or after a flood 
event in the respective county.
The NFIP baseline, with a reactive government is used as the baseline scenario to compare 
the other three scenarios to. Each scenario is run for 50 repetitions, to account for the 
stochasticity of the model. 
B.1.2.1	 Homeowners	–	insurance
Part of the NFIP is a mandatory purchase requirement for federally funded mortgages 
in a 100-year flood zone. Estimates show that on average 55% of the properties within a 
100-year flood zone are bound to the mandatory purchase requirement, but estimates 
show that on average only 78% of those households comply (Dixon & Clancy, 2006). We 
applied the 55% mandatory share for 100-year flood zones, but based the compliance 
rate on affordability (e.g., if a households cannot afford the policy premium, they will not 
comply with the mandatory purchase requirement). Following Kousky and Kunreuther 
(2014) and Hudson (2018), we applied an expenditure cap definition for unaffordability. For 
insurance, it is assumed that households can afford flood insurance if their annual premium 
is within the expenditure cap of their annual income, which is benchmarked to 7.5% as 
further described in section 3.2. Income is distributed per county through a log-normal 
distribution based on mean and median income from the United States Census Bureau 
2010 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010a). 
Households who are not bound to the mandatory requirement have a yearly decision to 
take or cancel insurance. First, (un-)affordability is tested through the same expenditure 
cap of 7.5%. Then, two strategies are compared following a subjective expected utility 
(Haer et al., 2019; Hudson, Botzen, et al., 2019; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) (EU) 
model:
 Strategy 1: take insurance, accepting the deductible; or
 Strategy 2: do not take or cancel insurance.
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The strategy that yields the highest EU will be chosen. The subjective EU equation is as 
follows:
Equation B.1 calculates EUs for each strategy s. Each event i has a probability pi of occurring. 
The total set of events I are the return periods of each flood event (with return periods of 
5; 10; 25; 50; 100; 250; 500; 1000; and 10,000 years) and the probability of no flood event. 
The EUs is subsequently calculated as the approximation of the integral over I. Utility is 
calculated as a function of wealth W, uncovered damage D, premium C, and a premium 
discount d (if applicable for the scenario). Damage D per event i for year t is calculated 
using the hazard-exposure-vulnerability model. For Strategy 1, homeowners must pay a 
deductible δ of 10% of the incurred damages, while Strategy 2 has full damages (as no 
damage is covered, so that δ2 = 1, C = 0, and d = 0). A general utility function following 
constant relative risk aversion (Bombardini & Trebbi, 2012; Harrison et al., 2007; Wakker, 
2008) is assumed. In line with common findings (Bombardini & Trebbi, 2012; Harrison et al., 
2007), households are assumed to be slightly risk averse, in which case U(x) = ln(x).  
Individuals act boundedly rational in their decisions on flood insurance, which is repre-
sented by the perceived probabilities β and perceived damages γ. Both factors are 
benchmarked based on empirical data by de Ruig et al. (2021), and simulate households 
overestimating their risk after a flood event, while they underestimate their risk after a 
period of no floods. Mathematically this is shown as:
Where αt = 1 if a flood occurs, and αt = αt₋1 / 1.6 if no flood occurs. In addition, it is 
assumed that households have some sense of increasing risk over time, but not perfect 
information. Therefore, each grid cell has a different risk increase value, determined from a 
random-uniform distribution at the start of each 2010–2080 simulation.
Premiums in the NFIP baseline scenario are 2014 county averages for 100-year flood 
zones and low-risk flood zones, from the dataset by Czajkowski et al. (2017). Premiums are 
adjusted to 2000 values at the start of a simulation. State averages are used if county-level 
information was lacking. While the NFIP is often lagging behind in updating flood insur-
ance rate maps and premiums, it is assumed that premiums change with the calculated 
percentual risk change with the year before to account for changes in protection standards 
and growing risk over time. 
=  , ×  ,  ,  (B.1)
(B.2)=  12.0639 ×  
. + 0.08233 
=  0.442774 ×  . + 0.802826 
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For the NFIP with risk-based premiums scenario, unloaded premiums are first calculated 
by the flood risk model. Subsequently, average NFIP loading factors (49.7%) are added. The 
premiums are calculated per grid-cell (30”x30”), and for these risk-based scenarios the NFIP 
will offer a premium discount if households have applied dry-floodproofing measures or 
elevated the property. The premium discount is equivalent to the risk reduction from the 
taken measures. 
For both scenarios, households receive a discount through the Community Rating System 
(CRS). The CRS is a voluntary program that incentivizes communities to actively engage 
in floodplain management activities that exceed the minimum program requirement. 
Examples are flood preparedness, spread awareness or reduce risk in the community. Each 
activity rewards credit points, which can result in a community-wide premium discount. 
Table B.1 shows the credit points classification and the associated premium discount for 
100-year flood zones and low-risk flood zones. From the dataset by Czajkowski et al. (2017), 
we used the 2014 CRS classes per community for the entire simulation. 
B.1.2.2	 Homeowners	–	individual	adaptation
In terms of individual adaptation, homeowners have the choice to invest in adapta-
tion measures for their own property in each of the scenarios. For existing buildings, 
homeowners can invest in dry-floodproofing measures, which is often found to be the 
most cost-efficient measure. It is assumed that dry-floodproofing measures reduce risk by 
85% for the first meter of inundation, else full damages are endured (for a lifespan of 75 
Credit Points Class
Premium Reduction Premium Reduction
in 100-year flood zones 
by percent (%)
low-risk flood zones by 
percent (%)
4,500+ 1 45 10
4,000 – 4,499 2 40 10
3,500 – 3,999 3 35 10
3,000 – 3,499 4 30 10
2,500 – 2,999 5 25 10
2,000 – 2,499 6 20 10
1,500 – 1,999 7 15 5
1,000 – 1,499 8 10 5
500 – 999 9 5 5
0 – 499 10 0 0




years)(Aerts & Botzen, 2011b). Changes in residential surface area per cell is determined 
on a correlation between population growth and residential building surface growth as 
found in Haer et al. (2019). The household representatives per new residential building 
surface area can decide to reduce their risk by elevating their property, which is the most 
cost-efficient measure for new buildings. 
Affordability is tested before households can consider investing in individual adaptation 
measures. An expenditure cap definition of affordability is used, similar to insurance. 
However, as these are long-term investments that have benefits over time, but high 
initial investment costs, adjustments are made. It is assumed that households can fund 
the investment through a personal loan with 15% interest over 5 years. The annual loan 
payment is used to test the affordability (de Ruig et al., 2021). 
If the options are deemed affordable, each group (existing and new unprotected house-
holds) have the choice between two strategies;
 Strategy 1: implement disaster risk reducing measures; or
 Strategy 2: do nothing.
This choice is determined based on equation B.3, which calculates the subjective 
discounted expected utility (DEU), which goes as follows:
The DEU model is calculated for strategy s. The variables D, β, γ, W, p, and i and the general 
utility function U(x) are similar to those in Equation B.1. The Net Present Value (NPVs) is the 
sum of the wealth Wt and the (reduced) damages Di,t,s over the lifespan of either measure 
T, discounted to the present value using discount rate r. The discount rate is the pure time 
preference for residents and is assumed to be 3%, following Tol (2011). The investment 
costs C0,s are $100 per m2 for dry-floodproofing, and $45 per m2 for elevation (considering 
it only applied to new buildings). Following up the affordability metric, the investments are 
spread over 5 years through a personal loan with 15% interest, as an annual loan payment 
Cannual,s. For Strategy 2 without action, the NPVs contains full perceived damages and no 
investment costs. 
B.1.2.3	 Governments	–	large	scale	adaptation
Governments have the ability to adapt by raising protection standards (i.e., 5-, 10-, 25-, 
50-, 100-, 250-, 500-, and 1,000-year) each year per county. The initial fluvial protection 
standards are taken from the FLOPROS database (Scussolini et al., 2016). A 30-year protec-
(B.3)
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tion level is assumed for the coastal protection standards5 (Hallegatte et al., 2013a). During 
the setup, these protection levels are matched with water levels to estimate an initial dike 
height. Protection standards are increased by increasing dike heights for rivers and coasts 
for that region. The height increase is determined by using water levels associated with 
different return periods to reach the necessary protection level. In addition, if dikes are 
not upgraded over time, protection levels can decrease due to sea level rise and climate 
change effects. 
The decision to increase dike heights is based on a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) approach, 
whereby the present value of investment and maintenance costs are weighted against the 
present value of benefits from adaptation over time, or mathematically: 
Here, NPVPSi is the net present value of investing in dike heights associated to a protection 
standard PSi, calculated as the sum of each grid cell n for a specific county and over the 
lifespan of a dike L, assumed at 100 years (Aerts, 2018). The benefits over time Bt are the 
different between the reduction of EAD (EADred) between the new protection standard 
and the current protection standard current. Similarly, the maintenance costs Ct are the 
difference between the new and current protection standard PScurrent. Lastly, C0 are the 
investment costs, the discount rate r assumed at 4% and time t in years. The maintenance 
costs are assumed at $0.1x106 per km and investment costs are assumed at $8x106 per 
length (km) per height (m)(Aerts, Botzen, et al., 2013). The protection standard with the 
highest NPV is chosen, or if none of the protection standard have a positive NPV, nothing 
is done instead. 
B.1.3 Calibration and validation
Data availability of flood adaptation behavior for calibration or validation have been one 
of the more difficult challenges for coupled agent-based flood risk models (Aerts, Botzen, 
et al., 2018). Most studies use structural validation, whereby internal behavioral rules are 
validated, but outcome validation (i.e., the validation of modelling outcomes) still proves to 
be difficult. For this chapter, the flood risk and behavioral parts of the model are calibrated, 
after which an outcome validation was conducted using FEMA’s NFIP redacted claims 
(FEMA, 2020). For the validation, a historic time-series is run from 2000 to 2018, were 9 of 
the most significant storms are simulated, as seen in table B.2. The observed insurance 
damage payouts and premium incomes are then compared with the simulated damage 
5 While some have aimed to determine coastal protection standards based on GDP correlations, this is often 
not realistic for the US as found by Hallegatte (2013) and others (Nicholls & Cazenave, 2010; Nicholls, 2004).
(B.4)
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payouts and premium incomes. 
B.1.3.1	 Flood	risk	model	calibration
First, as stated by Ward et al. (2015), global-scale flood risk models have limits compared 
to local-scale models. In order to get a more accurate outcome, the flood risk model is 
rescaled to the NFIP redacted claims database. First, the storms from table B.2 were selected 
in the over 2 million claims from the NFIP redacted claims database (hurricane Katrina and 
Sandy were excluded as their damage was primarily caused by a storm surge and external 
factors such as collapsing levees). The counties that represent 90% of all damages were 
selected, and run in the flood risk model with the associated return periods as shown in 
table B.2. Subsequently, the damage as reported in the NFIP redacted claims data for the 










Aug. 2005 Hurricane Katrina 166,790 16,258 97,474 250
Sep. 2017 Hurricane Harvey 76,257 8,909 116,823 100
Oct. 2012 Superstorm Sandy 132,360 8,804 66,517 500





26,976 2,468 91,507 500
Sep. 2004 Hurricane Ivan 28,154 1,608 57,097 250




30,671 1,105 36,028 100
Sep. 2018 Hurricane Florence n.a. n.a. n.a. 1000
*The return periods were estimated through a variety of sources (Doran et al., 2009; Elsner, Jagger, 
& Tsonis, 2006; Emanuel, 2017; FEMA, 2005; Kelly, 2001; Lin, Kopp, Horton, & Donnelly, 2016; NOAA, 
2017; Suro, 2011; Van Der Wiel et al., 2017; Wang & Manausa, 2005).
Table B.2 | An overview of the storms that are included in the historic time series with their associat-
ed NFIP statistics on the number of paid losses, the amount paid and the average loss paid. 
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7 resulting factors is used as the total rescaling factor, as seen in table B.3. The rescaling 
factor of 0.585 is used in the flood risk model to prevent an overestimation of the damages 
from floods. 
B.1.3.2	 Mandatory	insurance	compliance	calibration
Similarly, the expenditure cap that is used for affordability is often an assumed percentage 
in the literature. Therefore, expenditure cap was used to internalize the compliance to the 
mandatory share. The Congressional Budget Office (2017) shows that the average annual 
NFIP premiums range from $420 to $1,330. Assuming a poverty line of around $17,000 for 
a two-person household, we assume an expenditure cap of 7.5% to be the maximum. 
Therefore, the setup of the model was run for three levels of expenditure cap (2.5%, 5% and 
7.5%) with 50 repetitions. The average amount of policies per county are then correlated 
with the amount of policies per county from the nationwide database in Czajkowski et al. 
(2017). The correlation between the observed amount of policies and modelled amount of 
polices per level of expenditure cap was investigated through a Spearman’s Rho correla-
tion test. Identified linear relationships between the variables justify the use of a correlation 
test. Spearman’s Rho is preferred over Pearson since our data are not normally distributed 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p=0.000 for all relevant variables) and includes outliers. The results 
can be found in table B.4. The correlation is found strongest for an expenditure cap of 7.5%, 
which is used throughout the model. The insurance expenditure cap is also included in the 
supplementary sensitivity analysis. 
Event Observed damage Simulated damage Rescale factor
Hurricane Harvey 4.48E+10 2.58E+10 1.739
Hurricane Ike 7.20E+9 2.60E+10 0.277
Louisiana severe storms and 
flooding
3.78E+9 3.99E+9 0.946
Hurricane Ivan 1.34E+10 1.44E+10 0.930
Hurricane Irene 1.95E+9 4.15E+9 0.470
Tropical Storm Allison 6.02E+9 1.93E+10 0.311
Hurricane Florence 4.95E+9 1.51E+9 3.279
Total 0.585
Table B.3 | An overview of the different hurricanes with observed damages, simulated damages and 




In the period of 2000 to 2018, some of the most expensive storms have hit the U.S. While 
the NFIP had close to no debt in 2000, the borrowing limit of $30.4 billion was reached 
in 2017 after which congress cancelled $16 billion (Horn & Webel, 2019). To this day, the 
debt is around $20.5 billion (Horn & Webel, 2019). As an output-validation exercise a 
historical time-series was run and compared with the NFIP observed data on unloaded 
premium income and damage payouts. Table B.3 shows the nine storms and associated 
return periods that were simulated. In addition, the model also ran stochastic flood events 
from the GLOFRIS coastal and fluvial inundation model. For the nine storms, similar to the 
calibration of the flood risk model, NFIP’s redacted claims database was used to select 
the counties that represent 90% of the total event damage. The model was run for 200 
repetitions. 
As seen in Figure B.2, on average the model preforms well, but there are three noticeable 
patterns: 1) There is a steady increase in premium income found in the observed data from 
2000 to about 2008, which is not found in the modelled results. The observed increase is 
likely caused by the awareness of extreme events such as tropical storm Allison or hurricane 
Katrina (Browne & Hoyt, 2000), or urbanization and population growth in high risk zones. 2) 
The stochastic “background” flood events, in years without a hardcoded event, are relatively 
high in terms of damage payouts compared to the observed data. As the stochastic flood 
events are modelled in addition to the hard coded events, a relative overestimation of 
baseline storms is expected. 3) Three extreme events are underestimated by the model, 
namely hurricane Katrina, Sandy and Harvey. Hurricanes, and primarily the storm surges, 
are still underestimated in many (global) flood models, with GLOFRIS being no exception. 
In addition, these events each had particular characteristics that caused the observed 
damages to be so extensive. For example, the levees collapsed in New Orleans during 
hurricane Katrina, hurricane Harvey caused extended periods of rain in the same location, 
and hurricane Sandy had specific bathymetry conditions that caused a devastating storm 
surge. Such specific event characteristics are not included in the inundation and require 
a very detailed study to be able to reproduce it – which is not the aim of this chapter. 
Despite the time-series not being able to capture the period of 2000 to 2018 in the upmost 
accuracy, we believe the outcomes are within an acceptable range and average future 
simulations will give useful insights on the dynamics between households, governmental 
adaptation and the NFIP. 
Table B.4 | Results of the Spearman’s Rho tests on the relation between the observed amount of 
policies in the Czajkowski et al. (2017) dataset and the simulated amount of polices for each of the 
expenditure cap values
Expenditure cap 2.50% 5% 7.50%
Coefficient 0.626 0.668 0.679




Figure B.3 shows the modelling results for the RCP4.5 climate change scenario coupled 
with the SSP2 socio-economic scenario, for 2030. Figure B.4-5 and table B.5 show model-
ling results for the RCP8.5 climate change scenario coupled with the SSP5 socio-economic 





























Simulation of 9 historically
expensive storms
Damage payouts − Model prediction
Damage payouts − Observed by FEMA
Premium income − Model prediction
















Figure B.2 | A historical time-series for damage payouts and premium income. Each of the hardcod-








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.5 | The total flood risk societal costs over the period 2020 to 2050 are the sum of uncov-
ered total risk (i.e., [B] covered residential risk subtracted from [A] total risk), [C] insurance premium 
expenses, [D] governmental flood protection investment costs, and [E] household flood-proofing 
investment costs. Values are expressed as present values ($bn 2020, 4% discount rate) and given 
relative to the baseline scenario (i.e., current NFIP and reactive government). Green indicates a 





















































































































[$bn] [$bn] [$bn] [$bn] [$bn] [$bn]
Baseline




$44 $68 $150 $7.4 $735
Relative to baseline




-$2.9 -$2.1 +$99 -$1.7 -$3.0
Relative to baseline




-$15 -$23 +$0.2 +$3.9 -$17
Relative to baseline




-$19 -$30 +$99 +$0.9 -$20
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Appendix B
B.3 Supplementary sensitivity analysis
Tables B.6-9 show the results of the sensitivity analysis. A one-at-a-time sensitivity analysis 
has been conducted for the variables: Expenditure cap for insurance premiums, expendi-
ture cap for DRR investments, loan interest rates and government investment costs. The 
sensitivity analysis is run for RCP4.5 with SSP2 as this is purely to show the robustness of 
the model. 
Table B.6 shows the outcomes with changes in the insurance premium expenditure 
cap for households. The benchmark in section 3.2 showed 7.5% correlated best with 
the observed data. Reducing the expenditure cap clearly shows the impact on the total 
share of households with insurance premiums, with decreases of up to 15% and 42% for 
an expenditure cap of 5.0% and 2.5% respectively. This is largely fueled by an increase in 
household affordability. Other variables are only slightly influenced. As the expenditure 
cap of insurance premium is benchmarked on the observed data, we are confident in the 
used benchmark of 7.5%. 
Table B.7 shows the outcomes with changes in the DRR expenditure cap for households. 
As expected, increasing the expenditure cap will result in more households investing in 
DRR, up to 54% for an expenditure cap of 7.5%, and consequently reduce residential risk, 
up to 20%. While this is substantial, most variables changes are relatively uniform between 
scenarios, and should not impact any of the major conclusions of the chapter.
Table B.8 shows the outcomes with changes in loan interest rates for households. Within 
the model, loans are used to fund DRR investment for households. Increasing/decreasing 
the loan interest rate will decrease/increase the share of households that invested in DRR. 
The impact on the overall modelling outcomes is relatively low – residential risk only 
changes up to 4%. 
Table B.9 shows the outcomes with changes to the governmental investment costs of 
large-scale adaptation such as dikes. The investment costs appear to have only minor 
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